

The
American Journal of
ECONOMICS
and
SOCIOLOGY

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VOLUME 2 JANUARY, 1943 NUMBER 2

Published QUARTERLY under grant from the Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation in the interest of constructive synthesis in the social sciences

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY is published quarterly, in October, January, April and July. Published at North Queen Street and McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Executive offices, 32 East Twenty-ninth Street, New York. Subscription, \$3.00 a year. Single copies, \$1.00. Checks payable to the American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. Correspondence concerning contributions should be addressed to the editor at the Journal's offices. Correspondence concerning subscriptions and other business matters should be addressed to the secretary at the Journal's offices. The editor and the members of the board of editors do not necessarily endorse opinions and statements in signed contributions, and are not necessarily in agreement with any contributions whose publication they recommend. The members of the editorial advisory board do not necessarily endorse the Journal's orientation. Entered as second class matter at the post office at Lancaster, Pa., under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1897. Registration of title in the U. S. Patent Office pending.

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Toward a Rational Basis for Inter- national Law

By JACKSON H. RALSTON

HAS INTERNATIONAL LAW an existence? An extensive group, embracing the majority of the laymen, scoffs at the idea. Half-hearted defenders assert such law to be an established fact. Was it not laid down centuries ago by Vitoria and Grotius? Since then have not a hundred writers asserted its pre-eminence, all the way from Pufendorf, through Bynkershoek and Vattel to Oppenheim, with his many editions? Do not American Secretaries of State, British prime ministers, German chancellors, all with equal solemnity, appeal to its teachings? How, then, can its existence be questioned?

But the doubter will say that International Law as taught and practiced lacks certainty and consistency. Today it apparently teaches one thing and tomorrow another. Its foundations are laid in shifting sand. It varies according to the necessities of a nation, as such necessities are appraised by those at the head of affairs. If during the Spanish-American war our courts held that enemy fishing vessels were not to be disturbed even though their cargoes might perchance reach the enemy army, no German or English court of today would

exhibit any scruple about so deciding that the life of an opponent may be taken through starving its people as well as its army. If there be real International Law can it vary according to the whims or claimed advantages of contending parties?

These doubting Thomases point to the fact that a good half of what is called International Law relates to the laws of war, and inquire how it is possible that there can be laws regulating disorder and setting bounds which, its existence being recognized as legitimate, disorder must not pass. I recall that on one occasion a Venezuelan years ago recounted to me various infractions of human liberty indulged in by the then ostensible president (really dictator) of Venezuela, Castro. Upon my remarking rather naïvely that these things were contrary to the excellent Constitution of that country, he retorted scornfully: "What is the Constitution? It is a book." This, the critics urge, is the situation as to International Law. It is a book, without authority or reason behind it.

Pursuing the argument further, critics ask—we hasten to say without due consideration—how can there be a law without the fixation of sanctions and a court or other body to determine guilt and the measure of punishment? We will examine as objectively as we may and seek to determine if, indeed, there is an International Law, if it exists in the books of the present day, and, this failing, if there is any hope of its discovery in the future.

I

LET US DEFINE, for the purposes of this article, just what we mean by the word "law" in relation to human affairs. Can we not agree that "law" in its profound sense and as applied to men means those rules which make it possible for men to live in contact with each other while duly observing the

rights of all, and with peace as the resultant? This is all that good behavior can hope to accomplish. In this sense law sprang into effect the moment one human being encountered another. It was born of their respective rights as mortal beings to live on a plane of equality. Whatever authentic rules of behavior grew out of this situation we may regard as law in a true sense. Later came customs or legislation over many things having little or no relation to this fundamental. Many of these were violative of the primary law as we have just described it. These violations of the primordial system have led to ultimate human distresses.

But true law is based not alone upon the abstract equality of human beings. It finds its foundations and limitations in human nature, and any custom or purported law ignoring them cannot bring peace. To illustrate: by the law of our existence love begets love and hate breeds hate; injury results very often in a desire for revenge and order is set at defiance. Injustice, directly or indirectly, injures even its perpetrator. These and the like principles of conduct set bounds controlling or overruling any express written form of law. They govern individual action. How best to give free vent to these laws and others of like importance, or to prevent their deleterious workings, is the object of human regulations. Minor rules are often given the name of law, but are usually nothing of the kind from any fundamental point of view. But if and when they do not undertake to contradict human experience they serve a useful purpose. When they deny the teachings of experience, then they prove largely inoperative because they are not veritable laws.

All this is true as to the relations between a man and his neighbor, also of groups of men. Their fundamental character is unchanged. The right of man to exist and preserve his equality in relations with his fellows remains the same, however many times the small group becomes the larger

nation. For the operative principle is that the state is but man enlarged, not changed in nature because a million are concerned rather than the two with whom we started. It will be argued that a mass of men is something more than individual men, and that their union calls into existence elements not before recognized. But, after all, whether the crowd is exalted or degraded by its actions when working in mass, the fact remains that it can exhibit no element not contained in the individual.

It is true that new situations are constantly arising and that we are accustomed to saying that law is developing. What we mean is that our knowledge of law is growing through new experiences. The fundamentals remain the same. The human element is ever present, and the results of its action are the same, save as to size or location. We may compare its quality with that of any element, iron, for instance. Ever this remains iron, whatever shape it may take. Union with other elements may qualify its action. In this respect only the human element differs from it. That may be changed in situation but not in characteristics. Ever, as we have stated, the rights of the individual and his response to pressure are unaltered. Union with other men does not affect the response. Love answers to love and hate to hate, and revenge is likely to follow injury.

By studying the relations between men and the reason for their dealing one with another—the rights to be observed and the wrongs to be avoided—and allowing ourselves to be helped by experience, we have attained a certain degree of perfection in the law as between man and man. We discover that that law most nearly approaches perfection which recognizes the right of the individual to exist uncontrolled so long as he does not interfere with the well-being of his neighbor. There cannot be one law for the powerful and another for the weak. With the centuries we become more

careful of the equal rights of the individuals. We discover that when another course is taken disorder creeps into the state and in the end all are injured. Whether we know it or not, pragmatism determines what is right or wrong. Centuries have brought us to a point where these are the ideas we unconsciously seek to follow.

Briefly I have undertaken to state what may be regarded as fundamental law. Of course there are many minor rules of action dictated by written law or custom controlling the lesser matters of conduct, and there is adjective law, useful and necessary to put the substantive law into action. And it will not be overlooked that as to the important matters, finding that certain courses of action are injurious, mankind is sedulous to denounce the evil by written law, even though the breaking of rules of natural law ever carries an automatic certainty of punishment or retribution, not always obvious to limited human intelligence. The truth is that just as a violation of the laws of physical health results in punishment without the necessity of denunciation or prison for the offender, so the laws of moral health operate. To give an extreme illustration: nobles of old who denied human equality by persecuting their serfs or villeins lived lives of greater anxiety and torment than pertains to the citizens of today. They did not know that their procedure carried its punishment. As to many things parallel in nature, we are even today grossly ignorant.

II

BUT, YOU MAY ASK, what has this to do with International Law? When men began to talk about the Law of Nations—to give International Law its earlier title—the writers ignored what had been learned about the equal rights of all men, and began with the state as the unit of their thought. They were, perhaps, most often the representatives of the prince

whose advisers they were. They created as the object of their study a wholly artificial structure, something having no palpable existence. Their Law of Nations was unreal from its very inception. They failed to observe that a state was not a creature for reward or punishment. If on the face of things a fine were levied upon it, as after an unsuccessful war, this could only be paid by the persons gathered under its name. The punishment was upon the individuals. Human beings, united in a large body called the state, were not the objects of the solicitude of the writers. The well-being of the members of the mass was ignored. All that experience, in court and out, had taught mankind as to the rules of living together justly was forgotten or set aside as useless. If within the state the rights of men and the benefits of orderly life were found to forbid the exercise of private slaughter because of the ensuing social consequences, this meant nothing to the servants of potentates writing the Law of Nations.

Although private oppression, murder and theft had led to all manner of evil in the private relations of life and were contrary to the equality of all mankind before the law, it was somehow silently concluded that the teachings of so many experiences running over many centuries could be ignored by the leaders of nations. By some mysterious process of alchemy rights and wrongs as between individuals reversed their meanings as between nations, and the doctrine of state sovereignty appeared. Even Grotius, who is supposed to have introduced ideas of clemency into the Law of Nations, maintained the right of the conqueror to do as he would with the lives of those whom he had overcome, reduce the conquered to slavery or exterminate them, at his pleasure, although he advised the mildest possible measures. Grotius founded his position as to this absolute right upon the practices of the ancient Hebrews, backed, as he believed, by the

approval of the Almighty. He ignored the fact that in all propriety the Law of Nations, if indeed it was to be called a law, could only mean the extension to the larger bodies of that which had been found true for individuals.

The nature of Sovereignty was well shown by the remark attributed to Louis XIV—"the State—it is I." It was necessary that the State, regarded as above and beyond all law, should be draped with a new lot of attributes pertaining to Sovereignty, such as Independence and Equality. As a personal possibility mankind, for untold generations, had been repudiating Sovereignty, for this meant that any man had the right to attack his fellows for any or no reason, and this, if it were permitted, might mean the destruction of the human race. But our learned Internationalists accepted this destructive thing and vindicated the right of the State to determine the extent of its own rights and wrongs, with the mutual right to every state of destroying any of its fellows. Rarely it occurred to the proponents of the Law of Nations to challenge the existence of Sovereignty or to point out that its exercise was inconsistent with the existence of such a thing as law, either for the individual or for the nation. They have almost universally failed to discover that the exercise of what is regarded as a national right was antagonistic to the existence of a Society of Nations. Innumerable battlefields with their wounded and dead have meant nothing, meriting not the slightest examination into the causes of the slaughter. They have not known that to tolerate such struggles was to deny life to the science they professed.

Experts in what is called the Law of Nations have not noted that the most common cause of killings among human beings was to be found in the desire of a man to possess himself of something regarded as desirable but under the control of another; nor that the prime motive of many modern wars was of precisely the same nature. The fundamental cause

could not be otherwise, since States are but numerous individuals working together and their components are stirred to action solely by the emotions affecting men as human beings. These experts have not perceived, and for this they may not be entitled to special criticism, that private persons are permitted to take the gifts of nature for their personal benefit—not for that of their country or mankind. No comment, therefore, has been excited by the fact that quickly after a country had been conquered its lands passed into the control of a few of the most influential persons among the conquering nations and the majority could only be losers. Many times the greater power has hectored the lesser and often acted in an oppressive way. We believe that the United States has not been guilty of such a course of conduct to the same extent as has Great Britain, for example, but the veriest tyro in history can call up cases in which American action has been unvirtuous, to express the fact mildly.

Stealings from another of power, territory and natural wealth have very rarely, if ever, called for any special condemnation from the international student as being violations of law, existent none the less even if not embodied in a code. Sometimes they are denounced by members of the State offended against, but not upon the fundamental grounds we have very briefly indicated. The doing of a wrongful act by one nation is altogether too often held to be a precedent for the commission of a like one by another nation which later finds such action to its interest or rather that of the controlling fraction of its population.

III

WE HAVE SPOKEN OF independence and equality as being among the attributes ascribed by International Law to a State. Again let us resort to fundamentals as affecting the individual. Is any human being independent? No man is

or can be wholly independent economically. To an extent increasing with the growth of civilization he must rely for his very life upon working with his fellows. The existence of anything approaching independence denotes a low grade of civilization. The home of a man of cultivation contains the products of every part of the globe; otherwise it is lacking in some element of comfort or luxury. To furnish his breakfast table, half-naked natives may have labored in the jungles of Africa. Comparison of his condition with that of the African will demonstrate his dependence upon specimens of his fellowman whom he is tempted to underrate or despise. The walls of his home may exhibit the highest specimens of art from the ateliers of Europe, thus contributing to his comfort or pleasure. No, the individual is not economically independent, and when gathered in numbers does not change his original character. No nation can live in independence of others.

Political independence has no meaning save it be found in the desire to carry on the operations of government without dictation from another group of men. This is a desire for autonomy, not independence. Its workings do not require that a nation limit commerce and intercourse with its fellows, but only that local matters should be controlled by the people of the limited jurisdiction. Interference with commerce constitutes interference with the people of other nations and is not merely the establishment of rules over one's own citizenry or simple autonomy.

Customary International Law does not as yet teach that custom-houses or other impediments to the free intercourse of peoples are against all law, either national or international. In saying this we again refer to true law and not what the writers with unconscious sarcasm call "positive" law. By this they signify the law which may be laid down by the books, and not the all-controlling law which, consciously or

unconsciously, governs international as well as intra-national conduct. Besides teaching that nations are endowed with the unrealizable things called sovereignty and independence, we are further told that all states are equal. True, they should be in all that pertains to their unhampered right to existence and equal treatment when confronting the application of law. Like human beings of which they are composed, they are unequal, as are their components. Some states are subordinate to others. They vary in size, in intelligence, in wealth, in ability to govern their present and future. Equality is but a word, to which the smaller states attach a meaning quite different from anything known in human affairs. To give equal voice in a gathering of nations to a state of one million souls and one of a hundred millions is to deny equality to the human beings composing the body of the states. The state should be regarded as the sum of the units of which it is composed. Thus considered, the so-called equality of states becomes but a shield for the grossest inequality of the human units, in the case suggested of one to one hundred. International Law asks us to accept as a reality something which has never existed on sea or land.

Let us sum up briefly the so-called International Law of today. It is not true law as relating to the principles of human action, for it is not founded on any idea of preserving the rights of man. It ignores the principles which govern human action as a basis for the promulgation of human law. All that experience in the affairs of individual men had taught about right and wrong, the advisable and the inadvisable, the possible and the impossible, is forgotten. Instead of being built upon the foundations of human experience, the structure has been laid in some aerial manner and with qualities assumed that can be proved to be non-existent, such as sovereignty, independence and equality. With every opportunity of observing that theft of power and pelf have led to

conspicuous and disastrous results among men who should be living together peacefully in groups, it has not occurred to its votaries to couple cause and effect. They have assumed that which exists to be its sufficient justification and as furnishing a sure guide to successive violations of basic laws of human existence. To them a million dead in war are simply a million dead, suggesting nothing calling for examination into the fundamental law violated. Bookish international law has devoted half of its content to the laws of war, without reflecting that in a true sense there can never be a law of war any more than a declaration that theft and murder are legitimate and shall be subjected to certain rules, and when any attempt is made to follow them, such things, crimes in the individual, are commendable or at least not condemnable.

Some slight excuse for the use of the words "International Law" in connection with present conditions may nevertheless be found. For instance, the term is usually applied to the ordinary rules governing ambassadors and consuls and their reception, recognition of states and their responsibility, control of the seas, etc. Other matters receive attention by the courts or arbitral tribunals or otherwise as International Law. Examining, we will find that such law, as far as declared and sound, simply follows out on a wider scale what the courts have pronounced proper to be enforced as between man and man. This has been shown many times in disputes over boundaries, measure of damages, agency, interpretation of treaties (akin to disputes over statutes), and the like. Whenever International Law has undertaken to lay aside the injunctions of municipal law as between individuals, its pronouncements have lacked the sanction of sound reason, usually are essentially immoral, and have led to deleterious results. When we say "immoral" we mean that they have invaded the rights of individual citizens or subjects.

We know that the desire to obtain or maintain control of natural resources offers a constant occasion for armed conflict, and that tariffs and other provisions hampering trade and intercourse between nations lead indirectly to the same condition. Does the writer of today upon what passes as International Law ever examine as to whether these things are in accordance with true law? He will brush the question aside as belonging to economics and not law. Should he not examine as to whether, though they are called "economic," they invade and defy what he should pass upon as law? If he does not, is he shirking his plain duty? When men die because of a departure from a state of health between nations, can he not see that some law of international application has been violated, and it is his duty to examine into the matter? What would we say of the physician who utterly forgot to consider which law of health his patient had violated, if for no other reason than to caution him as to his future conduct?

We are forced to the conclusion that the man in the street is not without reason doubting the existence of any International Law, looking as he must to the language of the books on the subject and finding them bare of any solid foundation or of any critical examination of international situations.

IV

IS IT POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP a law for the future which will discard the manifest blunders of the past? The undertaking may seem a fanciful one unless we observe the manner in which what is regarded as law has been uncovered in other directions, and institute a sort of parallel. Let us take, for instance, the subject of what is known as Corporation Law. This title, based upon developments of the past in municipal law, has grown immensely within a few years, and may be regarded as fairly established. We may confidently say that its primary unit is not the corporation as a going concern

but the stockholder, and whenever necessary Corporation Law reverts to him. It was created to aid him. With this beginning, the principles which have surrounded the stockholder have been given a development suitable to the changed conditions of modern life. All this may be regarded as a flowering of the law, its roots having been planted firmly in fertile soil and its growth having followed a natural course. It has taken advantage of the learning of the past and present.

What must be the basis of what the future is to regard as International Law? Although laws affecting relationships between men are far from perfect, principles have been found workable and should be transferred to the international field. Not all ideas followed by what we consider civilized nations can be accepted without wide reservations. Concentrated control of natural resources, usually represented by the inclusive word "land," has caused suffering and degradation within the nation and war between states. In early Greek history a man of position measured his wealth in acres and slaves. Today the man who owns land still has control of his fellows through the fact that if they would work it must be upon land. He can refuse permission to use it unless his terms are met.

But there are other rights so generally recognized that they may be called "natural." A man is entitled to live an orderly life without interference by his neighbors. This right he should carry with him when he joins his fellows in such a combination as a state. Individuals who interfere with such an existence are subjected to censure and, if apparent need for it exists, to punishment. Nations without judicial or other checks are permitted to attack and thus limit the rights of other aggregations of individuals.

We believe and through courts seek to maintain that that which a man creates is his and in its possession he is not to be disturbed. Likewise, that which he obtains through ex-

change with others. Offenses against such possession are punished by law and universally condemned. But internationally, the two attempts to protect a nation against robbery, the World Court and the League of Nations, have fallen into disuse or have been repudiated by certain of the larger powers. Thus far, for practical purposes, this requirement of domestic law has been rejected when sought to be applied on the larger field.

Another fundamental principle of domestic law is that no man can properly be a judge in his own cause. Any nation becomes its own judge when it goes to war and such procedure the International Law of today approves.

Within the nation we maintain that no man has a right violently to prevent another individual from dealing with a third person. He may be summarily haled into court for any attempt in this direction. But internationally nations through tariffs and other instrumentalities and by their officers interfere with their own citizens and those of other countries when they seek to trade together. Still more do nations indulge in a like interference in time of war by blockades and the strewing of mines and the like. These violations of natural right indulged in on a national scale escape any condemnation.

Experience has proved that an agreement entered into as the result of duress is assailable or void. Not so with penalties exacted after a war by the conqueror from the defeated. The loser must in all circumstances recognize the solemnity of an act which as between private individuals would not be so treated.

If the laws between nations were based upon such principles as we have mentioned and which operate among men, at least a beginning would be made toward establishing the law between nations.

The points we have just mentioned and others which might

be elaborated will furnish the bases of a true International Law, and such a law is awaiting our study. Our teachers think they have studied it in the past. The common man, feeling the lack of all such study, though not recognizing what is the difficulty, may well scoff at the idea that the thing itself can exist.

This sums up to the position that from now on it is our duty to check against experience everything advanced as International Law—the experience of men in the ordinary relations of life, in the courts, and between nations.

Let us cease slaying our millions on the battlefield because we fail to realize the close connection between economics and law and that the violation of economic law is at the same time violation of International Law. Let us understand that the instructor who discusses diplomatic etiquette and ignores the fact that men are dying by thousands, because of ignorance to which he has contributed, is straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.

The writer who thinks that only that is law which can be enforced through sanctions to be found in some statute book writes himself down as profoundly ignorant. True law carries its own sanctions, none the less certain because silent. All mankind can do is to make the laws known, and study and perhaps succeed in giving a little more obvious life to the punishments that follow the violation of law. We will not forget that the law of gravitation, for instance, makes no noise about its operations and they are none the less certain. Thus it is with the laws that govern the operations of men. They are inexorable. They are true natural law.

But why now pursue our study further? Is it not manifest that while there is a real Law of Nations it possesses existence only so far as it is based upon the experiences of men in their individual and group relations? Never can there be a true International Law starting at the top with

the nation as the unit. There must be a thorough re-writing based upon principles of proved right. Such a new approach is not made today.

Let us no longer ask the man in the street to pin his faith upon a ghostly tissue of imaginings, pointing their shadowy fingers to the ways of destruction. For even today it is sufficient for him to remark "By their fruits ye shall know them" and reject the teachings of the learned. But this may not be true of the future if we have enough strength of character to reform.*

* [EDITOR'S NOTE: A fuller development of Mr. Ralston's argument for his position and a thorough discussion of that position appear in his recent book, "A Quest for International Order," Washington, D. C., John Byrne Co., 1941.]

The Appeal of Communist Ideology

By HARRY GUNNISON BROWN

I

WE LIVE IN A "CAPITALISTIC" country. And there is, at the present time, no indication that the Communist Party—or the Socialist Party either—has the allegiance of more than a very few voters. There is, indeed, only one country, Soviet Russia, in which either communism or socialism can be said to be dominant. To discuss, therefore, the "appeal" of the ideology of either of these "isms" may appear to some as altogether ridiculous.

But such discussion might have seemed ridiculous in Russia, too, in the days before World War I and even during the first year or two of that war. And even if the Communist Party, as such, is still anathema in a particular country, yet many of its tenets may be widely, if nevertheless vaguely, believed in. They may be believed in without consciousness of inconsistency by thousands or millions of persons who do not know precisely what communism is—though they are sure that they are not themselves Communists—and who do not realize that many of the inchoate ideas which seem to them reasonable and just are of the essence of the communistic philosophy.

It is worth while to note, in this connection, that communism and socialism are in many respects the same. Both envisage an economic system operated by the State. Protagonists of both contemplate an economic régime in which private ownership of productive goods and enjoyment of the income from them by their owners are prohibited. And, indeed, the terms "communism" and "socialism" have often enough been used interchangeably. Karl Marx has been called "the father of modern socialism." Yet he was the

author (with Friedrich Engels) of "The Communist Manifesto." Russia should probably be classed as a "socialist" rather than a "communist" State, since it has departed from its earlier ideal or plan of substantially equal incomes for each and now purposely gives higher pay to skilled workers than to the unskilled and very appreciably larger income to persons of high technical training. If, thus, the term "communism" usually conveys an idea of more insistence on equality of incomes and if, in recent decades, it has had in it more of a suggestion of the advocacy of radical and revolutionary change—as distinguished from evolutionary and gradual reform brought about through the ballot—these differences are nevertheless not greatly important for our present purpose.

Perhaps one of the conditions favorable to either of these "isms" is the widespread tendency to rely on government: if there is anything wrong "pass a law about it" and so "fix it." Under communism—or socialism—government operates the entire economic system. Government owns and manages all productive capital, determines the amount of new construction of capital, if any, and, in doing so, dictates the amount of saving. All workers are employees of government and the terms and conditions of work are dictated by government. If one finds the idea appealing that, whatever is wrong, the government ought to "fix it," it may not be too hard for him to accept a system under which government definitely *manages* or *runs* the entire economic system.

The believer in a system of free and essentially unregulated industry, on the other hand, must be ready to put his faith in more or less automatic and impersonal forces. To do so, he must have some sort of concept of such forces. The system of free industry, the price system, what is often called "capitalism," depends for its operation on such forces. This system of free industry, "capitalism" or "the free enterprise system," operates through the lure of price. Higher

prices for particular goods and services tempt men to produce those goods and services as a means of securing larger incomes. And lower prices in a particular line discourage men from continuing in it. Higher wages in one area than in another lure men to the former and higher income on capital in one area than in another induces savers to invest their savings where the yield on these savings is thus relatively large. Indeed, the hope of deriving some income from capital is in many cases the incentive that makes men save it.

It is through the lure of price, too, that the public is protected against excessively high prices. For, since relatively high prices for particular goods lure men into the production of those goods, they increase the competition to sell them and thus tend to prevent further rise of their prices and may, even, bring about a reduction.

The believer in the virtues of the free enterprise price system does not hold, however, that government has *no* economic functions. He does hold that the price system cannot operate successfully *unless* government maintains the conditions essential for such operation. There must be a degree of security against robbery and against violation of contract. There must be—or should be—protection against monopoly and against unfair methods of competition which tend towards monopoly or which merely mislead and injure consumers. There must be provision for highways. There must be standards of weight and length which are generally recognized. There must be (at any rate, it is very important that there should be) a stable monetary system. Given such conditions—and it is certainly a proper responsibility of government to see that they are present—the price system will work without continual governmental oversight and regulation of each specific operation.

If one were to compare the State or nation, as a social body, with the individual, he might liken the operation of the price

system—through which the members of the society are fed and clothed—with the operation of the alimentary canal and of the arteries, veins, heart and lungs in the individual body. These organs do depend for their proper operation on the intelligence of the brain. The individual must not consume poisonous mushrooms or the germs of botulism, and he must see that the proper remedial measures are adopted in case a vein or artery is severed or if appendicitis, pneumonia or cancer occurs. The conscious mind must try to protect these organs and their operation from injuries, whether produced externally or internally. The conscious mind must, indeed, endeavor to secure and maintain the conditions necessary for the effective operation of this largely automatic system of supplying the body's needs. But the conscious mind does not have to direct the flow of gastric juice or bile, the peristaltic motion of the intestines, the beating of the heart or the expansion and contraction of the lungs.

This analogy between the individual and the State is certainly not perfect but it is, I think, close enough to be helpful. In our present society there is a large area—the economic one—in which it is necessary only that the State provide favorable conditions and in which, if favorable conditions are provided, the forces of demand and supply will operate automatically and impersonally, and without specific State direction in each separate transaction, to bring about the production and the essentially fair distribution of needed goods. Why should we not, therefore, rely as largely as may be on this automatic operation of the free enterprise system rather than impose the burden of specific detailed direction and control upon government?

But if we are to get anything like the best results it is desirable that government do its part in maintaining certain more or less essential conditions. And it is important that we come to understand just what these conditions are and

just what government has to do to maintain them. Such understanding requires some knowledge of economic principles. The task of directing every detail of our economic life may not, indeed, be a simple task, in practice, for government to assume. But to the minds of the economically naïve, it is apparently much easier and simpler to propose that "government take over the means of production" than to reach an understanding of just what conditions are essential for the most successful operation of the system of free, competitive industry and what, specifically, government must do to realize those conditions. Here, almost certainly, is one of the reasons why communistic—and socialistic—ideology has so much appeal as, directly and consciously or indirectly and unconsciously, it does have.

In the same connection it is to be noted that each pressure group (or its spokesmen and representatives) tries to bend government to its own purposes of abstracting wealth from other groups. The pressure group in question may be the beneficiaries of tariff restrictions; or they may be wheat or corn or tobacco farmers seeking guaranteed prices or special benefit payments or crop-restricting quotas to hold up prices; or they may be persons over sixty years of age—or merely over fifty!—seeking tax levies through which they may be supported in high comfort at the expense of others. The price system or system of free enterprise is impersonal. In it, when it is operated consistently with the principles on which it is generally defended, one prospers by giving goods and services to the community, goods and services that are wanted, and not by propagandizing and by bargaining with other pressure groups to win votes for special favors. What, now, if each interested group is thus to propagandize and to bargain with other groups, to an increasing extent as time goes on, and with less and less realization of the advantages of an automatic and impersonal system! Will not this system,

then, which indeed never has been allowed to operate at its possible best, cease almost altogether to be either automatic or impersonal? May we not, then, many of us, decide that we might as well abandon further pretense of maintaining a free enterprise system and choose to rely exclusively on government for the managing of our economic life, and so on propaganda and on continual bargaining between interested and powerful pressure groups,—or, perhaps inevitably in the end, on dictatorship?

II

ANOTHER PROBABLE REASON for the appeal of communistic—and socialistic—ideology is its apparent simplicity in regard to the explanation of inequality and to unfairness in the sharing of the product of industry. Here is an appeal to the discontented and not too economically well-lettered worker. Such a worker easily and naturally explains his unhappy state by the claim that his “boss,” or the “corporation” that employs him “doesn’t pay me what I earn.” The employer or the employing corporation—the “capitalist”—is unfairly withholding something. Therefore, “capital exploits the workers.”

In this view “capital” or “capitalism” is an inclusive term. No distinction is commonly made between capital and land. What if A does derive an income from useful capital which his own labor produced directly; or from capital which his labor produced indirectly, as in producing (say) food beyond his own needs, thus relieving another from the necessity of producing food, and enabling this other to produce that capital? And what if B derives an income from charging others for permission to make use of material resources which neither he nor anyone else produced or by charging others for location advantages that the community produced? To most Communists and Socialists, apparently, though not, of course, to all, these two different kinds of income are hardly worth distinguishing. Both are incomes from “the means

of production" and both kinds of income are characteristic of "capitalism." And it is probably true that a doctrine of economic reform which does not need to make any such distinction—fundamentally important as I believe the distinction to be—has a very real advantage in proselytizing at least the economically illiterate.

Unfortunately, the so-called educated individuals are frequently not educated in an understanding of our economic life or in the making of economic distinctions. Nevertheless they have, often, high literary ability and persuasiveness and are not infrequently persons of considerable social idealism. And so we have the phenomenon of the idealistic literary intelligentsia who become enamoured of the too simple economic philosophy of communism or socialism, who feel that thus they have become "liberals," and who then use their literary powers to instruct, in the application of such a philosophy to current events, the readers of magazines of opinion! Thus the system of free or unregimented, competitive industry becomes discredited among many of the readers of our "highbrow" periodicals as well as among persons of less intellectual pretention. And so instead of help in instituting those reforms which would make the system of free enterprise work acceptably to the common advantage, we get a strengthening of the appeal of communistic philosophy.

III

FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE APPEAL of communism to the common man is the fact that one or more of its subsidiary doctrines fall in with a very common—albeit fallacious—mode of economic reasoning. Karl Marx, for instance, writes of machinery as displacing labor and producing "an industrial reserve army." This he does without qualification, thus seeming to imply that there is a more or less permanent displacement of labor and that such displacement is to be expected under "capitalism." Thus, this philosophy,

though more pretentious and recondite in its formulation and more literate in its expression, is pretty much consistent with the seemingly cruder philosophy of those workmen who have smashed newly invented and constructed machines as the supposed condition making for unemployment.

The fact is that invention and the use of improved machinery do not have any inherent tendency to decrease opportunities for employment. When new and improved machinery makes it possible to produce with half as much labor and so for \$25, clothing formerly costing \$50, the saving of \$25 to the consumer (if he does not spend most of this in buying *more clothing* than before) enables him to buy more books, paper, magazines, phonograph records or other desired goods, and thus enables more persons to have employment in these other lines. If this happy result does not occur it is presumably because the new method is so *monopolized* as to *prevent* the fall in the price of clothing which would have come under conditions of competition; and in that case the consumer does *not* have more money with which to buy other desired goods. But this is *not* an inevitable concomitant of "capitalism" and is *certainly not* inevitably associated with a system of free *competitive* industry. If government does its proper job of preventing monopolistic extortion, progress in the mechanic arts may still lead to a certain amount of individual employment dislocation and require readjustment to new conditions—e.g., the change to new lines of work when more are needed in these new lines and fewer in the old—but such progress will not bring about large, permanent unemployment.

It is much the same with the socialistic and communistic hypothesis regarding the causation of business depression. Consider the worker whose simple but woefully inadequate and misleading philosophy of exploitation is that "my boss doesn't pay me what I earn," or perhaps, more generally expressed along lines of socialistic or communistic formulation,

that "laborers produce all value but 'capitalism' regularly robs them of a part of the product." Such a worker easily may be persuaded that herein lies the explanation of recurring periods of business depression. Indeed, there is an appealing sense of the accomplishment of poetic justice in the thought that the dull business and bankruptcies suffered by the "capitalists" come as results of, and so as a sort of retribution for, their "exploitation" of their "wage slaves."

But the hypothesis is a false one, nevertheless. It is based on the idea that the wage earners are paid too little to buy back as many goods as they produce. That, supposedly, is why goods are unsalable and why prosperity inevitably ends in depression. In considering this hypothesis, let us assume, with the Communist and the Socialist, that "capitalism" does "exploit" the workers and that the latter do not have money enough to buy the goods of their production. It still does not follow that such goods could not be sold.

To illustrate, suppose that Smith and Wilcox each earns \$4,000 a year—a total of \$8,000 for both—but that Wilcox regularly picks Smith's pocket to the amount of \$3,000 a year, so that Smith has only \$1,000 left to spend and cannot buy more than a fourth as much as he produces. It certainly does not follow that there is any less demand for goods or any fewer sales or any less employment producing goods or any reduction in "prosperity." For Smith's decrease of spending power is balanced by Wilcox's increase of spending power. Though Smith must purchase less—because he had his pocket picked—by \$3,000, Wilcox can purchase \$3,000 worth more than before.

Now, however, we are told that the "capitalists" do not "spend" their money but "invest" it in producing more goods. This means, in terms of our illustration, that Wilcox does not spend for consumable goods the \$3,000 he picks from Smith's pocket but invests it. But what the protagonists of this view persistently overlook is that investing nor-

mally is spending. If Wilcox builds a barn instead of buying clothes for himself, flowers, bric-a-brac and curtains for his wife and toys for his children, his purchase of stone, mortar and lumber is indeed an investment but it is none the less spending and there is just as much labor employed in making what he buys for investment as what he might have bought for comfort and pleasure. Similarly, if he buys the stock or bonds of a corporation which in turn buys, with the proceeds, structural steel, brick, glass and lumber for a factory and hires men to build it, there is as much purchasing of goods and demand for labor as if he had instead bought luxuries for personal enjoyment and hired servants to minister to the members of his household.

In the space which may be reasonably allotted for this discussion of communist ideology, I cannot present a full and complete and detailed theory of business depression. I cannot consider every possible minor aspect of the general principle stated or meet every possible uncomprehending criticism. But I believe I have gone far enough to make fairly clear that, whether or not "capitalism exploits the workers," underpayment of the workers is not the cause of recurring business depressions.

Any satisfactory explanation of the great oscillations in business activity which we refer to as alternate prosperity and depression must give large emphasis to the phenomena of money and of bank credit. This will not be disputed, I think, by thorough and careful students of monetary and banking theory. But, if true, it means that the literary intelligentsia of communistic leanings, or any other persons of literary ability who are nevertheless untrained in the technicalities of monetary economics, are more likely to confuse their readers than to help them understand the causation of depression. The socialistic or communistic explanation appeals to these literary intelligentsia not only because it falls in with a very simple theory of exploitation of the workers but

also because it is itself simple—however seriously fallacious—and does not require, for its *apparent* understanding, tedious study of the complications of money and bank credit, complications in a technical subject that has little attraction for the literary intelligentsia type of mind. Lacking any such study and devoid of any considerable background in the principles of economics generally, they convince themselves by the seeming plausibility of their theory; and they can enjoy the pleasant feeling that their understanding of economic phenomena is superior to that of most of their readers and that their literary elaborations of this theory are helpful in spreading such understanding more widely!

IV

AN INTELLIGENT APPROACH to a comprehension of our economic system, to an appreciation of its shortcomings and to a correlative understanding of what specific changes or controls or reforms would make it operate to better advantage, is not so naïve as that of the Communist and Socialist theorists. The importance of understanding monetary theory if we would get the best results from a free enterprise system has just been discussed. To mention here but one other proposed reform in our economic system (although one which, in my opinion, is at least as fundamental and important as any other and probably most important and most fundamental), an understanding of the reasons why the rent of land should be socialized, involves some comprehension of how and why land, comprising natural resources and sites, differs from capital. If understanding is to be at all complete, there must be some comprehension of how wages are determined, how the rate of interest is determined, how the sale value of land is related to its rental value and to the rate of interest, why the value of capital is normally related to its cost of production or of duplication while the sale value of land can be arrived at only from its anticipated future

yield or rent and the interest rate by which this is capitalized, how both wages and rent are affected by the speculative holding of land out of use, etc., etc.

No doubt if and when any considerable part of the relatively sophisticated classes come to have a comprehension of these relations, the prestige of their support for public appropriation of the rental value of land will carry enough weight with those whose thinking is less subtle and critical, so that a simple and popular presentation of the issue will suffice for the latter. Such assertions as that rent is a geologically and community produced value, that its collection by private owners amounts to their charging others for *permission* to work on and to live on the earth in those locations where labor is relatively productive and life relatively pleasant, and that private enjoyment of such an income is inappropriate in a society which makes any pretense at equality of opportunity or which is defended on the ground that incomes received are in some reasonable relation to productive contribution,—such assertions seem intrinsically reasonable. These ideas and others related to them are by no means too difficult for common understanding, once they have the support of the comparatively influential and are considered with open minds. They are, indeed, easy to understand when the mind is not confused by involved and fallacious but often superficially plausible objections. Nevertheless, they are not so naïvely simple and so altogether unsophisticated as the assertion that the “bourgeoisie,” in general, as owners of the material means of production, exploit the “proletariat” or workers. Nor is the reform indicated from a study of the land question so apparently simple and its ultimate implications so little realized by its advocates as in the case of the proposal that we just “take over all the means of production and operate them for the common advantage,” or “for use and not for profit.”

No doubt an important reason for the strength of socialist

and communist ideology is the fact that we have for so long neglected to make those reforms in the system of "capitalism" which would make this system operate efficiently and fairly, as there can be no reasonable doubt that it could and would operate if thus reformed. And just because the victims of its uncorrected faults are, therefore, for the most part, relatively poor and unsophisticated and uninformed, their discontent may express itself in the more naïve proposals for reform instead of the more sophisticated ones.

Of course, there would be more hope of adequate reform of the so-called free enterprise system if such reform were definitely urged—and not, instead, opposed—by our propertied conservatives who so often preach the advantages of this system in rewarding efficiency and thrift. Indeed, a sincere and an intelligent defense of the free enterprise system must not merely point to its virtues but must admit its present faults and, in order that this defense of the system may be both logically convincing and appealing for its fairness, must be ready to recommend sufficiently radical specific reforms.

At this time, we of the United States of America are engaged in a desperate war in which our most powerful and effective ally is the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the great socialist nation of Europe and Asia. And the only party of this socialist nation is the Communist Party. After we have won this war, with the help of this great ally, is it reasonably to be expected that prejudice against socialist and communist propaganda will be as overwhelming as it was after the last war, when Russia's withdrawal and separate peace were generally attributed, in part, to the Bolshevik revolution? What if victory, with Russia's important help, puts Americans generally into a more receptive attitude of mind toward such propaganda! If, by any remote chance, matters should work themselves out that way, would not communist proselytizing inevitably make the greater head-

way because the masses of men are not at all trained in an understanding of our economic system, and least of all in an understanding of how it needs to be reformed; because conservative beneficiaries of its faults and their spokesmen darken counsel by arguing fallaciously against the reforms most needed, and because of the tendency I have considered at length in this article, for the great majority of the discontented to accept a naïvely simple analysis?

Although its system of land tenure leaves something to be desired, Russia does have the great advantage of collective ownership of land, including all natural resources. And we may assume, reasonably, that their appreciation of this fact helps explain the heroic resistance of the people of Russia against the Nazi invaders who, presumably, would not allow such ownership to continue. But with this collective ownership of land there is, in Russia, government operation of industry, public ownership of industrial capital and compulsory saving. With us, on the other hand, there is private ownership of capital, voluntary saving and, in general, a system of free enterprise. But along with all this there is the payment of billions of dollars a year to the private owners of the earth in the United States, for *permission* to work upon it and to live upon it, for *permission* to draw geologically-produced subsoil deposits from it and for *permission* to make use of community-produced location advantages.

Cannot men learn to distinguish between capital on the one hand and natural resources and sites on the other hand? This distinction, fundamental as it is, clear as it is to those who study it just a little and who are not *unwilling* to see, is all-essential for the reform of our economic system. Must it remain uncomprehended forever by the great majority of the victims of landlord exploitation? Shall we have to choose, therefore, between a basically unreformed capitalism in which landed property control is rampant and tends ever to grow worse, and a regimented socialism?

The Passing of the Middle Ages

By FRANCIS NEILSON

THE RENAISSANCE, WHICH WAS supposed to bring the New Learning to Western Europe, brought also a complete change in the life and manners of the people. This other side of the story needs to be emphasized today, for we are passing through a period of fundamental transition not only in the affairs of the State but also in those of common man. Perhaps there is no epoch in the history of civilization that has been treated so one-sidedly as that of the two hundred years which divided the so-called New Birth and the Council of Trent; for the New Learning was nothing more than a continuation of the work begun by Erigena and Abélard. Long before Petrarch and Boccaccio came upon the scene there were scholars who studied the classical writers of Greece and Rome. Perhaps no one since Erigena has left a more enduring monument to the intellect and industry of a scholar.

Upon examining recent researches (which reveal far more knowledge than the writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries worked upon), we find that the so-called Humanism of the Renaissance was nothing more or less than the aesthetic pursuit of collecting books. Why an arbitrary line should be set at the fourteenth century for book collectors is something that has never been adequately explained, for Ptolemy himself was a greater collector than any of the people of the Renaissance. So great a scholar as Montague James points out that the library of Cassiodorus in the sixth century was not only famous but that Cassiodorus himself must be regarded as "the greatest individual contributor to the preservation of learning in the West."¹

As for Humanism, there were Greeks and Hebrews who

¹ "The Cambridge Medieval History," Vol. III, Chap. XIX, pp. 485-7.

had a much better conception of what was essentially required by man than any of the people, dating from the fourteenth century, whose works I have seen. However, it all depends upon what the student is seeking. But surely it is necessary for him to acquire a wide background of knowledge before he sets to work to establish theories such as we find in the nineteenth-century interpreters of the Renaissance and in our modern Humanists.

After two hundred years of the New Learning and mediæval Humanism, we reach the period of Henry VIII, Luther, and Thomas Cromwell. What do we find? Following the dissolution of the monasteries and the Reformation, a firmly-entrenched system of landlordism, such as the world had never known before, reduced the peasantry to slaves of the soil. A tract of the times has it: "After the gluttons were starved by the thieves, what was left of religion, justice, and the public lands?" New aristocracies arose in the western countries of Europe, and they dealt mercilessly with the victims of the change.

There was a period of only one hundred forty years between the time of the land conspiracy, planned by Gaunt and his barons, and the era of the suppression of the great abbeys. It took nearly a thousand years to build, rebuild, and complete Glastonbury—to name only one of the many perfect art monuments—but Cromwell and his friends looted and demolished it in a few months. The alleged reason for much of this thievery was that the church—or the monasteries—had become dissolute and did not serve their purpose. So, a very clever, discontented monk, a much-married, intellectual king, and an unscrupulous statesman thought the time had come to clean house by wiping the structure out of existence. The result was that, after their work was done, the religion of the people, which had carried them through fearful vicissitudes for a thousand years, sank into an ob-

livion from which there was no return. This happened to a nation which, until the time of the Tudors, had scarcely ever heard the word "religion" spoken, because there was only one. It was not until the warring factions split up into sects that religions, and more religions, were heard of. These sects fought and hated, despised and punished one another just as lustily as any pagans did; indeed, as fiercely as had Saxon and Briton before Augustine brought the blessings of Christianity from Rome to England. Not that Christianity was unknown in the islands before Augustine, but Augustine marks the time when the Saxons were converted. However, long before that period, the British worshipped at the altars of Christian faith.

A terrible period followed the work of Henry VIII and Luther. In Bloody Mary's time, the stake was the order of the day. After five years of the Counter-Reformation, England was reduced to disaster, and the death of Mary alone averted a general revolt.

At any rate, whether or not you canonize Henry VIII or give Luther the benefit of every doubt and whitewash the soul of Thomas Cromwell, it must be admitted that the religion of the Middle Ages died a lingering death and the mass of the population entered upon a long series of what were called religious wars. Ever since the Reformation, which really began in Central Europe as a peasants' war about economic grievances, every community in Western Europe has been split up into warring, discontented and fear-ridden sects. Old, religious Catholicism was superseded by an ecclesiastical bureaucracy, which has become, and is today, the most perfectly organized system of ministering to the great mass the world has ever known. It functions successfully in many of the Protestant countries. However, before the outbreak of war, in Italy and France, especially in the towns, one saw a sad apathy, and the condition of the

churches in many places revealed a neglect that was most regrettable.

But since the Council of Trent, what bequest to science and art have the many different sects given to mankind? One order within the Catholic Church—the Jesuits—has made great contributions to science and letters. Music has been enriched by many men *in* the Church but not *of* the Church. Art and architecture were divorced from religion after the middle of the sixteenth century. At about the same time, the Council of Trent and Michelangelo terminated two great periods: the former brought to an end the religious schools from which our science, philosophy, and art sprang into existence; and the latter—the sculptor of “Moses” and “David,” whose “Last Judgment” in the Sistine Chapel at Rome created a scandal—brought to a close the great Gothic period.

The spring and the summer of our culture were gone. What strange century bedfellows were Henry VIII and Pope Paul III, Luther and John Colet, Michelangelo and Thomas Cromwell! It was the end of the so-called Dark Ages. The Light Ages, however, have never recovered from the great springtime so much that was precious to the soul of man and which might have lessened the gross materialism, the unhealthy scepticism, and the political turmoil of so-called enlightenment.

The Reformation strengthened the Rome it contended against. It enabled the Church to correct abuses and gave it a new lease of life; but her power as the patron of science, philosophy, and art was gone forever. She could not restore life to that which had passed away. Of our culture before Luther, all art, science, and letters were of religious birth. After him, the churches speedily became centers of dissension and distrust. Think of Calvin, Laud, Cromwell, and Praise-God Barebone! Contrast Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon,

Wyclif, and Cusanus with them, and try to compute the difference.

The great revival in letters under Elizabeth came not from within the Church. Indeed, it was not participated in by a single member of any priesthood. The great divines, such as Hooker, wrote only on ecclesiastical affairs, and Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke were philosophers. But the long list of Elizabethan poets and dramatists contains not a name of a man affiliated with a religious institution. Consider the great ones: Spenser, Sidney, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Drayton, Beaumont, and Fletcher! All were laymen. An exception might be Donne, but he was forty-two when he became a priest, and had already written most of his verse before he was ordained.

Michelangelo's poem on the death of his father might be taken for an obituary on the death of the Gothic:

Thou'rt dead of dying, and art made divine;
Nor need'st thou fear to change or life or will;
Wherefore my soul well-nigh doth envy thine.
Fortune and time across thy threshold still
Shall dare not pass, the which mid us below
Bring doubtful joyance blent with certain ill.
Clouds are there none to dim for thee heaven's glow;
The measured hours compel not thee at all;
Chance or necessity thou canst not know.
Thy splendor wanes not when our night doth fall,
Nor waxes with day's light however clear,
Nor when our suns the season's warmth recall.²

This note of sadness seems to permeate the work of the great artist and, whereas joy suffused the achievements of the poets, painters, and sculptors of Christendom's springtime, a melancholy, denoting loss—perhaps defeat—marks the work of those who realized a vital change had taken place in the

² John Addington Symonds, "Renaissance in Italy," "Italian Literature," Vol. I, p. 561.

mind and soul of man. The yearning for another life expressed in the sestet of a sonnet by Michelangelo reveals the tortured soul of the artist craving release from the uncertainties of time:

Burdened with years and full of sinfulness,
 With evil custom grown inveterate,
 Both deaths I dread that close before me wait,
 Yet feed my heart on poisonous thoughts no less.
 No strength I find in mine own feebleness
 To change or life or love or use or fate
 Unless Thy heavenly guidance come, though late,
 Which only helps and stays our nothingness.

'Tis not enough, dear Lord, to make me yearn
 For that celestial home, where yet my soul
 May be new made, and not, as erst, of naught:
 Nay, ere Thou strip her mortal vestment, turn
 My steps toward the steep ascent, that whole
 And pure before Thy face she may be brought.³

And was Shakespeare conscious of the great change that had taken place? Every tragedy he wrote seems to reflect the condition of his mind—that something was lost, never to be recovered, and of a future black with doubt. These men of the grand climacteric—Michelangelo and Shakespeare—were epitaphic: one in sculpture, to wit, the great tombs of the Medici; and the other in the histories—those great dramas of the vanity of the kings and the futility of change without grace. The deep longing for rest in King Henry's speech cannot be matched. Its yearning for a simple life of security, far removed from the conflicts of ambition and time is more than the cry of a care-worn monarch; it is the craving of all distressed souls for the joys of that peace which only child-like natures ever know.

Gives not the hawthorn-bush a sweeter shade
 To shepherds looking on their silly sheep,

³ John Addington Symonds, "Renaissance in Italy," "The Fine Arts," pp. 526-7.

Than doth a rich embroider'd canopy
To kings that fear their subjects' treachery?
O, yes, it doth; a thousand-fold it doth
And to conclude, the shepherd's homely curds,
His cold thin drink out of his leather bottle,
His wonted sleep under a fresh tree's shade,
All which secure and sweetly he enjoys,
Is far beyond a prince's delicates,
His viands sparkling in a golden cup,
His body couched in a curious bed,
When care, mistrust, and treason waits on him.⁴

All is envy; care bows every head; the bauble of power lingers in the hand a little while; and life dwindles away, un-lived in grace, unrealized. Every great poet of that tremendous period was deeply imbued with the sense of loss. Each felt lonely; felt a great kinship was broken; the golden link with the past severed; and the future threw no beckoning ray of hope. None knew the art of approaching the Most High; the superb artistry of each left him isolated and unrelated to the bourne of spiritual joy.

The soul of man was stricken with a haunting fear that that tegument of life which bound him to his tradition had been destroyed. The sense of direction, one of the dominant impulses in all fields of art, was numbed, and a weariness of the spirit afflicted all sections of society, notwithstanding the somewhat forced gaiety that broke out spasmodically even in Shakespeare's day. He seemed to crystallize the general thought and feeling of his time, and we find in his histories, and also in the tragedies, the note of melancholy expressed with a depth tinged with a strange sadness. Hamlet is balked by

. . . the native hue of resolution
. . . sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;⁵

and a Romeo would

⁴ William Shakespeare, "King Henry VI," Part III, Act II, Scene 5.

⁵ *Ib.*, "Hamlet," Act III, Scene 1.

. . . shake the yoke of inauspicious stars
From this world-wearied flesh. . . .⁶

Macbeth says:

. . . all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. . . .
Life's but a walking shadow. . . .⁷

The Prologue to "King Henry VIII" marks the change, for it was penned only a few years after the Reformation:

I come no more to make you laugh; things now
That bear a weighty and a serious brow,
Sad, high, and working, full of state and woe,
Such noble scenes as draw the eye to flow,
We now present.⁸

Vasari said of Michelangelo: "Toward the close of his life there arose in him no thought which was not graven with the idea of death, when one could easily perceive that he was making his retreat toward God."⁹ In a sonnet, which sounds the same note heard so often in Shakespeare's soliloquies, Michelangelo says:

The fables of the world have filched away
The time I had for thinking upon God;
His grace lies buried 'neath oblivion's sod,
Whence springs an evil crop of sins alway.
What makes another wise, leads me astray,
Slow to discern the bad path I have trod:
Hope fades; but still desire ascends that God
May free me from self-love, my sure decay.
Shorten half-way my road to heaven from earth?
Dear Lord, I can not even half-way rise,
Unless Thou help me on this pilgrimage:
Teach me to hate the world so little worth,
And all the lovely things I once did prize;
That endless life not death may be my wage.¹⁰

⁶ *Ib.*, "Romeo and Juliet," Act V, Scene 3.

⁷ *Ib.*, "Macbeth," Act V, Scene 5.

⁸ *Ib.*, "King Henry VIII," Prologue.

⁹ Vasari, "Lives of the Painters," trans. into English by Mrs. Foster, London, 1850.

¹⁰ John Addington Symonds, "Renaissance in Italy," "The Fine Arts," p. 526.

The myth of the Dark Ages is now slowly losing its significance. The farther back research goes, the deeper the fair-minded student delves into the archives of cathedral and monastery, the clearer becomes the atmosphere, so long choked with prejudice and misunderstanding. Now with the new attitude of estimating the true values of the work and thought of the men of pre-Reformation centuries, we find that Hallam, Robertson, and Symonds—to mention only three writers of the nineteenth century—missed the real meaning and import of the life, thought, and labor, which built up the Gothic edifice.

Among the many men of learning who are today bringing back the Middle Age to us and revealing its splendors, none sees with a clearer vision than Egon Friedell who, in his remarkable work, which followed Spengler's "Decline of the West," gives us an entirely new conception of the period from which our greatest achievements spring. Friedell says:

. . . And everywhere they saw the supreme reality, God, everything was of God. And over everything they succeeded in drawing the magic veil of their own dreams and deliriums: everything was beautiful. Hence the splendid optimism which neutralized their disregard of this world, their poverty, and their narrowness. He who believes in things is always full of joy and confidence. The Middle Ages were not gloomy, they were bright. We are entirely helpless before a Milky Way that has been dissolved into atoms by rationalism, but we can do a very great deal with a chubby angel and a club-footed devil in whom we believe whole-heartedly. In short, the life of those times had, as compared with our own, much more the character of a painting, a puppet-show, a fairy-tale, a mystery play—the character, in fact, of our childhood's life even now. It was, therefore, more sensible and impressive, more exciting and interesting, and, in a sense, more real.¹¹

Further on, in the same work, he administers a well-merited rebuke to our modern philosophers who have not taken the trouble to study the Middle Ages:

¹¹ "A Cultural History of the Modern Age," Vol. I, p. 72.

But, granted that these people were children, they were nevertheless clever, gifted, mature children. The theory that they lived and worked in dull subjection will not bear examination, at least so far as the high Middle Ages was concerned. Men were clear thinkers then, bright minds, master-artists in logic, virtuosi in the poetic presentation of concepts, architects endowed equally richly with powers of construction and of calculation; and they were possessed, in all the manifestations of their life, by an instinct for style which has never since been equalled. Equally indefensible is the theory that mankind in the Middle Ages consisted of nothing but types. Neither in the State and the Church nor in art and science was there any lack of sharply outlined, uninterchangeable personalities. The confessions of an Augustine or an Abélard reveal an almost uncanny capacity for introspection and self-analysis, such as is unimaginable without the premiss of a highly developed and nuanced individuality. The portrait-statues show strikingly individual figures and at the same time demonstrate the sculptors' talent in seizing that non-recurrent individuality. . . .¹²

We might now turn to the nineteenth century and consider the conditions in England after three hundred years of the period of so-called enlightenment. Let us look at a work which undoubtedly influenced a deep change in thought and brought to the notice of scholars a past in England's tradition that was worthy of reconsideration. Curiously enough, Thomas Carlyle was the only outstanding philosopher of the middle of the last century who realized the value of the chronicle of Jocelin de Brakelond,¹³ published by the Camden Society in 1841. H. D. Traill, the editor of the centenary edition of Carlyle's works, says:

. . . Perhaps if one were challenged to name ten pages in which Carlyle has most brilliantly exhibited the whole array of those gifts by virtue of which he makes history live again, one would do well to seek them . . . in the two short chapters of "Past and Present" wherein he describes the canvassing of the new Abbot of St. Edmundsbury, and the final election of Samson *Subsacrista* to that exalted office. . . .¹⁴

¹² *Ib.*, p. 75.

¹³ Died 1211 (?); English chronicler and Benedictine.

¹⁴ Thomas Carlyle, "Past and Present," New York, 1903 (originally published, 1843), Introduction, p. x.

Jocelin's Chronicle takes us back to the Abbey of St. Edmundsbury in the twelfth century. Carlyle, speaking of law and labor, still sees a morsel of God's justice to give us hope. In these days of law we seldom hear of justice. But back in the twelfth century justice was as much a living thing to Englishmen as it was to the Israelites. Then, turning to the life of manual and mental activity of the abbey, Carlyle realizes what was done under the discipline and routine of the abbot:

It is all work and forgotten work, this peopled, clothed, articulate-speaking, high-towered, wide-acred World. The hands of forgotten brave men have made it a World for us;—they,—honour to them; they, in *spite* of the idle and the dastard. This English Land, here and now, is the summary of what was found of wise, and noble, and accordant with God's Truth, in all the generations of English Men. Our English Speech is speakable because they were Hero-Poets of our blood and lineage; speakable in proportion to the number of these. This Land of England has its conquerors, possessors, which change from epoch to epoch, from day to day; but its real conquerors, creators, and eternal proprietors are these following, and their representatives if you can find them: All the Heroic Souls that ever were in England, each in their degree; all the men that ever cut a thistle, drained a puddle out of England, contrived a wise scheme in England, did or said a true and valiant thing in England. I tell thee, they had not a hammer to begin with. . . .

Work? The quantity of done and forgotten work that lies silent under my feet in this world, and escorts and attends me, and supports and keeps me alive, wheresoever I walk or stand, whatsoever I think or do, gives rise to reflections! Is it not enough, at any rate, to strike the thing called "Fame" into total silence for a wise man? . . .¹⁵

Contrast of spiritual and economic conditions was never so vividly pictured as in "Past and Present." There is no philosopher of this day who sees as clearly as Carlyle did what cancer is at the root of the social system.

The condition of England, on which many pamphlets are now in the course of publication, and many thoughts unpublished are going on in

¹⁵ *Ib.*, pp. 132-3.

every reflective head, is justly regarded as one of the most ominous, and withal one of the strangest, ever seen in this world. England is full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want in every kind; yet England is dying of inanition. With unabated bounty the land of England blooms and grows; waving with yellow harvests; thick-studded with workshops, industrial implements, with fifteen millions of workers, understood to be the strongest, the cunningest and the willingest our Earth ever had; these men are here; the work they have done, the fruit they have realised is here, abundant, exuberant on every hand of us: and behold, some baleful fiat as of Enchantment has gone forth, saying, "Touch it not, ye workers, ye master-workers, ye master-idlers; none of you can touch it, no man of you shall be the better for it; this is enchanted fruit!" On the poor workers such fiat falls first, in its rudest shape; but on the rich master-workers too it falls; neither can the rich master-idlers, nor any richest or highest man escape, but all are like to be brought low with it, and made "poor" enough, in the money sense or a far fataler one.

Of these successful skilful workers some two millions, it is now counted, sit in Workhouses, Poor-law Prisons; or have "out-door relief" flung over the wall to them,—the workhouse Bastille being filled to bursting, and the strong Poor-law broken asunder by a stronger. They sit there, these many months now; their hope of deliverance as yet small.

. . . Tall robust figures, young mostly or of middle age; of honest countenance, many of them thoughtful and even intelligent-looking men. They sat there, near by one another; but in a kind of torpor, especially in a silence, which was very striking. In silence: for, alas, what word was to be said? An Earth all lying round, crying, Come and till me, come and reap me;—yet we here sit enchanted! . . .¹⁶

But what could be expected of the centuries after Cromwell? Think of the Restoration period, then William and Mary, Anne, and the four Georges! Liberty turned to license, justice to persecution, religion to sectarianism, government to aristocratic tyranny, manners debauched! The scandals of the courts of Charles II and the Georges cannot be matched in any pre-Reformation period. Think of the worst that can be said of the dying monastic system; then think of the condition of England under the Regent, after-

¹⁶ *Ib.*, pp. 1-2.

wards George IV! War, penury, and lust increased. And after the Napoleonic Wars, the mass of England lay almost destitute and forlorn, while landlords built palaces from the proceeds of the Corn Laws. Reformation!

Still, the Age of Enlightenment had to come. There was nothing to stop it. That it might have been tempered to the shorn lamb I have no doubt, but the means of moderation—one religion for all, and its essential corollary, economic justice, were crippled almost beyond action before Elizabeth reached the throne. If by enlightenment the philosopher wishes us to think that he means scientific knowledge, then are we to conclude that the theory of the mechanistic system was the sum of achievement of the past two centuries? What else? Literature (drama, poetry, and prose) called for no reformation. Painting, sculpture, and music asked for no religious or scientific change. Enlightenment! What is left today of the mechanistic system? What has science not thrown on the scrap-heap during the past quarter of a century? Sir James Jeans says that science had better not make any more pronouncements for the present.

The other great feature of the Age of Enlightenment—Darwinism—is just about done as a theory. It was never more than a mere hypothesis anyway. Evolution suited the mechanistic notions of an industrial and commercial empire. Strangely enough, the idea of the struggle for existence was suggested to Wallace, Darwin's co-worker, by the "Essay on Population" of Malthus, a work based on so many erroneous economic notions that a school boy blessed with a knowledge of economic fundamentals could have torn it to pieces. Of course, Huxley, who was never certain of what it all meant, was the champion of the Darwinians. The ridiculous old law (heaven save the term!) of diminishing returns has been completely shattered, and the other preposterous nostrum—"Population has a tendency to increase faster than food"—

is as dead as a door-nail. It was dead when Malthus tried to bring it to life again. As for Darwin's contributions to the Age of Enlightenment, scarcely anything of real value remains.

Spengler says:

There is no more conclusive refutation of Darwinism than that furnished by palaeontology. Simple probability indicates that fossil hoards can only be test samples. Each sample, then, should represent a different stage of evolution, and there ought to be merely "transitional" types, no definition and no species. Instead of this we find perfectly stable and unaltered forms persevering through long ages, forms that have not developed themselves on the fitness principle, but *appear suddenly and at once in their definitive shape*; that do not thereafter evolve towards better adaptation, but become rarer and finally disappear, while quite different forms crop up again. What unfolds itself, in ever-increasing richness of form, is the great classes and kinds of living beings which *exist aboriginally and exist still, without transition types*, in the grouping of to-day. . . .¹⁷

However, it was Samuel Butler¹⁸ who attacked Darwin's theories and refuted the assumptions laid down in "The Origin of Species." At the same time, he exposed the methods by which Darwin had put together his work. It is only within the last few years that Butler's notions on evolution have been recognized by such scientists as Professor Bateson of Cambridge.

Evolution, as a term, suited the political exigencies of the time. Reformers grabbed it, Socialists enshrined it, imperialists inscribed it on their banners, party politicians used it indiscriminately for perorations, and the liberal clergy gave it their blessing. But evolution, like all other movable things, requires a starting point, a datum line and, moreover, Darwinian evolution, to be effective, needs a thorough, sound, upstanding specimen of what natural selection can do in the struggle for existence. Not a common, old, submerged-

¹⁷ Oswald Spengler, "The Decline of the West," Volume II, p. 32.

¹⁸ "Life and Habit," London, 1878; reprinted 1935.

tenth struggle, nor a polite church-charity struggle, but a real nature struggle, the sort that wore the Dinosaur to a shred and his playmate, the Dinotherium, to a neurasthenic wreck!

The nineteenth was a great century of enlightenment. War presided at its birth, war officiated at its death. So Reformation and *Ein' feste Burg*¹⁹ (the Church Militant's last mighty Satan-song, as Spengler calls it) brought the city into prominence and depopulated the countryside. Luther's work raised a great landlord aristocracy into a position to batten on the labor of the mass. It enabled the lords of domains wider than any held in trust by abbots to cast off the *Trimoda Necessitas*,²⁰ the obligations of the manor, and put the burdens of taxation on industry. It split up one religion of direct communication between man and God into a hundred and one sects, all jostling in the struggle for existence, which has finally forced many of them to rely on the movie and charades as attractions.

It is strange that it should be an atheist who has defined more clearly, more sincerely, than any other man of our time (save perhaps Nietzsche) the true worth of the piety of the Middle Age and what was done by the men and women who asked for little. In a footnote Spengler says:

. . . In the Gothic Age entry into the cloister, the renunciation of care, deed and will, had been an act of the loftiest ethical character—the highest sacrifice that it was possible to imagine, that of *life*. . . .²¹

And no one has seen as clearly as Spengler the terrible results of the change wrought by the many issues provoked by the Reformation. He sets the men of the Middle Ages against the men of the Age of Enlightenment. The contrasts he presents are profoundly interesting:

But the last reformers, too, the Luthers and Savonarolas, were *urban* monks, and this differentiates them profoundly from the Joachims and

¹⁹ Opening line of Luther's best-known hymn. Cf. Spengler, Vol. II, p. 296.

²⁰ In Anglo-Saxon law, the three-fold necessary burdens that rested on the tenure of all lands.

²¹ Spengler, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 316 n.

the Bernards. Their intellectual and urban askesis is the stepping-stone from the hermitages of quiet valleys to the scholar's study of the Baroque. The mystic experience of Luther which gave birth to his doctrine of justification is the experience, not of a St. Bernard in the presence of woods and hills and clouds and stars, but of a man who looks through narrow windows on the streets and house walls and gables. Broad God-perfused nature is remote, outside the city wall; and the free intellect, detached from the soil, is inside it. Within the urban, stone-walled waking-consciousness sense and reason part company and become enemies, and the city-mysticism of the last reformers is thus a mysticism of pure reason through and through, and not one of the eye—an illumination of concepts, in presence of which the brightly coloured figures of the old myth fade into paleness.

Necessarily, therefore, it was, in its real depths, a thing of the few. Nothing was left of that sensible content that formerly had offered even to the poorest something to grip. The mighty act of Luther was a purely intellectual decision. Not for nothing has he been regarded as the last great Schoolman of the line of Occam. He completely liberated the Faustian personality—the intermediate person of the priest, which had formerly stood between it and the Infinite, was removed. And now it was wholly alone, self-oriented, its own priest and its own judge. But the common people could only feel, not understand, the element of liberation in it all. They welcomed, enthusiastically, indeed, the tearing-up of visible duties, but they did not come to realize that these had been replaced by intellectual duties that were still stricter. Francis of Assisi had given much and taken little, but the urban Reformation took much and, as far as the majority of people were concerned, gave little. . . .

The Reformation abolished the whole bright and consoling side of the Gothic myth—the cult of Mary, the veneration of the saints, the relics, the pilgrimages, the mass. But the myth of devildom and witchcraft remained, for it was the embodiment and cause of the inner torture, and now that torture at last rose to its supreme horror. . . .²²

The great spread of witch-hunting in the two centuries succeeding the Reformation, when enlightenment went raving mad, surpassed all cruelties and atrocities practised in the Middle Ages. The total number of victims of the witch persecutions is variously estimated at from 100,000 to several

²² *Ib.*, Vol. II, pp. 297–99.

millions. If it be true that Benedikt Carpzov²³ passed sentence on 20,000 victims, the former figure is undoubtedly too low.

And what about superstition and idol worship? These evidences of "abject ignorance" of the Dark Ages were not to be tolerated by reasonable folk of an enlightened age. Yet, the people of the Middle Ages were never so benighted in superstition as to worship the State. They never deluded themselves as the law-and-order patriots do. Think of the changes of military and naval superstition! Think of the superstition of statesmanship and medicine! It is difficult to think of a branch of science which calls for a deeper faith and trust in human experience than medicine. The gods we worship, no respectable artist of the Dark Ages would waste stone and chisel on for a moment. What could he make of our chief god, Progress? He would be at his wit's end to find out anything about that deity that would inspire him to creative effort.

What does it all amount to in the end—that end for which the millions strive? And when one counts heads, what do the so-called intelligentsia amount to? The striving of the millions everywhere is to reach the goal of eternal peace, and no one has described this striving in a small crystal of great beauty in finer terms than Goethe:

In the Endless, self-repeating
flows for evermore The Same.
Myriad arches, springing, meeting,
hold at rest the mighty frame.
Streams from all things love of living,
grandest star and humblest clod.
All the straining, all the striving
is eternal peace in God.²⁴

²³ 1595–1666.

²⁴ Spengler, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 140.

We approach the winter of our culture and, as it has been in every other great civilization, we find now the outstanding men of science seeking to satisfy a spiritual hunger, which is not at all appeased by the discoveries of the telescope, the microscope, and the atom-smasher.

The mystery deepens with every scientific advance; every recorded addition to scientific knowledge adds complexity to the system and makes us more and more conscious of the recessions from the goal. Still, there is a salvage that is immeasurable; one which is all gain. Ten or a dozen great minds—astronomers, physicists, and mathematicians—in seeking the solution of the mystery, have recaptured the spirit of reverence. They bow before the altar of universal harmony, and something resembling prayer is humbly whispered by them. Perhaps the greatest gift they will bequeath to us poor laymen will be their example of reverence and humility.

We lost our way when reverence was taken from us, and the art of our proper attitude to life was lost when we became proud. Out of the collapse of materialism will come something precious to the soul of man, so long lonely, something that will help to raise up, in fellowship, a temple of justice and love. Love without reverence, or reverence without love, is a severance in the orders of discipline and duty. Both are necessary adjuncts for the complete realization of the spiritual man. Unite duty with love, and discipline with reverence, and a combination of manly virtue is effected that will withstand the torments of passion and pride!

The Place of Statistical Methods in Modern Historiography*

By ERNEST RUBIN

I

THE OBJECTIVE PURPOSE of this paper is to indicate certain considerations towards a scientific history, by employing in actual case illustrations some of the concepts of science and mathematics as embodied in statistical methods. This paper is only suggestive in character, no attempt being made to develop a scientific or statistical theory of history. In statistical methodology, however, there are certain elements of value which should be brought to the attention of the historian, particularly the historian of mass phenomena and institutional developments in modern times.¹

Before proceeding to the body of this paper, a word is necessary concerning the patterns of thought familiar to mathematics and science, and the differences among the problems of mathematics, science, and history.

Scientific problems are distinguishable from those of history in several unique ways. Perhaps the most important difference is that of experimentation in science, which is impossible in historical analysis bounded by various ideological concepts as to its limits and purposes.² In science, theories and hypotheses may be checked, revised, or destroyed in part by the experimental method. Furthermore an important

* The author is especially indebted to Professor Harold Hotelling of Columbia University for criticism and suggestions related to the statistical aspects of this paper.

¹ "As in natural science no organism is pretended to be understood as long as its superficial aspects are described, so in history no movement by a mass of people can be correctly comprehended until that mass is resolved into its component parts." Charles A. Beard, "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," New York, Macmillan, (new edition), 1936, p. 253. Statistical methods are powerful tools in analyzing precisely such masses.

² See Robert L. Schuyler, "Indeterminism in Physics and History," *The Social Studies*, Vol. XXVII, No. 8 (Dec. 1936), pp. 514-5, for an interesting discussion of this point.

implication of the experimental method is control, which would seem to be lacking in even the most rigorous historical analysis. And while the fruits of scientific inferences often contain predictability (though sometimes couched in the language of probability), historical analysis in its present state is chary of this element—if not hostile entirely to such an idea.

The problem of mathematics differs from that of history and science since the truths it seeks to discover lie in the matrix of postulation and logical analysis exclusively; that is, the "facts" of mathematics are in part the axioms of logic and several special assumptions and definitions, from which various complete algebraic or geometric systems may be deduced. In a certain sense mathematics may be considered as an extension of logic.

While the work of the pure mathematician is almost strictly in a non-empirical realm, there are elements of value in the pattern of mathematical thinking for the historian. Mathematicians in higher analysis, when examining the theoretical aspects of the calculus, for example, attempt to strengthen the statement of the theorems. This process of strengthening examines the mathematical and logical aspects of the theory, and by imposing such criteria as "necessary and sufficient" conditions can delimit the periphery of the propositions. The net result is to strengthen the conclusion of the theorem, since it has been submitted to rigorous proof, and at the same time to understand what the theorem implies under given operations.

It at once becomes obvious to the historian that the mathematical mode and the scientific approach would lead to null results if applied in that form, by the historian to his data. But the goal of the historian is not alien to that of the mathematician and the scientist, since all seek the truth in their respective fields, and all are interested, when absolute truth is

beyond verification, in the largest and most probable truth. Hence the historian must develop or use techniques proper to his domain. Such methods should enable him to estimate more accurately the probable truth, permit him to strengthen, weaken or destroy conclusions, and also test historical theories and hypotheses.

Scientific data, unlike historical data, are frequently expressed in mathematical terms or relations. In part, the historian's non-use of mathematics is understandable, since that branch of applied mathematics which he should employ, namely statistical methods, has developed relatively recently. Buckle recognized the intrinsic value of statistics as an important technique for modern historiography ninety years ago.³ Unfortunately there have been few Buckles in the modern period. It is quite probable that the proper application of statistical methods to the history of mass phenomena and institutional developments of modern times will strengthen those conclusions which today can only be put forth in a weak or conjectural manner, destroy statements that are inaccurate but which as yet have not undergone the more conclusive examinations of statistical analysis, and introduce historical conceptions that would remain neglected without the insight of the statistical techniques.

Economics, psychology and sociology have made ample use of the statistical techniques, and while this use has not always been very successful or without error (factors which must enter in the pioneering stage), these social studies, on the

³ After discussing the regularity of moral conduct as indicated by the statistics of crime, suicide, and marriages, Buckle says, "It will be observed, that the preceding proofs of our actions being regulated by law, have been derived from statistics; a branch of knowledge which, though still in its infancy, has already thrown more light on the study of human nature than all the sciences put together. But although the statisticians have been the first to investigate this great subject by treating it according to those methods of reasoning which in other fields have been found successful; and although they have, by the application of numbers, brought to bear upon it a very powerful engine for eliciting truth,—we must not, on that account, suppose that there are no other sources remaining. . . ." Henry Thomas Buckle, "History of Civilization in England," New York, Hearst's International Library, 1913 (from the 2d London Edition), Vol. 1, part 1, pp. 17-26.

whole, have advanced considerably with the aid of this new and powerful instrument. History and political science have scarcely touched or attempted to employ the new weapon. The time has come to investigate some of the possibilities and limitations of statistical methodology for modern historiography.

II

IT IS DESIRABLE TO TAKE several examples which will indicate, perhaps with more precision than other forms of explanation, the possibilities of statistical methods for the historian and the political scientist. In a paper of this kind it is not feasible to take many statistical techniques. For this reason only a few well known statistical techniques will be applied and discussed.

The Problem of Historical Sampling

Case I. Sampling used to discover historical facts:

FUTURE HISTORIANS OF the United States, in seeking to discover the attitude of the American people on various aspects of World War II, for example, will be in a fortunate position. Provided that the records have not been destroyed, the historian will have a choice of several statistical analyses, such as the Gallup Polls, the Fortune magazine polls, various newspaper polls or straw votes, as well as several surveys from other organizations. While these studies are not all equally reliable, the historian may select, with the aid of a statistician, the poll considered most trustworthy, according to the tests of significance and reliability which statisticians have devised precisely for this purpose.

On the other hand, present-day historians are completely lacking in ready-made statistical contemporary studies of past American history. An event of such magnitude as World War I, for example, was not adequately sampled as to American public opinion—and this is only a matter of

twenty-five years ago. Can such information be retrieved, for an event that occurred fifty or even a hundred years ago?

While it is not proposed here that statistical methods possess transcendental powers of retrieval, or that such methods provide an open sesame for scientific history, the case of reconstructing past American public opinion, upon a reliable basis, is entirely conceivable. For this reason, the author has chosen as an example, the results of Charles A. Beard's chapter, "The Popular Vote on the Constitution," from his volume, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, published in 1913, long before the technique of statistical sampling was on a firm foundation.

At the outset Beard notes that there was no popular vote of the people on this issue. The voters took part only in the selection of delegates to the ratifying conventions in the states. Beard's statistical problem was to obtain an estimate of the number of voters in question and then break down this number into various economic classes. The problem of estimating the total number of such voters must depend upon a reconstructed sample, in the absence of the actual figure. While the problem of a Gallup poll, for example, is to estimate a total vote figure, as in the case of the presidential election, the sample is so constructed as to yield such a result within a small percentage error. The difference in the case of the historical sample is that no control similar to that of the Gallup type can be applied, since the historian must select the facts as they have been left to him.

Beard's first consideration is to divide the number of voters into four classes: (a) those voters who were consciously in favor of the Constitution, (b) those voters who were consciously against it, (c) those who were willing to leave the matter to the discretion of their elected representatives, and (d) those who voted blindly. While the proportions that these classes bear to one another are not known, certain facts

will help us to estimate how many people favored the adoption of the Constitution. An important fact to be noted is that

. . . a considerable proportion of the adult white male population was debarred from participating in the elections of the delegates to the ratifying state conventions by the prevailing property qualifications on the suffrage (p. 240).

This fact is important because it immediately delimits a great part of public opinion that could not be voiced. Furthermore,

It is impossible to say just what proportion of the adult males twenty-one years of age was disfranchised by these qualifications. . . . Dr. Jameson estimates that probably one-fifth of the adult males were shut out in Massachusetts, and it would probably be safe to say that nowhere were more than one-third of the adult males disfranchised by the property qualifications (pp. 241-242).

From this point on, Beard takes each state separately, indicating the maximum number of males entitled to vote and estimating, from various sources, the percentage that did vote. In the case of New York, he cites tabulations of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist votes, as reported by contemporaries in the press of 1788. The analysis indicates that the apportionment of representation was against the Anti-Federalists; that the Anti-Federalists received the greater popular vote and that the urban areas of New York City and Albany were for ratification. In each state Beard analyzes the vote and breaks it down in terms of economic classes.

Some of the statistical conclusions that Beard reached may be given without summarizing the chapter:

(1) . . . it seems a safe guess to say that not more than 5 percent of the population in general, or in round numbers, 160,000 voters, expressed an opinion one way or another on the Constitution. In other words, it is highly probable that not more than one-fourth or one-fifth of the adult

white males took part in the election of delegates to the state conventions. If anything, this estimate is high (p. 250).

(2) . . . we may reasonably conjecture that of the estimated 160,000 who voted in the election of delegates, not more than 100,000 men favored the adoption of the Constitution at the time it was put into effect (p. 250).

In this case, Beard's work constituted an historical sample that was useful in bringing to light certain facts that would substantiate and develop a theory. The second case will deal with a different type of historical sample, designed to test an established theory or hypothesis.

Case II. Sampling used to test historical theories:

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER ADVANCED a theory concerning western development, explaining part of this theory in terms of the migrations of the dissatisfied, exploited eastern wage-earner to the West. This part of his thesis is commonly known as the "safety valve" theory. The statement of this theory occurs in several papers, brought together under the title, "The Frontier in American History"; the clearest statement follows, thus:

. . . Whenever social conditions tended to crystallize in the East, whenever capital tended to press upon labor or political restraints to impede the freedom of the mass, there was this gate of escape to the free conditions of the frontier. These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise, democracy. Men would not accept inferior wages and a permanent position of social subordination when this promised land of freedom and equality was theirs for the taking . . . (p. 259).

The other aspect, namely the effect of western migration on the East, he noted in a paper on the early colonial period of Massachusetts:

. . . The migration of labor to free lands meant that higher wages must be paid to those who remained (p. 62).

In 1935, Carter Goodrich and Sol Davison reopened the question, since various authorities had accepted and rejected

Turner's position, although no empirical study had been made of this problem. Case II is intended as an examination and a statement of the sampling techniques and the results that Goodrich and Davison obtained in their two articles.

The first article⁴ made a statement of the problem and the positions of various authorities on the doctrine. For the present purposes, the second article contains all the necessary material. This paper⁵

. . . represents an attempt to discover how much of a migration of wage-earners took place during the half century or so in which there was at one end of the country a substantial factory population and at the other an actively advancing frontier. Since there are no comprehensive statistics available, it will be recognized that any estimates must be based on a sampling of the imperfect records surviving so long after the event.

After indicating the limitations of the Census and the Records of the General Land Office, because the record of occupation is not indicated together with nativity, or where the occupation was first practised, the authors turn to the newspapers as sources of sampling material:

Any attempt at an answer must, therefore, be built up from more scattered and fragmentary sources of information. . . . Of these, we have placed chief reliance on the files of the contemporary newspapers. The press of the great cities gives clues to the kind of people who were leaving the East, and in these cases the impressions gained from standard journals could often be checked against the views of a vigorous labor press. Again the frontier papers frequently carried descriptions of the people who were arriving in the new country.⁶

Other sources of lesser importance were used. The next point was to indicate the time period chosen for this study;

. . . We have not believed that the early numbers of wage-earners were sufficiently large to require us to carry the inquiry back of the year 1830,

⁴ "The Wage-Earner in the Westward Movement, I," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (June, 1935), pp. 161-185.

⁵ "The Wage-Earner in the Westward Movement, II," *ib.*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan. 1936), pp. 61-116.

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 63.

and we have not in any case taken it further forward than the decade of the 1880's which Turner thought of as marking the end of the great frontier period . . . also, we have paid little attention to the Civil War years.⁷

An implication of the theory leads to a further analysis of intervals in the time period:

. . . If the movement of workmen to the West was to be regarded as an escape from oppressive conditions, it might well be expected that the outlet would be sought most eagerly when wages were lowest and conditions the worst. Thus the logic of the safety-valve doctrine suggests that the movement would be particularly marked during industrial depressions, and the belief that migration was unusually active at such times finds quite frequent expression in contemporary writings and at least partial support in the statistics of land alienation.⁸

In order to check the validity of these suppositions, the authors examine the relationship between the course of the business cycle and the sale and disposal of public lands. Wholesale prices are used as an indication of general business conditions, and plotted on the same graph are the acres of public land sold for the same period, including, since 1863, the number of original homestead entries. From observing the graph, it would seem that the amount of land disposed of in the earlier period varied directly with wholesale prices, while in the second period the opposite was the case, that is, the number of homestead entries varied inversely with this index of business conditions.⁹

After explaining that the results of the first period reflect in considerable measure significant speculation in land, the conclusion is drawn,

. . . the results for the first period do not necessarily conflict with the theory that the westward movement was intensified during depressions and

⁷ *Ib.*

⁸ *Ib.*, p. 64.

⁹ The rate of change of the price index, or of its logarithm, might have been a better index of business conditions. Cf. an article on this subject by Irving Fisher in *The Journal of the American Statistical Association* (Sept. 1923), v. 18, p. 835.

the results for the second period seem definitely to confirm it. Apparently, then, we are justified in giving special, though by no means exclusive attention to periods of depression.¹⁰

Having dealt with the temporal aspects of the sample, the next consideration is that of space or place concentration;

. . . the selections made were those that appeared most likely to develop the evidence of working-class migration. To the extent, therefore, that these choices introduce an element of bias, it would appear to be in the direction of overestimating rather than underestimating the relative importance of the wage-earner's share in the westward movement.¹¹

The rest of the paper is devoted in part to a detailed study of Fall River, Massachusetts,¹² for which more material seemed to exist than for other places, as well as various evidence on migrations from east and west. The conclusions reached concerning Turner's safety-valve doctrine are significant:

From this sampling of imperfect materials, we cannot claim the weight of conclusive proof. . . . The bits of evidence drawn from widely scattered sources fit together into a pattern of unexpected consistency. In it, for example, workers' complaints of the difficulty of migration are matched by western figures of the cost of settlement. . . . Still more significantly, the lack of reference to wage-earners in western accounts of frontier origins appears consistent with what can be learned from the records of the industrial centers, and suggests that the "case of Fall River" was far from exceptional. This cumulation of evidence thus points to the conclusion that the movement of eastern wage-earners to the western lands was surprisingly small. What is more striking, too few wage-earners left industrial centers to exert any marked effect on their labor situation.¹³

In Case II, sampling was employed to test the validity of an historical theory. Thus far, the statistical technique of sampling was applied, first to discover facts to develop a

¹⁰ Goodrich and Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

¹¹ *Ib.*, p. 66.

¹² *Ib.*, pp. 67-79. Many wage earners returned to Fall River after they had failed on the western lands.

¹³ *Ib.*, pp. 114-5.

theory; and second to discover facts to weaken a theory. While these samples were not subjected to tests of reliability, the methods employed appear to be sound and the results fruitful. In the next case the application of statistical methods on historical evidence will be discussed.

Case III. Historical evidence and statistical methods:

SEVERAL EXAMPLES CAN BE CITED indicating the use of statistical analysis for problems of historical evidence, such as the detection of the authorship of manuscripts of unknown or uncertain origin by a study of word-combination frequencies. The case chosen for our purpose deals with the subject of the Seven Kings of Rome, as examined by the master statistician, Karl Pearson.¹⁴

While the early history of Rome contains much that is inaccurate and mythical, it is of interest to see how a statistician may indicate the strength of a particular myth by the following examination. The aggregate reign of the seven kings of Rome is usually given as 257 years, a period supposed to correspond with the founding of Rome, *circa* 760 B.C., and the beginning of the republic, *circa* 503 B.C.

A historian without additional data can only guess that something is missing in the chronology of the early history of Rome, since a reign of 257 years for seven men seems quite unusual. The statistician, however, systematically analyzes the problem without guesswork. Thus Pearson studied various monarchical reigns, as did Sir Isaac Newton, who was also interested in the problem of the seven kings of Rome. Both found that the average of reigns, over wide periods of time and in dispersed geographical regions, lay between 18 and 26 years. The average for the seven kings of Rome, according to the myth, was 36.7 years.

¹⁴ Karl Pearson, "Biometry and Chronology," *Biometrika*, Volume XXa (Dec. 1928), pp. 241-62.

The statistical problem of the probability of such an aggregate reign leads Pearson to discuss two methods of solution. The first method is stated thus:

The frequency distribution of the reigns of sovereigns is given. What is the chance that a sample of 7 selected at random will give a total length of reigns of 257 or more years?¹⁵

The assumptions underlying this statement of the problem are derived from the study of a sample of the universe of reigns, which established the approximate mean and standard deviation, or the necessary parameters of the normal distribution.

Another solution of the problem is more general than the specific one dealt with statistically. The second method, essentially actuarial, is given thus:

Seven men are chosen at random between the ages of 30 and 60. Find the chance that their total future lifetime will not be less than 257 years.¹⁶

As this is for the historian a problem in the credibility of chronology, the solution as well as the problem are general in character, indicating that with slight modification of the principles used here, these methods may be adapted to similar historical problems. The results obtained for the above problem are interesting. Pearson determines the probability of such an event occurring as something between 0.002 and 0.005, so that odds against it are at least 200 to 1.

The statistician has indicated that the myth of the reign of the seven kings of Rome is indeed a weak one. While this type of analysis appears negative, its constructive aspect is also apparent. The conclusion indicates certain alternatives to the historian, some of which may be fruitful. For example, one alternative is to examine the historical evidence of the 257-year period and seek to discover new information concerning other possible reigns and new data concerning the

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 248.

¹⁶ *Ib.*

whole period generally. Without guessing about chronological gaps, the historian has received a definite statement of mathematical order that may be much more useful than any intuitive speculation.

Case IV. Time series trend lines and legislation:


THE PROBLEM POSED HERE concerns a general and important question for historians and political scientists. It would be very desirable if the effectiveness of law, or rather of specific legislation, could be determined on a more exact basis than methods heretofore employed in attempting such measurements. Put in a somewhat different mold, can certain aspects of law be subjected to the quantitative methods of statistics?

For the purpose of illustration hypothetical data have been used, since it is the method that is important. Suppose legislation has been passed in 1896 in the state of XYZ, regulating the maximum number of hours that may be worked in mines to 8 per day. A historian may note that in 1940 the number of hours worked in XYZ's mines was 7.5 on the average per day. The historian would like to know: (1), whether the law was effective in lowering the number of working hours (that is, without the law would the miners today work more or less than 7.5 hours?) and (2), whether the miners have continuously benefited by the operation of this law, by working fewer hours per given time period than would have been the case without such a law. In (2) we are trying to measure the short time effects of the law, say on a seasonal or year to year basis, whereas in (1) we are interested in the long term net effectiveness of the law.¹⁷



A suggested statistical procedure is to find and examine the

¹⁷ Economic statistics as a means of historical study may be mentioned at this point, since the procedures mentioned here are similar to those used in the study of business cycles. The historian who reads Wesley C. Mitchell's "Business Cycles, the Problem and Its Setting," New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1927, will get a first-rate appreciation of the field of economics statistics and historical studies, especially in Chapter III, "The Contribution of Statistics," pp. 189-360. Also of interest is Simon Kuznets' "Statistics and Economic History," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May, 1941), pp. 26-41.

GRAPHS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW: (HYPOTHETICAL DATA - CASE IV)




I. AVERAGES OF HOURS PER YEAR



II. SEPARATED ACTUAL TRENDS

III.
 (A) CASE OF COINCIDENCE
 ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL TRENDS



IV.
 (B) ACTUAL TREND BETTER → LAW GOOD
 ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL TRENDS

(A), (B), and (C) indicate
 the possible combinations
 that may result.

KB - ACTUAL TREND
 MEANS TREND INCLUD-
 ING EFFECT OF LAW.
 HYPOTHETICAL TREND
 IS TREND WITHOUT
 LAW IN OPERATION.

V.
 (C) ACTUAL TREND WORSE → LAW INEFFECTIVE
 ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL TRENDS

E. Rybin

trend line before the law was passed, and extend this trend line down to 1940. (For the purpose of simplification and illustration other factors and considerations have been excluded for the time being.) On the same graph with the hypothetical trend line, the actual trend for the whole period is drawn, as indicated on the drawing. Also, we may split the two periods, before and after the law, finding separate trend lines for each period. To find out whether these pairs of trend lines differ significantly, tests of significance must be employed. As a result of this procedure, the historian or political scientist may have a stronger insight; that is, a quantitative measure as to the effectiveness of the law. The above procedure is frequently used for economic time series studies, but may also be adapted to all types of regulatory legislation that affect quantitative elements, e.g., financial or population data.

Several questions will arise as a result of this method. For example, suppose the hypothetical trend line projection coincides with the actual trend line. What can we now say as to the effectiveness of the law? This method does not then give the answer, but suggests clues, to wit, that other factors of importance have been operating not in harmony with the law, or that other factors have come into play or have been cancelled since the passage of the law. It is important to note that the methods indicated show significant differences and these differences may be due to some factor not at first considered. In practice, allowance is made for those factors that are regarded as important, but the method is generally correct. The method is important since it is a factual and not a speculative approach, and suggests further clues, not necessarily statistical.

Case V. Index numbers and sociological history:

IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED that during periods of crisis, freedom, or rather civil liberties, are adversely affected. After defining

the terms of this statement, the hypothesis must be tested. Let us presume, again for the purpose of illustration only, that the legal prosecutions per year of radicals, liberals and labor leaders is known since the Civil War. An index number may be constructed using these three elements as an indication of liberties adversely affected. The index number may be weighted, that is, the prosecution of radicals may be most significant for the present purpose, that of labor leaders less so, and that of liberals least. Since the population has grown considerably in the last seventy-five years, our index must be expressed as a rate, say per million population, for the purpose of comparability. A graph is then constructed for the time base since 1865.

From actual observation of the graph we may note if there is any association with economic periods of depression, war periods or prosperity periods. This procedure may give some indication about the hypothesis to be tested. It is also possible to find a correlation coefficient for time series, which will measure the degree of association between the prosecution rate of civil liberties cases and the number of business failures per year.

The above case is an illustration of the qualitative as well as quantitative nature of statistical technique. It is entirely conceivable that a measure of social integration can be devised that may be applied to time periods by the historian. The problem of measuring national unity is also possible, and once this is done it will not be necessary to resort to nebulous phrases concerning the amount of our unity. Sociological history becomes possible with the utilization of statistical measures.

III

STATISTICAL METHODS may only be applied if the historian knows something as to the reliability of the data. These

techniques cannot be used by imitation or haphazard choice. There must first be a clear comprehension of these techniques, which implies an understanding of their possibilities and limitations. At the same time the historian must understand fully the relationship he wishes to discover and whether the statistical method is the only one that can obtain the desired result. Since statistical work will at times be arduous, it is not desirable to use a complicated method where simpler devices may obtain the required results.

The cases described in the foregoing pages are to be considered as a minimum sketch of what statistical methods hold for the historian. In a minor way, I have attempted to initiate a supplementary technique for historical research. As the curriculum stands today in the undergraduate and graduate schools, statistical methods are not required or desired by the history and government departments. If sociology and economics departments require this study, and these studies have given evidence that statistical methods are quite useful, then it is time for historians to avail themselves of this experience.

There are several conclusions that I wish to draw before terminating this paper. First, that historians should study statistical methods¹⁸ and examples of statistical analysis in other related fields, as sociology and economics. Second, that historians apply these methods to those aspects of historical research where such methods may be applied. And finally, that historians look forward to the development of a new auxiliary science in their field, namely the independent study of statistical historiography.

¹⁸ For the historian without mathematical background who cannot obtain the guidance of a teacher of statistics, Frederick E. Croxton's and Dudley J. Cowden's "Applied General Statistics," New York, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1941, as well as Margaret Jarman Hagood's "Statistics for Sociologists," New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, may be suggested.

There will be confident hope for the future provided our people and other peoples hold fast to the eternal principles of law, justice, fair dealing and morality which we have constantly proclaimed and sought to apply and which must underlie any practicable program of peaceful international collaboration for the good of all.

Our people and the peoples of the United Nations will need to have in the future, as they have today, a unity of purpose and a willingness to make appropriate and indispensable contributions toward the achievement of military victory and toward the establishment and maintenance of a peace that will endure.

With unity of purpose and common effort there can be achieved a peace that will open to all mankind greater opportunity than has ever before existed for welfare and progress in every avenue of human endeavor.

CORDELL HULL

The Christian Basis for a New World Order*

By DONALD A. MACLEAN

XI

State Sovereignty in the New World Order

THE NATURAL LAW of humanity demands the triumph of right over might. That applies to all forms of force—physical, military, economic or political. In the banishment of brute force from the world, States have a special natural rôle to play. This rôle must find its chief guidance in the natural law.

Man is by nature a social and political being. His welfare and perfection are bound up with and dependent on social organization and co-operation with his fellowmen. The family, occupational and social groups, nations, states and religious organizations are based on human nature and are grounded in the natural and Divine law. All such societies are necessary for the perpetuation and perfection of man, and they play their respective rôles in furthering the common good of their members and the general welfare of the human family.

Within the New World Order the rights of all persons and of every natural society, as well as of religious organizations, to existence, liberty, autonomy and natural development, must be recognized and accorded adequate protection. While in the natural order the world commonwealth itself constitutes a universal, organic, hierarchical society, it is likewise true that "a disposition of the divinely sanctioned natural order divides the human race into social groups, nations and states."¹²¹ Each of these has a natural function to per-

* Copyright, 1943, by D. A. MacLean.

¹²¹ Pius XII, "Summi Pontificatus," para. 65.

form, and each within its proper sphere possesses an autonomy and jurisdiction of its own, on which, while it is not absolute, others may not infringe. Besides, all such social groups must be co-ordinated in relation to each other and with a view to the higher ends of the superior societies. Furthermore, every society should eventually function in view of the higher and more general good of world society, as well as for the promotion of world order itself.

Each natural society functions rightly only within its proper sphere. On the other hand, it frustrates the welfare of every other society, as well as its own, when it transgresses the jurisdiction of any other society. This is particularly true with reference to the State. The claim to absolute autonomy by a State involves a denial and perversion of the natural order and hinders the attainment of the common good as well as the perfection of the human person. Hence, as Pope Pius XII noted,

Within the limits of a new order founded on moral principles there is no room for the violation of the freedom, integrity and security of other States, no matter what may be their territorial extension or their capacity for defense.¹²²

For the right to life, to independence, and to the possibility of continuous development in the paths of civilization, involve fundamental juridical relations between states established by international natural law. They find their main protection in no other source. Consequently, any infringement of these rights constitutes a violation of justice, a violation at the same time of the rights of the particular state as well as of those of the world community.

Rightly does the "Stimson Doctrine"¹²³ refuse to recognize territorial gains won through aggression. It conforms with

¹²² Christmas Broadcast, December 24, 1941.

¹²³ Embodied in an official note of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson to China and Japan, dated January 8, 1933. This doctrine was shortly adopted by practically all of the member States of the League of Nations.

the moral principles of justice. For, as Pius XII warned the world on the eve of the outbreak of the present World War, "Conquests and empires not founded on justice cannot be blessed by God."¹²⁴ All such aggressions violate the fundamental requirements of justice and true order. No human decree or agreement can ever remove the congenital taint involved in the aggressive invasion of other states. Vindication of such violations is an essential requisite of social justice. For, as the Holy Father stated,

When this equality of rights has been destroyed, attacked or threatened, order demands that reparation be made and the extent of that reparation is determined not by the sword nor by the arbitrary decision of self-interest but by the rules of justice and reciprocal equity.¹²⁵

The Atlantic Charter rightly asserts the responsibility of the signatories and of the world community for "the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny," after which

they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.¹²⁶

Recognition of the fundamental unity and solidarity of the human race as a world society imposes on this world commonwealth and on each of the various constituent states the obligation to defend the member states against aggression. They must guarantee "to all nations their right to life and independence."¹²⁷ It also imposes on all peoples and nations, as a fundamental duty, social justice and social charity, which is to promote jointly and individually world peace and prosperity as well as to establish a sound New World Order.

¹²⁴ Address, August 24, 1939.

¹²⁵ Prerequisites of Peace, December, 1939.

¹²⁶ Atlantic Charter, August, 1941, Clause 6.

¹²⁷ Cf. Joint Letter to *The Times*, London, by the British Church Leaders, Dec. 21, 1940.

Should nationalistic sovereign states refuse to recognize the regulating and restraining force of these social virtues, they naturally become subject to the fatal drive of national greed or collective selfishness, and the rule of might alone holds sway. Under the dominance of such individualistic philosophy treaties and legal obligations are violated with impunity; for "mutual trust and fidelity to contracts which constitute the very soul of the juridical relations"¹²⁸ between states, no longer possess any validity or binding force when the law of nations is divorced from the natural law.

Where one nation dominates another or attempts to impose on it a particular form of government there cannot be order. Thereby are generated hatreds and preparations for new revolts and new wars. No consideration of "national interests" can ever justify the violation of the fundamental rights of another state. "The will of one nation to live must never mean the sentence of death passed on another."¹²⁹ This, and many other basic "rights" claimed by Nazi leaders for their racial super-State and "new order," lacking any moral or juridical foundation, can only be enforced by the tyranny of might. The Nazi order of subjugation and enslavement of most of the states of Europe is no less than an extreme revolution of nihilism—the very antithesis of all order. The dethronement of the Nazi autocracy is a fundamental condition for the establishment of world order. Any usurpation of the rights of others or claims to absolute autonomy perverts the order of nature and "leaves the stability of international relations at the mercy of the will of rulers while it destroys the possibility of true union and fruitful collaboration directed to the general good"¹³⁰ of mankind.

¹²⁸ Pius XII, "Summi Pontificatus," para. 68.

¹²⁹ Pius XI, *op. cit.*

¹³⁰ Pius XII, "Summi Pontificatus," para. 66.

XII

Basic Principles of World Peace

THE FORCE OF MIGHT can never construct a Christian New World Order. It is with the power of reason and not with that of arms that truth, justice, charity, liberty and welfare of mankind progress. The attempt by any so-called "super-race" to enslave the rest of humanity is an inversion of the natural order and must inevitably fail. The whole does not exist, solely and ultimately, for the part, nor in the order of nature does the human race exist for any special "super-race." Any order, in which material and economic ends are made supreme, while the social, spiritual and moral worth of man is ignored, denied or relegated to a position of inferiority, contains in itself a corroding force which inevitably brings about its own dissolution. The brute force of economic or military might, essential to suppress continued threatening revolt, spells the doom of progress as well as of social order itself.

The experiences of mankind, as recorded in historical records, show that the natural forces operating in the world, do not of themselves assure the automatic development of the social order or the progress of human civilization. No new world order can arise from the dominance of a super-state. Any philosophy of international relations, which attempts to build a new order by giving to a majority of nations or peoples the status of subject-states or satellites under master-states, spells the enslavement of mankind. Neither the community nor the state, the nation nor the race can be regarded as a totalitarian, self-sufficing entity. Such conceptions are disruptive of a New World Order which embraces the family of mankind. Besides, as the liberty and well-being of the person, the family and the religious organization are more fundamental, and superior to those of the state, which in the

natural order ultimately exists for these higher ends, so a conception of society, which does not recognize the fact that the value of human personality far surpasses all other earthly values, suffers from a congenital weakness, which undermines all attempts to establish a sound, dynamic, world order.

The mere destruction of Hitlerism and of all totalitarian tyrannies will not bring about the realization of a new and better order in the world. Peace cannot be automatically secured by conquest, nor is it the mere product of success which has been achieved by the strongest forces or by the triumph of the greatest number. As Pope Pius XII stated:

Safety does not come to peoples from external means, from the sword, which can impose conditions of peace but does not create peace. Forces that are to renew the face of the earth should proceed from within, from the spirit.¹³¹

It is therefore but natural that, as in England, peoples should look to Christian leaders for the principles and the pattern on which, after victory has been achieved, the New Order will be created. For, unless the Church take the lead for world peace, there is no hope for the future of world civilization.

Even during the war against organized forces of barbarism, it is of paramount importance, as Premier Salazar of Portugal has declared, that "we should interest ourselves in the problems of peace, because war can only destroy and of itself can never rebuild."¹³² Consequently, all men should redouble their efforts for a speedy victory as a prelude to universal peace. All men of good will must strive, with all their might, "not for peace based on passion and the destruction of peoples but peace which, while guaranteeing the honor of all nations, will satisfy the vital needs and insure the legitimate rights of all."¹³³

¹³¹ "Summi Pontificatus," para. 74.

¹³² Olivera Salazar, Address on the Occasion of a National Celebration of His 52nd Birthday, April 26, 1941.

¹³³ Pius XII, Easter Message, April 13, 1941.

In the New Order of peace, which must replace that of armed international anarchy hitherto prevailing, a fundamental change in the principles as well as in the character of our social institutions is essential. Everywhere "the moral force of right should replace the material force of arms."¹³⁴ Every effort should be made to ensure the dominance of truth, justice and charity in the realm of international relations. In this sphere a real "new deal," actually Christian in principle and spirit, is vital. Instead of the "new order" of enslavement with which totalitarian might would fetter mankind, all men of good will should strive and pray for "a just, lasting peace" founded on the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man.

As justice and charity are the basis of any social order, so, in the New World Order, both play their respective rôles. A viable justice is essential so that the basic rights of all states, small and large, of minorities as well as of majorities, of persons as well as of the great human family, be fully guaranteed, and so that their liberty and honor rest secure. World peace which has for its purpose the promotion of "the higher interests of the great human family is the fruit of charity and justice."¹³⁵ In all endeavors for world peace, man's "thirst for justice," as St. Augustine said, must ever "remain in conformity with the law of charity."¹³⁶ And, as Pius XI notes, "charity is not charity if the requirements of justice be not taken into account."¹³⁷ While peace is "the work of justice,"¹³⁸ no true world order can be set up through "a hard and cast-iron justice but it should be tempered no less with charity, the virtue most adapted to bring about reconciliation among men."¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Benedict XV, Message to the Warring Nations, August 1, 1917.

¹³⁵ Pius XII, First Message to the World, March 3, 1939.

¹³⁶ St. Augustine, "De Civitate Dei."

¹³⁷ Pius XI, "On Atheistic Communism."

¹³⁸ Isaias, XXXII, 17.

¹³⁹ Pius XI, "Peace of Christ in the Reign of Christ," December 23, 1922.

The traditional Christian doctrine on this subject had been summed by St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, when he stated:

Peace is the work of justice, indirectly in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace, but it is the work of charity directly, since charity according to its very nature ensures peace. . . .

Charity causes peace precisely because it is the love of God and of our neighbor. . . . There is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace.¹⁴⁰

So in the reform of society and the establishment of a true New World Order "charity must play a leading part." For charity cannot take the place of justice unfairly withheld, but, even though a state of things be pictured in which every man received at least all that is due, a wide field will nevertheless remain open for charity. For, justice alone, even though most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the curse of social strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding all men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid. . . . Then only will it be possible to unite all in harmonious striving for the common good when all sections of society have the intimate conviction that they are members of a single family and children of the same Heavenly Father.¹⁴¹

Charity is the very soul of the New World Order. Nevertheless a dynamic spirit of justice must establish and pervade all juridical and social institutions essential to such order.

The Christian New World Order is basically an order of peace. The "form and essence of Christian life," Benedict XV states, "consists essentially in charity and the preaching of which is called the Gospel of peace."¹⁴² It is this Gospel that has proclaimed and established the dignity and integrity of the human person, that will bring about world peace. No other virtue can so promote integrity and fullness of life, or

¹⁴⁰ "Summa Theologica," II. II., q. 29, a. 3 ad 3., cf. Pius XI, "Ubi Arcano Dei" 1922; "Quadragesimo Anno," 1931.

¹⁴¹ Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno."

¹⁴² "The Re-establishment of Christian Peace," May 23, 1920; cf. Eph., VI, 15.

ennoble the dignity of and enhance the perfection of human personality.

The Gospel has not one law of charity for individuals and another for nations and states. Every person and every social group must submit to its rule. Hence peoples and states as well as individuals must wage war everywhere on greed, enmity and hatred. Furthermore, throughout the world, but especially among those nations participating in the World War, every effort should be made to uproot the poisonous seeds of discord. Hatreds, resentments and rivalries must give way to mutual love and concord. The corroding bitterness of class warfare must be supplanted by the constructive forces of mutual co-operation directed by social justice and social charity towards the attainment of the higher common good, so essential to the welfare and perfection of all.

The spirit of war, national strife and international discord will have to be transformed by a dynamic spirit of brotherly good-will which will inspire all men to collaborate effectively for the promotion of the common good of the whole human family. It is this spirit of charity which, as the soul of this New World Order, should permeate its builders. As St. Augustine notes, "citizens, peoples and all men, recalling their common origin, shall [and should] not only unite them among themselves but shall make them brothers."¹⁴³ All must realize the truth expressed by Pope Pius XI, that, as a general policy, "we cannot promote the instruments of war and pretend to seek international peace."¹⁴⁴

XIII

World Organizations and World Order

THE ESTABLISHMENT AFTER World War I of the League of Nations, the World Court and the International Labor Office,

¹⁴³ "De Moribus Ecc. Cath.," I, chap. 30.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Beals, "The Catholic Church and the International Order," p. 118.

gave great promise to a weary but expectant world. There can be no doubt that in their basic principles and their expressed objectives, all three organizations gave practical expression to the aspirations of centuries of Christian hope. In spite of the limitations to which they were subjected, their accomplishments in the realm of international well-being will always deserve the gratitude of mankind. For their failures must we not blame chiefly the world states for their refusal to bear their full share of responsibility for the world order? Their failure to prevent a world economic collapse and a World War, of greater magnitude and barbarity than heretofore witnessed, is due to a multiplicity of causes. We realize today that the refusal of the United States of America—the world's greatest democracy as well as the greatest "have" nation—to join and co-operate actively in the efforts of these institutions in solving the world's major problems, dealt to the infant League and its associated organizations a staggering blow.

Coupling the League with the problem of the World War reparations, and the enforcement of the irrational terms of the Versailles Treaty, tainted it from infancy with a congenital moral malady. Perhaps too much was expected and undertaken by these institutions. Certain it is that the imposition of the world war burdens on these agencies was unfortunate. However, had all nations, sincerely and with good will, rallied to their support, even this difficulty might have been surmounted.

Moreover, had the earnest plea of Pope Benedict XV, that "the rulers of peoples . . . forget their own differences for the sake of human society,"¹⁴⁵ been heeded, a considerably greater measure of success might have crowned their efforts. Envy, greed and national rivalries soon began to play their destructive rôles. But possibly what vitiated the efforts

¹⁴⁵ Message, September 8, 1922.

of nations more than anything else was the generally accepted individualistic conception of society which dominated political and social thought during the past century. Based on a false conception of human nature, the activities of all social institutions suffered from the influences of individual and collective egoism. Failure to recognize that the welfare of world society requires the sacrifice of many "national rights" and "national interests," has, during the twentieth century generally, dealt a fatal blow to most of the efforts to promote international harmony and well-being. For all peoples and all nations form a natural "world commonwealth" which does not depend on a basic "social contract" but stems from the human person, human solidarity and the natural needs of mankind.

Imminent danger of destruction or enslavement has forced most of the nations and peoples of the world today to recognize their interdependence. In this movement towards world unity, the United States of America is at present playing the leading rôle. A quarter of a century ago, chastened by menaces to our national security and by war experiences, our nation, under the leadership of President Wilson, basked in the spiritual glory of a temporary renunciation of the philosophy of extreme nationalism. Our relapse from this attitude of cooperative altruism was gravely pernicious both to ourselves and to the world commonwealth. As noted by Prime Minister Churchill in his address on the World War before the United States Congress: "If we had kept together after the last war, if we had taken common measures for our safety, this renewal of the curse need never have fallen upon us."¹⁴⁶ Extreme individualism and its social counterpart, rugged nationalism, will always remain fundamental crimes against the human person and against humanity. These evils automatically undermine and disintegrate the higher well-

¹⁴⁶ Washington, December 26, 1941.

being of man and of all efforts to promote the higher forms of social unity. Human nature is fundamentally social as well as individual, and all nations, no matter how powerful, must recognize and submit to the basic social doctrine that all, by Divine decree, are naturally members of the world commonwealth, and, consequently, share in the moral responsibility of defending its existence, promoting its organization, and contributing a proportionate share in the promotion of the common good of mankind.

No state or people need fear that its national interests will be adversely affected through the fullest acceptance of international natural law. Neither will national well-being suffer impairment through whole-hearted co-operation with other states in the advancement of higher international well-being. The more nations, States and peoples actually recognize the basic Christian truth that common humanity has a claim, under the natural law, to the genuine allegiance of everyone, the more surely will the good life of nations as well as of individuals be realistically and effectively secured.

In the scheme of the New World Order as envisaged by recent Popes, a fully organized world society or commonwealth is an essential feature. Assurance of economic security or of permanent world peace cannot otherwise be effected.

Pope Benedict XV, in his message to the warring nations, had this in mind when he urged a congress of all civilized nations for the establishment of institutions for the arbitration and adjudication of international issues, as well as for the enforcement of such decisions by appropriate and effective sanctions. During the sessions of the Versailles peace conference, Benedict XV further declared himself most emphatically in favor of a world league. In his encyclical on "The Re-establishment of Christian Peace," he stated:

It is much to be desired that all states putting aside mutual suspicion should unite in one league or rather family of peoples calculated to maintain their own independence and safeguard the order of human society. What especially calls for such an association of nations is the need generally recognized to abolish or reduce the enormous burden of military expenditure which states can no longer bear or to prevent those disastrous wars or at least to remove the danger of them as far as possible. We fervently exhort all nations under the inspiration of Christian benevolence to establish a true peace among themselves and join together in an alliance which shall be just and therefore lasting.¹⁴⁷

In the previous century, Leo XIII, who had been responsible for the movement which eventuated in the First Hague Conference, expressed himself in favor of the establishment of a World League. In a letter to the Secretary of the 7th International Congress,¹⁴⁸ he warmly thanked Father Pichot of Budapest "for the eloquent words which he had pronounced and published more than once in favor of a League of Nations."

Pius XI dedicated his life to an aggressive crusade for world peace. In various ways he encouraged the thorough-going organization of institutions capable of establishing a New World Order, which would relieve mankind from the crushing burden of armaments and promote the economic and social well-being of mankind. The idea of world organization for peace, the Pope pointed out, had already been foreshadowed "in the middle ages by that true society of nations which was the community of Christian peoples."¹⁴⁹

It was this same Pope who, in his program of social reconstruction urging the application of social justice and social charity to the solution of the world's economic problems, set his stamp of approval on reciprocal trade treaties and international co-operative institutions as effective methods of establishing a better economic order. He said:

¹⁴⁷ December 23, 1920.

¹⁴⁸ December 1, 1896.

¹⁴⁹ Pius XI, "Peace of Christ and the Reign of Christ."

It would be well if the various nations, in common counsel and endeavor, strove to promote a healthy economic co-operation by prudent pacts and institutions, since in economic matters they are largely dependent one upon another and need one another's help.¹⁵⁰

The need of international political, juridical, and economic institutions, such as are represented by the League, the World Court and the International Labor Office, as a part of the practical organization of the world commonwealth, is necessary for the promotion of the common good of all men by social justice and social charity and to ensure "a new tranquil and lasting order."¹⁵¹

In pointing out that, while "force may be used to further right it may never be employed against right," Pius XII urges the re-establishment of international organizations as necessary for world peace and order. Only by accepting the rule of right instead of might will

men responsible for the government of peoples and their reciprocal relations . . . succeed in effectuating and perfecting a stable, fruitful international organization such as is desired by men of good will, an organization which respecting the rights of God will be able to assure the reciprocal independence of nations big and small, to impose fidelity to agreements loyally agreed upon, and to safeguard the sound liberty and dignity of the human person in each one's efforts towards the prosperity of all.¹⁵²

In this statement is to be found a complete repudiation of the "new world order" founded on Nazi racialism which is the antithesis of everything demanded by Christian morality—an order built upon the repudiation of all moral principles—in which people and nations are subject to the rule of barbaric terrorism and enslaved in the interests of a "super-race."

In the New World Order envisaged by Pope Pius XII, the

¹⁵⁰ "Quadragesimo Anno," 1931.

¹⁵¹ Pius XII, Discourse on visit to King Victor Emmanuel, December 28, 1939.

¹⁵² Response to New Minister of Haiti to the Holy See, November 10, 1939.

liberty and well-being of individuals, peoples and of nations, is safeguarded and ultimately the higher good of each individual is promoted. It is through the moral principles grounded on the solid rock of natural law and of Divine Revelation, that the "new order of national and international life must rest."¹⁵³ Thereby, in this new order,

the human race is bound together by reciprocal ties, moral and juridical, into a great commonwealth directed to the good of all nations and ruled by special ties which protect its unity and promote its prosperity.¹⁵⁴

Keeping in mind the fundamental doctrine of the solidarity of the human race, it becomes evident that the theory of racial particularism, and, especially, of a so-called super-race, can have no prescriptive right against the fundamental rights, liberties and general welfare of the human family. Neither should the institution of nations into which a natural disposition of Divine Providence has divided the human race, undermine or destroy either the "consciousness of universal brotherhood" or "the unity of a supra-national society," which, in itself, constitutes "a great commonwealth."¹⁵⁵

Coupled with a progressive organic disarmament of nations, Pius XII urges the "creating or re-constructing of international institutions"¹⁵⁶ as essential to a true New World Order. Naturally, no such steps can be taken until the forces of barbarism have first been conquered, and the "right to life and independence for all nations great or small, powerful or weak" is established. In the re-establishment and functioning of such world organizations, statesmen should learn wholesome lessons from "the experience gained from the ineffectiveness or imperfections of previous institutions of the kind."¹⁵⁷ Furthermore,

¹⁵³ Pius XII, "Summi Pontificatus."

¹⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*

¹⁵⁵ Pius XII, *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁶ Christmas Message, December 24, 1939; also December 24, 1941.

¹⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*

to procure the rebirth of mutual trust (the very soul of juridical relations), certain institutions must be established which will merit the respect of all, and which will dedicate themselves to the most noble office of guaranteeing the sincere observance of treaties and of promoting, in accordance with the principles of law and equity, necessary corrections and revisions of such treaties.¹⁵⁸

While such international institutions must preserve their dynamic character, the already-constituted League of Nations, the World Court, the International Labor Office and the Bank for International Settlements, with some general modifications, readily could be made to perform the fundamental functions urgently demanded of such world organizations. An extension of the jurisdiction of each and their revitalization through a thorough-going recognition of the international juridical relations involved is a requisite for such an order. Furthermore, conserving the supremacy of the world order and of the jurisdiction of the universal common good over that of any state, is vital. As the world commonwealth constitutes a natural, organic, juridical, political society, recognition of its inherent authority to enact positive laws for the promotion of the common good must be conceded by all states. The right to establish, either through custom or by the "consent of the greater part of mankind,"¹⁵⁹ such international positive laws as will bind the whole world community was, according to the medieval theologians, regarded as incontestable. Even in the fifth century this right was already accepted as inviolable by St. Augustine,¹⁶⁰ who maintained the higher authority of world human society over that of the state.

In view of this supreme, political jurisdiction and higher purpose of the world commonwealth, any act of a nation or law which interferes with the international common good

¹⁵⁸ Pius XII, Christmas Message, December 24, 1941.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. "Victoria De Potestate Civile"; Suarez, "De Legibus."

¹⁶⁰ St. Augustine, "Contra Faustum," XIX, c. 7.

must at all times be regarded as unjust and illicit; and should be so adjudged, as Suarez notes,

by the Law of Nations and by the authority of the whole world . . . otherwise society could not hold together.¹⁶¹

One of the fundamental gains achieved during the present world crisis is the recognition of hemispheric and world solidarity. Common dangers have placed the pet political doctrines of "neutrality," "splendid isolation," and "national interests" in their proper perspective. Few serious statesmen or scholars now do them reverence. Pearl Harbor punctured the sparkling bubble of neutrality.

The world must guard against a post-war relapse. The spirit of egoism, which generates exaggerated and unjust nationalism, than which nothing is more contrary to the brotherhood of men and people, dies hard.¹⁶² A dynamic spirit of world fraternity, without which no real new world order can develop, "can find vital healthy roots and satisfying nourishment only in the dictates, inspirations and practices of Christianity." Only thereby is it possible for suffering humanity to survive the present world holocaust and assure the realization of

a universal dominion of right by such concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.¹⁶³

The formal acceptance of such ideals and principles by President Roosevelt, as indicated and expressed in a recent letter to the American Catholic Hierarchy, is most encouraging. In part the President states:

We shall win the war, and in victory we shall seek not vengeance but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and nations.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Suarez, "De Jure Belli," 433, and "Victoria De Jure Belli," 431, 19.

¹⁶² Pius XI, Address to the Cardinals' Consistory, March 14, 1933.

¹⁶³ Quoted by Sumner Wells in Address to Rio de Janeiro Conference, January 16, 1942.

¹⁶⁴ *The Washington Post*, January 17, 1942.

In his original appeal for the establishment of a New World Order to supplant the present world chaos and world carnage, Pius XII sounded an appeal for world co-operation based on a spirit of Christian fraternity. He notes with alarm "the tremendous amount of work that will be necessary, when a world tired of fighting wishes to restore peace, to break down the walls of aversion and hatred which have been built up in the heat of strife."¹⁶⁵ His Holiness not only traced out the broad outlines to effect and preserve a just international peace but also indicated a basis for the effective co-operation of Catholics and non-Catholics in their struggle to achieve that goal.

For "those who guide the destinies of peoples and peoples themselves" it is essential, the Pope states, that they "be penetrated always more and more by that spirit from which alone can life, authority and obligation arise from the dead letter of the articles of an international agreement." This spirit emanates solely from "the holy unshakable rules of Divine Law." To all men of good-will who hunger and thirst after justice even, "to those who have not the benefit of participating in our own Faith," the Pope indicates a common basis for united action in the common acceptance of the doctrine of "universal love."¹⁶⁶ The admirable example set by the leaders of the different denominations in co-operating for the propagation of the principles enumerated by the Pope as requisite for the establishment of the New World Order has, according to the public statement of Cardinal Hinsley¹⁶⁷ in London, elicited expressions of satisfaction from His Holiness. Furthermore, in his recent broadcast on the New World Order, His Holiness extended his apostolic blessing to "those who, though not members of the visible body of the Catholic Church, are near to us in their faith in God and in

¹⁶⁵ Christmas Message, December 24, 1939.

¹⁶⁶ Pius XII, *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁷ *The Tablet*, London, June, 1941.

Jesus Christ and share with us our views with regard to the provisions for peace and its fundamental aims."¹⁶⁸

A similar appeal for united action of all mankind in the face of the world crisis had been voiced by Pius XI. In part he stated:

In the name of the Lord. . . . We conjure individuals and nations, in the face of such problems and in the throes of a conflict of such vital interest to mankind to put aside the narrow individualism and base egoism that blinds even the most clear sighted, that withers up all noble initiative as soon as it is no longer confined to the limited circle of paltry interests. Let them unite together even at a cost of heavy sacrifices to save themselves and mankind. In such a union of minds and forces they naturally ought to be the first who are proud of the Christian name.¹⁶⁹

World peace and the establishment of a stable and dynamic New World Order is a matter vital for pagan as well as for Christian, for Jew as well as for Gentile. For all peoples it is the essential condition for their higher well-being and perfection: for oppressed minorities, for peoples economically impoverished, for states especially destitute of primary products, for the smaller and weaker States, as well as for those economically or politically menaced or oppressed. For all these it is especially urgent. But for all states, no matter how large and wealthy, or of whatsoever condition, a sound New World Order is necessary and imperative. The solidarity of the human race under God and international natural law, which forms the basis of such order, imposes on all peoples and nations the individual and collective responsibility for mutual defense, for the promotion of world peace and prosperity, as well as for the establishment of a sound dynamic New World Order.*

¹⁶⁸ Pius XII, Christmas, 1941.

¹⁶⁹ Pius XI, "The Sacred Heart and World Distress."

* [EDITOR'S NOTE: Msgr. MacLean has dealt with the problems of minorities and of disarmament extensively in separate studies not included here for lack of space. W. L.]

In time of desperate war society can grant no grace to private luxuries. Is education a luxury, to be relegated to the scrap heap? For the youth under military age education, it is universally agreed, must go on. No provision is being made for the exemption of students training themselves for teaching and research positions in the social sciences and the humanities. In those fields the war represents a lost academic generation.

Too bad; but can't we mend the situation by extra efforts in liberal education when peace returns? This is not sure. The forces that draw young men and women to college are subtle and fluctuating. The national judgment that in time of crisis the humanities and social sciences do not count may work powerfully to turn the youth away from college. Technical education has obvious meaning. What, after all do the humanities and social sciences mean?

We are fighting, it is constantly repeated, to preserve our "way of life." What then is our way of life? Fundamentally, it turns on the recognition of the worth of the individual human being, his right to guide his own life, under the rules of the road, his duties to his fellowmen and to the state under whose protection he lives. Under Fascism, Nazism, Japanism, there can be no individual with rights and duties, but only cogs in the governmental machine. We do not choose to be cogs: therefore we will fight to the bitter end.

But we can not be free individuals, capable of maintaining our rights and executing our duties, without enlightenment. The struggle with Fascism will not end with the laying down of arms. We shall need to strengthen our liberal educational system, if we are to cope satisfactorily with the totalitarian ideas that will outlive the totalitarian armies.

ALVIN JOHNSON

Henry George: the Dedication Period*

By ANNA GEORGE DE MILLET†

1

The Vow

IN DECEMBER, 1868, HENRY GEORGE was engaged by *The San Francisco Herald* to go to New York and try to get the paper admitted to the Associated Press.¹ Failing that, he was to establish a special news service for *The Herald*.

When he started East the transcontinental railroad was not yet finished, although thousands of Chinese coolies had been imported to work on it—as many as twelve thousand at one time.² George left San Francisco on the Overland Stage Route. Crossing the plains in a four-horse “mud wagon,” he spent days and nights sitting beside the driver. From his seat the traveller could observe sky and earth and question his companion. With years of experience on the trail the latter may have been able to answer some of them.

Were these vast tracts of virgin land, stretching to the far horizon, part of the “alternate sections” that had been deeded to the railroad, along with the mile-wide strips that would border the tracks on either side? Were they some of the twelve million acres presented to the Union Pacific Railroad by Congress?³ Were they some of the lands that had been bought from the Indians by wily white men for two cents an acre, and sometimes paid for, not in money but in merchandise?⁴ Were they grants that had been vouchsafed by sweep of pen in the hand of an alien king now long dead?

There was much to ponder over during that bumpy, jerky ride, in the springless, lumbering stage; it served to help George forget the physical discomfort of the journey. But when he reached the railroad at last and

* Copyright, 1943, by Anna George de Mille. A section of a previously unpublished study, “Citizen of the World”; see “Henry George: Childhood and Early Youth,” *AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO.*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April, 1942), p. 283n.

† The former site of the convent of the Sisters of the Order of St. Vincent de Paul, the Sisters of Charity (“Henry George: Early California Period,” *ib.*, Vol. 1, No. 4, July, 1942, p. 441n.) was at Alameda and Macy Streets, not Alameda and Tracy. It is now occupied by the Union Railroad Terminal.

¹ This news agency was a forerunner of the present agency of the same name.

² Oscar Lewis, “The Big Four,” New York, Knopf, 1938, p. 72.

³ Gustavus Myers, “History of the Great American Fortunes,” New York, Modern Library, 1938, p. 440.

⁴ *ib.*, p. 667.

boarded a sleeping car, his new quarters seemed like the height of luxury, even though he had to share his berth with a stranger.

He went straight to Philadelphia, of course. The reunion with his wife and children, as well as with his parents and his Aunt Mary and his sisters and brothers, whom he had not seen for eleven years (only Jennie was missing from the family circle),⁵ was a joyous one. Still, he could remain at home only a short time. Engaging a boyhood friend as his assistant, he went on to New York to attend to the business that had brought him East.

It was a different New York from the one he had visited fourteen years before as a lad of fifteen, starting on a trip around the world. Now its population, half of it foreign-born, was nearly a million. The concert hall, Castle Garden, at the Battery, had been turned into a depot where immigrants, who poured into the port at the rate of 200,000 and more annually,⁶ could get information, interpreters and guidance. And in the city, in contrast with the mansions of the affluent (a two million dollar one was then being built for a newly-rich merchant),⁷ were ten thousand dingy tenements which the newcomers helped crowd. The poverty was reflected in the death rate, double that of London.

During his stay in the city, Henry George waged a tedious fight with the management of the Associated Press. At this time he wrote a letter to *The New York Tribune*,⁸ attacking the Wells-Fargo Express for its recklessness in handling mail, and the Central Pacific Railroad for its excessive freight charges. Concerning the latter, he wrote that the road as yet afforded no advantage to those on the Pacific coast because transportation cost as much, if not more than in the days when the people there were dependent for haulage on horse or ox.

There would be some excuse for this, if the road had been constructed by private means; but it has been, and is being built literally and absolutely by the money of the people, receiving liberal aid from cities, counties and State of California, as well as the immense gratuity of the general government. . . .

The Central Pacific can dictate to California, Nevada and Utah, and the Union Pacific to the States and Territories through which it passes more completely than the Camden and Amboy dictated to New Jersey, and each or both will be able to exert an almost irresistible pressure upon Congress

⁵ Cf. "Henry George: the Formative Years," *AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO.*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1942) p. 97.

⁶ John A. Kouwenhoven, "Adventures of America," New York, Harper, 1938, sections 3, 134.

⁷ A. T. Stewart, a dry-goods merchant. The structure was built of white marble at Thirty-fourth Street and Fifth Avenue, across the street from the present site of the Empire State Building.

⁸ Printed March 5, 1869.

in any manner in which their interests are involved. . . . The Central already influences conventions, manages Legislatures, and has its representatives in both Houses at Washington. . . .⁹

Failing to get *The San Francisco Herald* into the Associated Press, George returned to Philadelphia, where he gathered all the news he could, revamped and condensed it and wired it in cipher to his paper. His small service proved to be so competitive that the other San Francisco papers, which were in the Associated Press Service, brought pressure on the Western Union Telegraph Company to refuse the business. The carrier took the stand that it could not transmit a cipher or give service from Philadelphia. George promptly moved back to New York and continued to send news from there. The Western Union countered by setting a new schedule of rates, which increased charges for *The San Francisco Herald* and reduced them for the Associated Press.

The owner of *The San Francisco Herald* was strangely silent at his end of the line. Alone George fought the dragon of monopoly. He remembered the injunction, "Let no man living impose on you." To the vice-president of Western Union and afterward to the president, with whom persistence won him a hearing, he protested that the discrimination in service meant the crushing of the paper he represented. But he appealed in vain.

Then risking his future, he wrote an exposé of the monopoly which he sent, under his own signature, to newspapers in the East. *The New York Herald* was the only one of the large papers to publish the article. It did not change the company's stand. The San Francisco paper's telegraph news service had to be reduced so much that it could not compete with the rival dailies.¹⁰

Although the six months on the Atlantic coast had been a failure, from the viewpoint of his mission, they helped to shape the course of his life. He had gone through a long and bitter experience, learning how difficult it could be, even in bountiful California, to earn a living. Now he had found conditions even worse in the East. In these crowded cities where material development was far advanced, where, closer to the culture of Europe, there had been fifty years more of "civilization" than on the Pacific frontier, one would expect material wants to be more easily satisfied, life to be more abundant. Instead, everything unjust and corrupt in the body politic or the economy that was developing in the new country seemed to

⁹ Cf. Henry George, Jr., "Life of Henry George," New York, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1942, p. 182.

¹⁰ Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 181, 183-6.

be firmly entrenched in the older settlement: men begged and sweatshops flourished in the very shadow of magnificent churches and private palaces.

For if, in the West, there was a small, privileged group controlling vast tracts of the richly-endowed soil, and thereby affecting the lives of the comparatively few who toiled on those lands, in the East there was a small privileged group who owned far less acreage but who, due to the density of population, wielded unbelievable power over the lives of masses of their fellows. Prominent in this New York City group were the Astors, Goeleys, Livingstons, and Rhinelanders; the Trinity Church Corporation, which mulcted the very people to whom it doled charity; and the Sailors' Snug Harbor Foundation which financed the benevolences it showered on a few old seamen by extorting high rents from slum dwellers.

If, in the West, fortunes were made and lost in mining ventures, in the East fortunes were made and lost in Wall Street speculation—a form of gambling more pernicious in its wide effects. In California was the "Big Four," dishonestly acquiring land titles, subsidies and franchises through corruption of politicians and law courts.¹¹ But New York also had its schemers, who, by bribing State Senator Tweed and his Tammany "ring," contrived, at criminally low cost, to get title to the highly valuable water front of Manhattan Island, as well as to transportation franchises, public utilities and rights-of-way.¹²

In California the ubiquitous railroad had far-reaching powers that seemed to take toll of every enterprise in the State, but in the East chains of railroads were extracting subsidies from a much larger public, making appalling levies on industry, and through the knavery and craft of their controllers (Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jay Gould and their cohorts), corrupting the judiciary and city and state officials on their own account. Altogether, the plunderers succeeded in making the politics of New York a flaming scandal.¹³

East and West the unscrupulous few were able to prey upon the weak many; the few becoming richer; the many, more impoverished, George saw. Ignorance permitted exploitation. Political corruption was linked with privilege. Bitter suffering was the result. Side by side with wealth stalked want. In the wake of progress followed degrading poverty. Surely it was not because the earth was poorly equipped or nature niggardly that human beings were starving in the midst of plenty, he thought. Certainly no

¹¹ Lewis, *op. cit.*; Myers, *op. cit.*

¹² Henry George, Jr., "The Menace of Privilege," New York, Macmillan, 1905; Myers, *op. cit.*

¹³ Myers, *op. cit.*

beneficent Creator could have willed it so! There must be some natural law that was being broken, else why this unequal distribution?

Which to do—to attack the political dishonesty or seek the cause of privilege?

It seemed hopeless that any one man could make an impression against these monstrous wrongs—let alone a man who had just failed in his attack on a comparatively small arm of entrenched monopoly. And why should he, Henry George, who wanted to live quietly and give a life of ease to those he loved, who wanted to study and travel and read history and poetry and to write a novel,—why should he even try?

Less than thirty, small, slender, shabbily dressed—the type of man threading unnoticed in a crowd, alone and unknown—he roamed the great metropolis. Along Fifth Avenue and around Washington Square, past the brownstone or marble mansions, where the powerful ones lived. On to the teeming, squalid districts where were the miles of unheated, unsanitary, noisome tenements of the poor—the poor who labored ten or twelve hours a day, whose young children worked in factories, all undernourished, all starved of the beauty of life.

The shocking contrast between monstrous wealth and debasing want permitted the man from the West no peace. He kept searching for the reason for this disparity. Putting aside the dream he once had had of acquiring wealth for himself, he asked now to be shown the way to relieve this suffering—and the strength to do it. Then—

Once in daylight, and in a city street, there came to me a thought, a vision, a call—give it what name you please. But every nerve quivered and there and then I made a vow.¹⁴

And from this vow—to seek out and remedy, if he could, the cause that “condemned little children” to lives of squalor and misery—he never faltered.

2

The Answer

REALIZING THAT HE COULD BE of use to his paper no longer in New York, Henry George said good-bye to his family. Late in May he returned to San Francisco. At once he opened a fight to have a resolution against the telegraph monopoly introduced into the Legislature. It was later adopted.

¹⁴ Letter by Henry George to the Rev. Thomas Dawson, O.M.I., of Dublin, Ireland, New York, Feb. 1, 1883. The holograph ms. was presented to Brotherton Library, Leeds, England. A photographic copy is in the private collection of the writer.

For the crusader, things were looking black again. John Russell Young, managing editor of *The New York Tribune*, had contracted with him for a series of articles about the new transcontinental railroad and the country through which it passed. George had written several while he was in New York. They were paid for but they had not been published. The new managing editor, Whitelaw Reid, Young's successor, annulled the contract. Then too, more than \$700 in back salary, due George for his work in the East, was slow in coming; he finally had to sue for it.

No other work being open, he went back to type-setting on *The San Francisco Herald*. Meanwhile he wrote editorials for *The Evening Bulletin*, read widely and made his first attempt to enter politics. He tried to get a nomination on the Democratic ticket for the Assembly, where he hoped to fight the telegraph, express and railroad monopolies. But when he refused to pay the assessment asked by the party managers, he was not chosen. Then an offer of an editorship came.

At a meeting of the American Free Trade League he had become acquainted with the Governor of California, Henry Hadley Haight.¹⁵ Haight, like George, had been a Republican and had turned Jeffersonian democrat. The two men had much in common. When the owners of a small Democratic paper, *The Transcript*, published in Oakland, a suburb of San Francisco, were looking for a capable man as editor, Haight influenced them to select George.

The new editor attracted attention in his new post. While in New York he had written an article in which he discussed the relation of Capital and Labor, dwelling particularly on the wages of the hordes of Chinese coolies who were migrating to the Pacific coast and working uncomplainingly for \$40 a month.¹⁶ George wrote in part:

As the competition of Chinese labor with white labor has become more general and threatening, the feeling against them has become correspondingly intense. . . .

Our manufacturers have talked of the pauper labor of Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield. Here is cheaper labor at their own doors. Labor which will deem itself well remunerated by wages upon which English operators could not keep themselves out of the poor house—which will not agitate for its own rights, form trades unions, or get up strikes; which will not clamour for eight hour laws, but will labor without murmur twelve or fourteen hours a day, not even asking Sundays; which is patient, submissive, enduring, with the patience, submissiveness, and endurance which countless ages

¹⁵ Tenth governor of California, 1868-72.

¹⁶ Leland Stanford held that, "more prudent and economical, they are content with less wages." Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

of tyranny have ground into the character of the down-trodden peoples of the East.¹⁷

Although the author pointed out that this problem on the Pacific coast was at bottom a labor problem, he contended also that since there were such things as family, nation, race—and the right of association—there was the “correlative right of exclusion.” The article had been printed on the front and second pages of *The Tribune* and had occupied nearly five columns. While writing it, “wishing to know what political economy had to say about the cause of wages”¹⁸ he had read John Stuart Mill. George was deeply impressed by Mill’s work, in spite of the fact that Mill was both a Malthusian and a materialist and he was neither. He had sent a copy of *The Tribune* article to the English economist. To his surprise and delight a letter of commendation from Mill had followed him to California. This letter, together with a long editorial, George printed in *The Transcript*. That a celebrated European scientist should write at such length to a young, almost unknown editor, and on a subject so important to California, caused much comment.

As editor of *The Transcript* George was stimulated to study and discuss many problems of the day. But it was the problem that seemed to him to be at the root of all others—the problem of poverty—that harassed him. The passionate desire to solve it possessed him. He had turned to taking long horse-back rides. On one of them the answer came.

After riding into the hills, he had stopped to let his mustang rest. Absorbed in thought he gazed over the vast stretches of unused land on every side. A teamster passed and the two men exchanged greetings. George, for want of something better to say, asked casually what land was worth there.

“I don’t know exactly,” said the teamster. And pointing in the direction of some grazing cows, small in the distance, he added, “but there is a man over there who will sell some land for a thousand dollars an acre.”¹⁹

A thousand dollars an acre! Why, it was worth only a small fraction of that! This soil had no greater natural fertility than thousands of acres further away. Further away . . . not so near to the growing colonies of men. . . .

¹⁷ “The Chinese on the Pacific Coast,” *The New York Tribune*, May 1, 1869. Copy in Scrapbook 21, Henry George Collection, Manuscript Division, New York Public Library (hereafter abbreviated as HGC). Quoted in part by Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 194–5.

¹⁸ George, “The Science of Political Economy,” New York, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1942, p. 200.

¹⁹ Meeker Notes. *The New York Journal*, Oct. 10, 1897. Scrapbook 29, HGC. Quoted by Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 210.

Quick as a flash came the answer to the riddle that had troubled him.

When settlers come, when population increases, land augments in value. Without a stroke of work on the part of the owner (who could go live in town or abroad if he wished) these idle stretches, with the expansion of the cities of Oakland and Berkeley and San Francisco and the need for the use of this land, would come to be worth a fortune to him. And in anticipation of this prospective rise in value, due to the growing demand, the owner was now holding his land for one thousand dollars an acre. Soon he would be able to collect personally the value that he had had no part in creating but that an aggregation of people would bring to it.

Suddenly it was clear to George that land value is not the result of a man's labor but of the growth of the community and the development of its activities. Morally, he reasoned, this unearned gain "belongs in usufruct to all." To permit a few individuals to take for their aggrandizement this fund that is created by the community, forces the community to levy exactions upon labor and thrift for the maintenance of its services. The very process, while thus penalizing labor and thrift, offers rewards to the few for withholding land from use to the many—rewards that accrue to the speculator, the profiteer in that which is absolutely necessary to human life. . . . Here were fundamental reasons for the increase of poverty with increase of wealth. At last the problem which had tormented him was solved! Long after, he told of the significance of this moment:

I then and there recognized the natural order—one of those experiences that make those who have them feel thereafter that they can vaguely appreciate what mystics and poets have called the "ecstatic vision."²⁰

3

The Theory

WHILE HENRY GEORGE was coming to grips with the communications monopoly of the newspapers, his friend, Governor Haight, was facing the transport combine. The Governor had undertaken a bitter fight to change the government's policy of subsidizing the Central Pacific Railroad, a policy the railway magnates themselves had "railroaded" through legislatures. The "great absorber" was not only acquiring vast tracts of land but was demanding more and more of the people's money. Meanwhile the four Sacramento ex-shopkeepers and traders—Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, Mark Hopkins and Colis P. Huntington—who controlled the corporation, were building themselves the fortunes and the power of feudal

²⁰ "The Science of Political Economy," p. 160.

lords by manipulating their holdings. In 1862 they had managed to elect Stanford as Governor of California, for a two-year term, at the same time he had been chosen president of the Central Pacific.²¹

Stanford's incumbency had helped materially to obtain the passage in Congress, in July, 1862, of the Pacific Railroad Act. This measure and its later amendment had deeded to the Central Pacific vast tracts of the public domain—a wide strip of land for right-of-way, as well as "alternate sections," of one square mile each, on both sides of the entire line. The grant made the company one of the biggest land owners in the West.²² The statute had further provided a government loan in the form of thirty-six-year bonds at 6% interest, in amounts ranging from \$16,000 per mile of track on flat land to \$48,000 per mile of track on mountain land.²³

The power wielded by the "Big Four" was now a national scandal and a Western curse. They openly purchased the votes of citizens. They flagrantly corrupted legislators as well as congressional Representatives. They bought legal decisions. They imported Chinese to compete with American labor. They underbid competing ship and stage transportation until it was destroyed, and then jacked up freight rates to prohibitive levels, blighting trade. In May, 1869, while Europe rejoiced over the opening of the Suez Canal and the United States celebrated the linking of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts by rail, California was already beginning to see that hers was a mixed blessing. The "iron horse," upon which she had built up such big hopes, was becoming a menace.

Haight was determined to check the "Big Four's" evil power before it grew beyond challenge. Believing in George's ability, the Governor asked the newspaper man to leave *The Transcript* and take the editor's desk on the chief Democratic party paper, *The Sacramento Reporter*. George was glad to do it. In February, 1870, joined by his family, recently returned from their long visit to Philadelphia, he moved to the State capitol.

One of the things George liked about his new post was that it kept him in close touch with Haight. One evening the editor took the Governor home with him. It was late, the meal was over and Mrs. George had gone to bed. Great was her dismay when she heard the front door open and the cheery voice of her husband announce that he had brought Mr. Haight for

²¹ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

²² *Ib.*, p. 36.

²³ *Ib.*, p. 45. This legislative munificence did not satisfy the four enterprisers. In one place they contrived to have 150 miles of flat land considered as mountain land, thereby netting themselves a bonus of nearly half a million dollars. (*Ib.*, pp. 66-7.) Indeed "they had the entire road constructed," according to Gustavus Myers, "with scarcely the expenditure of a single dollar of their own." (Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 522.)

dinner! Hastily she dressed. Going downstairs, she gave a gracious welcome and warmed-over Irish stew and rice pudding to the distinguished visitor, whom she had never met before. And the Governor of California, assuring her that Irish stew and rice pudding were delectables of which he was particularly fond, consumed them with conviction.²⁴

George was with *The Reporter* for only nine months. His tenure gave him a chance to resume his fight against the communications monopolies, the Western Union Telegraph Company and the Associated Press. But he also gave his energies, with effect, to exploding the plea of the Central Pacific Railroad for further subsidies. The all-powerful transport monopoly commanded money as well as politicians and the press, and it was able quietly to buy control of *The Reporter*. Preferring to recruit George's abilities rather than wreak vengeance, the magnates tried to force on George a policy in which he would not acquiesce. To have remained would have yielded him an augmented income and surcease from financial worry. Without considering the temptation, he resigned and moved with his family back to San Francisco.

His ouster from the paper that he had turned into a weapon against reaction did not silence his attack upon the "octopus."²⁵ He turned to pamphleteering and produced a sixteen-page brochure on "The Subsidy Question and the Democratic Party." Governor Haight considered it so valuable he had a large edition of it circulated as a campaign document. In the pamphlet George declared that railroad subsidies were condemned

. . . by the economic principle that the development of industry should be left free to take its natural direction . . . ; by the political principle that government should be reduced to its minimum—that it becomes more corrupt and more tyrannical, and less under the control of the people, with every extension of its powers and duties . . . ; by the democratic principle which forbids the enrichment of one citizen at the expense of another, and the giving to one citizen of advantages denied to another. . . . They are condemned by the experience of the whole country which shows that they have invariably led to waste, extravagance and rascality; that they inevitably become a source of corruption and a means of plundering the people.²⁶

The brochure did much to make George's name known throughout the State. It also attracted to him the particular enmity of the powerful

²⁴ Related to the present writer by her mother.

²⁵ This apt characterization, the origin of which is obscure, was, of course, made popular by the late Frank Norris. His novel of that title, a useful contribution to the record of this period, is one of the great American classics of social criticism: "The Octopus," New York, Doubleday, Page, 1901.

²⁶ Copy in Scrapbook TIQB, p. v. 3, HGC. Quoted in part by Henry George, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 216-7.

oligarchy. When he obtained the Democratic nomination and ran for the Assembly, he received proportionately an even smaller vote than Haight or the others on the ticket. He took his defeat at the polls lightly.²⁷ Still, it was a disappointment, for as a member of the Assembly he would have had a better chance to fight to write into the land laws of California just and equitable provisions. But he was compensated by the knowledge that his campaign had been successful enough to make the enemy take serious measures to insure his defeat.

The four months from March to July, 1871, were interrupted by the Haight campaign. In the midst of the fight, he had been working on an elaborated answer to the economic problem that had been consuming him. It took the form of a long pamphlet, entitled, "Our Land and Land Policy."

This study, which presented the essential rudiments of the theory which he was later to expand and refine in each succeeding work, was first published in forty-eight closely printed pages.²⁸ It was an able and authoritative analysis of the distribution of Federal and California State lands and land grants. Citing case after case in California of privately owned estates amounting to one, two and three hundred thousand acres—several of over four hundred thousand acres—it pleaded for a halt in the reckless grants of the public's site and soil resources:

The largest landowners in California are probably the members of the great Central-Southern Pacific Railroad Corporation. Were the company land divided, it would give them something like two million acres apiece; and in addition to their company land, most of the individual members own considerable tracts in their own name.²⁹

In the essay he discussed the relation of labor and land, the analysis of which was to occupy his lifetime. He traced out the tendencies of the accepted land policy, then indicated what he thought American land policy should be. He pointed to the fact that in new countries where land is free, wages are high, but in old countries where land is monopolized and access to it can be obtained only by paying a land-owner for the privilege of using it, wages are low and poverty is great. He asserted that economic rent, or the return for the use of land, should be collected and employed for social needs, and that no taxes at all should be levied on the products of labor. His argument was to become a familiar thesis in later works that, unlike this original essay, were to be distributed widely around the world:

²⁷ Cf. Henry George, Jr., p. 218.

²⁸ Equivalent to 130 book pages of average length today.

²⁹ "Our Land and Land Policy," Henry George's Works, Memorial Edition, New York, Doubleday Page, 1904, pp. 71-2.

The value of land is something which belongs to all, and in taxing land values we are merely taking for the use of the community something which belongs to the community. . . . In speaking of the value of land, I mean the value of the land itself, not the value of any improvement which has been raised upon it. . . .³⁰

The mere holder of land would be called on to pay just as much taxes as the user of the land. The owner of a vacant city lot would have to pay as much for the privilege of keeping other people off it till he wanted to use it, as his neighbor who has a fine house upon his lot, and is either using it or deriving rent from it. The monopolizer of agricultural land would be taxed as much as though his land were covered with improvements, with crops and with stock.

Land prices would fall; land-speculation would receive its death blow; land monopolization would no longer pay . . .³¹

The whole weight of taxation would be lifted from productive industry. The million dollar manufactory, and the needle of the seamstress, the mechanic's cottage and the grand hotel, the farmer's plow, and the ocean steamship, would be alike untaxed.

Imagine this country with all taxes removed from production and exchange! How demand would spring up; how trade would increase; what a powerful stimulus would be applied to every branch of industry; what an enormous development of wealth would take place. . . . Would there be many industrious men walking our streets, or tramping over our roads in the vain search for employment . . . ?³² Go to New York . . . the best example of the condition to which the whole country is tending. . . . Where a hundred thousand men who ought to be at work are looking for employment . . . where poverty festers and vice breeds, and the man from the free open West turns sick at heart . . . and you will understand how it is that the crucial test of our institutions is yet to come.³³

This able essay, which came from the pen of a man not yet thirty-two years old, presented a new³⁴ and startling conception of the economic crisis. It included what later critics identified as the kernel of George's social philosophy³⁵—one of the few important systems native to America. But it

³⁰ *Ib.*, p. 106.

³¹ *Ib.*, p. 112.

³² *Ib.*, p. 113.

³³ *Ib.*, p. 127-8.

³⁴ It was new, of course, only to dominant thought in western civilization. George's followers have found many anticipations of his ideas, not only in times recent to his, but, in a number of instances, in earlier times. His own effort to credit the French Physiocrats as his forerunners was based on inadequate second or third-hand information about their theory; the Physiocrats were only partial anticipators, and among the less important. In spite of the anticipations, several of which were almost perfect parallelisms, George's conception actually was as original as any contribution in his field; on this see Dr. George R. Geiger's thorough study of the problem, "The Theory of the Land Question," Macmillan, New York, 1936.

³⁵ Broadus Mitchell, "Single Tax," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, Macmillan, 1934, Vol. XIV, p. 65.

did not receive the recognition for which the author had hoped. About one thousand copies were sold. He realized that if he really wished to command attention he would some day have to develop his theories more thoroughly, within the frame of current economic knowledge, and in a much larger book. The failure of the modest essay made possible—indeed, prepared the way for—the creation of a classic.

I have reason to know that our boys at the front are concerned with two broad aims beyond the winning of the war; and their thinking and their opinion coincide with what most Americans here back home are mulling over. They know, and we know, that it would be inconceivable—it would, indeed, be sacrilegious—if this nation and the world did not attain some real, lasting good out of all these efforts and sufferings and bloodshed and death.

The men in our armed forces want a lasting peace, and, equally, they want permanent employment for themselves, their families and their neighbors when they are mustered out at the end of the war.

Two years ago I spoke in my annual message of four freedoms. The blessings of two of them—freedom of speech and freedom of religion—are an essential part of the very life of this nation; and we hope that these blessings will be granted to all men everywhere.

The people at home and the people at the front—men and women—are wondering a little about the third freedom—freedom from want. To them it means that when they are mustered out, when war production is converted to the economy of peace, they will have the right to expect full employment—full employment for themselves and for all able-bodied men and women in America who want to work.

They expect the opportunity to work, to run their farms, their stores, to earn decent wages. They are eager to face the risks inherent in our system of free enterprise.

They do not want a post-war America which suffers from undernourishment or slums—or the dole.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Issues in Ethical Theory

I

Some Presuppositions of an Aristotelian Ethics

By PAUL WEISS

I

THE IDEAS OF ARISTOTLE once held men in an iron grip. For over a thousand years he dominated their thought in science, metaphysics, politics, logic and the subsidiary domains these illuminate. There were rebels throughout this period, but their power was slight and their day was brief. When they passed, the intellectual climate was somewhat as it had been before.

It is not until we come to modern times—this, in fact, is its definition—that the revolt against Aristotle is carried through persistently and effectively in discipline after discipline. Almost without exception our scientists are Galilean, our philosophers Cartesian, our political scientists Lockean, our logicians Leibnizian, rather than Aristotelian, in principle and spirit.

We have lost and gained by this change. Much was rejected that should have been retained. Our ideas are somewhat wider but also somewhat thinner. Our disciplines do not let us affirm, as Aristotle's could, that there is a real, full-bodied world where trees grow and bloom, where men need a state and are more than what they need, or where logic is a science of truth and not only of validity. But gain there has been. We are freer, more flexible; we have discovered truth upon truth where error and darkness once held sway. We have naturalized the stars, and know something of the bearing of economics on politics and of logic on mathematics.

It is not difficult to show that Galileo, Descartes, Locke and Leibniz are dangerous guides. We cannot stay with them without losing the world and knowledge we have every day, and which their principles demand that we forego. But they have taken us part of the way we ought to go, and at least far enough to enable us to see that the Aristotelian principles are not all sure and sound.

In but one field—that of ethics—has opposition to Aristotle proved, so far, to be largely futile and fruitless. Though Christianity was, in its beginning, anti-Greek or at least non-Greek in spirit, it was not long before

the great theologians had the one fitted neatly to the other. The non-Aristotelian ethical systems of Hobbes, Kant and Bentham have had but a short life and few disciples. There is no vigorous non-Aristotelian school of ethics today.

Yet the non-Aristotelian spirit is strong and will not down. Having failed to replace his ethics, we are nevertheless unwilling to avow allegiance to it. As a result, the Aristotelian ethics occupies the singular position of a doctrine unrefuted but dismissed, rejected and yet opposed by nothing, and as a consequence we do not know just what to say positively or negatively about the purpose of the state, the aim of education, the function of discipline or the meaning of virtue.

We have failed to take due account of Aristotle's ethics partly because it is so difficult for us to understand. That ethics is so intimately related to his other views, which we have already abandoned and almost forgotten, that we find it very difficult to grasp.

What modern men want is a new ethics which, without sacrificing any of the facts, will be in harmony with their other views. Failing this, what they need is a work which reveals the full weight and meaning of the Aristotelian ethic in a form which they can understand. In the absence of both, nothing is so desirable as a work which starts where they now are and attempts to lead them where Aristotle is. I know of no book which satisfies this last need as well as Adler's "Dialectic of Morals."¹

2

ADLER HAS A THREE-FOLD objective. He wants to tear the reader away from moral scepticism and hedonism, to convince him of the truth of Aristotelian absolutism, and to expound the basic implications of the view.

He is most successful in the first of these efforts. Through the agency of a modified dialogue, a "distillation of actual arguments which President Hutchins and I have had with students in a course devoted to the reading of great works in ethics and politics," he clearly shows, in the first forty pages, the inadequacy and confusion characteristic of the prevalent view that there are no absolute moral standards and that pleasure is the good.

In the last forty pages, where he is concerned with the third task, he abandons the dialogue form and at the same time some of his clarity. He is overly dogmatic and far from persuasive, and his comments on the order of different goods and the relation of ethics to politics are little more than

¹ Mortimer J. Adler, "A Dialectic of Morals," Notre Dame, Ind., The Review of Politics, 1941, 117 pp., (cloth), \$1.80.

ex cathedra remarks, sometimes quite difficult to follow and often quite difficult to accept.

Throughout the first, and conspicuously in the middle part of the book, Adler attempts to move towards the second of his objectives. Here again he fails—but in the failure lies a greater and unobserved success. His argument, as he himself notes, is too brief to be either complete or convincing, and requires support by demonstrations which are promised for a later occasion. This is regrettable, but it is not serious; particularly since his “inductive and dialectic” method, of forcing the reader back and back to more general and ultimate principles, has the signal merit of making clear what is proved and what is not. What is serious is the fact that the way is dotted with unexamined and dubitable suppositions and evaluations. To question these suppositions is to stop the work dead in its tracks; but since it is the work itself which makes this possible, it is it we must thank for enabling us to see a little better why we must eventually pursue another path to another goal.

I shall devote the remainder of this study to an examination of some of the unexamined suppositions on which the book rests. I have chosen those which permit a ready focussing of an issue, and have neglected others, equally or perhaps even more important—such as the relation of the body to the mind, thought to action, etc.—which require a great deal of discussion. I have attended only to those views which are stated in the book and have put aside those, such as the doctrine of the mean, which Adler does not focus upon, although they are integral to the Aristotelian view. The following, then, is a partial list of presuppositions readily abstractable from the present book, to which I have subjoined brief commentaries. It is to be hoped that they suffice to point the way towards a new and more adequate account.

3

1. *Pleasures are comparable.*²

PLEASURES, LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE, are capable of being compared by virtue of some abstract characteristic such as duration, number, location and so on, which each exemplifies in different ways. But what Adler apparently desires to assert is that they are comparable *qua* pleasures. Yet pleasures, like all that is immediate, are qualitatively unique and beyond compare. We might prefer one pleasure to another and others might prefer just what we do, because that pleasure alone really satisfies, not because it is comparable with that other.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 16–7; cf. p. 50.

The supposition that pleasures are comparable does not seem necessary to the main position, but only to the attempt to reach it through a dialectical criticism of moral scepticism and hedonism. Its denial makes impossible the affirmation of the next two propositions and affects the conclusions Adler draws regarding the nature and order of the goods men ought to have.

2. *Pleasures are measurable quantities.*³

This is Bentham's view. Adler accepts it without qualification, though there have been hedonists, such as Mill, who have rightly refused to embrace it. We do not compare sensuous and intellectual pleasures in terms of quantity. No more ought we to attempt to compare one sensuous pleasure as greater or less than another, but only as qualitatively richer or poorer. An adequate comparison of pleasures—granting that they can be compared at all—requires the use of a qualitative rather than of a quantitative scale.

3. *The sum of two pleasures is greater than either.*⁴

Even if, by an act of abstraction, we succeed in arranging pleasures on a scale of comparable quantities, we cannot affirm that they can be added like so many whole numbers. Two units of pleasure together can add to a pleasure less than either. There is pleasure in being loved and pleasure in hating, but to have both together, or even after one another, is to spoil the fine edge of either. Pleasures infect one another and the result is sometimes greater and sometimes smaller in value than the pleasures with which one began.

4. *There is only one possible measure of pleasures.*⁵

Every measure, Adler observes, is a universal. But from that it does not follow, as he seems to believe throughout the book, that there is only one proper measure for a given kind of thing. Every man must decide for himself the question as to whether or not, for example, he will assign weights to pleasures according to their availability, familiarity, popularity, etc. His decision will provide him with a universal rule which may or may not be accepted by others or even by himself at some later time.

Adler makes very clear that moral sceptics and hedonists are forced to acknowledge some universal measure. He slips from this to the doctrine that they are forced to acknowledge one and only one measure, and that

³ *Ib.*, pp. 17-8.

⁴ *Ib.*, pp. 20-1, p. 48.

⁵ *Ib.*, pp. 25-7.

this holds for all men all the time. But if the latter is false, as I think it is, there are many equally respectable but alternative measures of pleasures and of goods. There is a relativity in the realm of absolutes as surely as there is in the realm of finite things.

5. *There are universal moral rules, because there is a common human nature.*⁶

This supposition seems rooted in the belief that what is common to all men is something static rather than dynamic, a result rather than a process. Grant, however, that what is common to all men is a radical freedom of will which they can always exercise. Their exercise of their will, then, will lead them in diverse directions, yet their natures, as beings with free will, would be the same.

The denial of free will involves a denial of the fact of preference and responsibility. Its whole-hearted acknowledgment compels one to affirm that a man is free to choose one principle or end rather than another. If men, therefore, have a common nature, that need not make possible the existence of a single moral rule, but only of a common means for electing rules.

6. *There is a discontinuity between the object desired and the satisfaction of that desire.*⁷

Adler affirms that it is impossible for a satisfaction to be the object of a desire. He argues that

if satisfaction were an object of desire, then satisfaction would result from fulfilling such desire, but the resultant satisfaction could not be the same as the satisfaction which, being desired and then possessed, gave rise to it. And there would be nothing to prevent the second satisfaction from being in turn an object of desire, thus giving rise to a third satisfaction in the same way, and so on in an endless progression. To make satisfaction an object of desire is, paradoxically, to condemn desire to endless dissatisfaction.

The feeling which accompanies the acknowledgment of an object of desire is not identical with the satisfaction that ensues when the object of desire is possessed. But there is no difficulty in desiring the satisfaction at the same time one desires the object which promotes that satisfaction. The satisfaction and the possession of the object form a single organic whole. Since we do not merely desire the object but to possess it as well,

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 28.

⁷ *Ib.*, p. 39.

we must desire the satisfaction, which the object will provide, in the act of desiring the object.

We direct our desire towards the object and in that act we are partly satisfied. The more we master the former, the more intense is the experience of the satisfaction. In short, we desire both the object and the satisfaction, the one constituting the external objective, the other the internal objective of the desire.

7. *All men desire to live.*⁸

"Even if there were exceptions, it would certainly be true that a man who does not desire to live desires nothing else, and for him there is no further problem."

That there are exceptions, it would be hard to deny. Some men desire to die, and sometimes because, like Iphigenia, their death makes possible the existence of other goods.

But more important, the fact that a man does not desire to live does not imply that he desires nothing else. Not to have a desire to live is not the same as desiring not to live. The former is a state where life is taken for granted and desire is directed towards other ends, such as the glory of one's state or nation, or the perfection of some work or art. The latter is impossible except so far as one also desires to make use of the means for destruction and thus involves a desire for specific things. The desire to live is neither a paramount nor an indispensable desire.

8. *All men desire to live well.*⁹

Adler understands "living well" to be the achievement of the utmost satisfaction through the fulfillment of capacities common to all men.

This is a central Aristotelian thesis which entails the characteristic Aristotelian view that man seeks and ought to seek his own good. The view stands in the way of such inescapable facts as the desire to sacrifice oneself for the good of others, the desire to forget oneself, the desire to devote oneself to some impersonal or supra-personal end, even at a cost to oneself.

It surely is not true that all men ought to desire to fulfill their capacities and thus direct themselves to acquisition of wealth, health and social goods. Sometimes it is eminently desirable to put these resolutely aside as too human to be worthy of a man's concern.

⁸ *Ib.*, p. 43.

⁹ *Ib.*, p. 43.

9. *Choice is concerned only with alternative means to some one ultimate end.*¹⁰

It is possible to choose ultimate ends as well as means. See above, nos. 4, 5 and 8.

10. *There are no incompatible partial goods.*¹¹

Innocence is a partial good, knowledge is another. Both correspond to something in human nature. Yet they are incompatible. Or to take Adler's own example: the pursuit of wealth is not always compatible with the pursuit of health, even in a minor degree. It depends on how much energy and time the individual has available.

11. *There is only one right conception of the variety and order of goods.*¹²

This thesis rests on the supposition that there are a set of fixed capacities in man and that these ought to be satisfied in only one way in relationship to one another. It allows no possibility for a fundamental change in the structure of man. It supposes that the nature of man is rigid, allowing no range of adjustment of one good to another. Let us, with Adler and Aristotle, suppose that wealth ought to be subordinate to health. Yet for different men the degree of subordination ought to vary considerably and at different times. But then it is but a step to recognize that there are times when the order should be reversed to enable the individual to find his proper place in this changing world. A theory of ethics based on the conception that the capacities of men are fixed forever and ought to be ordered with respect to one another as more or less important, entails the supposition that the nature of the world is unalterable, or that happiness has no relevance to the state of the world in which a man is forced to live throughout his career.

12. *All men desire to be happy.*¹³

It would appear more correct to say that men desire their children and friends to be happy. For themselves they usually have higher and more adventurous aims. See above, no. 8.

13. *There is no discrepancy between what animals do seek and what they should seek.*¹⁴

This assertion is the result of denying free will to animals while attributing to them a fixed nature and set of capacities. It is hard to be-

¹⁰ *Ib.*, pp. 46, 48, 51, 62, 67.

¹¹ *Ib.*, pp. 49-50; cf. p. 60.

¹² *Ib.*, pp. 56, 57, 67.

¹³ *Ib.*, pp. 56, 57.

¹⁴ *Ib.*, p. 58.

lieve, however, that the moth ought to seek the candle or that a dog should overeat.

14. *A man can never be happy; he can only become happy.*¹⁵

This assertion seems to be incorrect in fact and also on Adler's own grounds. We all have had moments when we were thoroughly happy. And, since Adler believes that all the partial goods are compatible, it is hard to see why he does not think we can have them all at once and be happy then and thereafter.

15. *A knowledge of the end provides a knowledge of the proper means, and not conversely.*¹⁶

This of course is true if there is only one end and it consists in "an ordering and proportioning of the means." But the knowledge of means and end seem to come to clarity together. It is by knowing what the available means are that we come to know what realizable ends there can be, and conversely. With a shift in available means there ought to be a shift in chosen ends and with a shift in chosen ends there ought to be a shift in one's concern for certain means. The *value* of the means is determined by the end, but this is far from saying that the end reveals or can be made to reveal just what means ought to be employed.

16. *Potentialities have determinate goals.*¹⁷

This is the supposition of fixed capacities viewed in another way. It supposes that man is stuffed with a set of invisible springs all coiled and ready to spring out towards some fixed objective. But the potentialities of a being seem to be distinguished only by becoming actualized. As merely potential, they merge into one another and have no set ends. The ends they make it possible for us to achieve are indistinct, achieving distinction and the status of ends in the course of an act of reaching towards them. One might speak of a man's potentiality to eat, but this is conjoined and merges imperceptibly into his potentiality to grasp and chew, and the objective towards which it points varies in accordance with the support and modification which these latter provide.

17. *The primary objects of desire are changes in oneself and not in another.*¹⁸

The fundamental objections to the Aristotelian ethic rest largely on its

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 61.

¹⁶ *Ib.*, p. 63.

¹⁷ *Ib.*, pp. 75, 83.

¹⁸ *Ib.*, p. 81.

dismissal or denial of the virtues of altruism, humility, self-sacrifice, and its indifference to the values which subhuman beings embody. The ethics is too self-centered and, too, all too human. These consequences follow from the supposition that what is sought is always a perfection for oneself, and this alone—though Aristotle weakens when he comes to the question of friendship and the place of man in the state.

Strictly speaking, a man cannot seek perfection for himself except so far as he seeks perfection for another and conversely. To be a man is to be a man among men. Not to enhance them is to be insufficiently selfish, for it is to deprive oneself of a necessary counterfoil. Not to look to oneself is to be insufficiently altruistic, for we are truly altruistic only so far as we give something worthwhile to another, and this requires that we do something for and to ourselves. The Aristotelian view presents but half of an organic truth: we must look at once to ourselves and to the rest of the world in order to do justice to either.

18. *God is the primary object of love.*¹⁹

The Christian theologians have been aware of the above-mentioned limitations (no. 17) of the Aristotelian ethic. Those who have held to the Aristotelian view have made interesting additions by bringing God into the account. According to them we love other men because they are also creatures of God. They suppose, therefore, that we do not love men directly but only indirectly. They think in loving we do not go sideways but only along a triangle, whose apex is God.

But we would seem to sympathize with, and to love another, for his own sake. We do not seek the perfection of another as if "it were the perfection of our own personality" or because we see it to be something God desires us to want. The reference is direct and immediate. It would be closer to the truth to affirm that we love God because we love men and not conversely.

19. *"No one of the moral virtues can be possessed except in the same degree that all are possessed."*²⁰

This runs counter to the obtrusive fact that a villain must have conspicuous virtues as well as conspicuous vices. Iago was patient, prudent, temperate and courageous. Otherwise he would have been a blunderer.

Each virtue undoubtedly requires support from others, but one can have a few without having all, or have some to a great degree and others in only

¹⁹ *Ib.*, p. 90.

²⁰ *Ib.*, p. 99; cf. footnote, p. 48a.

a minor form. Character, which is in a sense the sum of virtues and vices, does not develop like a sphere but rather like a plant, growing in different places at different times and at different rates.

20. *Political theory is a subdivision of ethical theory.*²¹

This seems to be true only in the sense in which it is true that reading and religion, pushpin and poetry—everything in fact—have an ethical side. But the proposition is intended as meaning that political theory ought to be subordinated to ethical theory. Political theory includes much that is outside the range of ethics. It deals primarily with the manipulation of things and men, sometimes for their own good and sometimes for a good which transcends either. It is desirable but not necessary that it conform to the dictates of an ethic which acknowledges the perfection of man as the greatest natural good.

4

THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHIC is a fragment of a whole, whose principles are broader and more flexible than the Aristotelians allow. It is a whole which finds room to affirm, with the Aristotelians, that man differs from the animals, that he has a free will, and that there are universal ethical principles. But, in opposition to the Aristotelians, it denies that man has a fixed nature with unalterable capacities, that there is only one possible ultimate end, or that man primarily seeks his own good and has no concern for other things, human or sub-human, except so far as they might benefit or injure him. An adequate ethics, like an adequate physics, is cosmic in its sweep and is adjusted to the fact that this is a changing world where neither means nor ends are forever determined in advance. It is the great virtue of Adler's vigorous and challenging book that it prompts one to see a little more clearly the basic features of this more comprehensive and richer view.

²¹ *Ib.*, pp. 108 ff.

Issues in Ethical Theory

II

Pleasure, Happiness and the Common Good in Adler's Ethical Doctrine

By JOHN WILD

1

FIRST OF ALL, let me say that I am entirely in sympathy with Mr. Adler's general purpose in his book, "A Dialectic of Morals." Anyone, indeed, who has tried to teach philosophical subjects to modern American students is, like Mr. Adler, aware of that widespread moral scepticism and relativism, which as he points out, is the ideal spawning ground for *Machtpolitik* and tyranny. I also share what I take to be his conviction that the only way of combatting this tendency effectively is to recapture and to revitalize the basic insights of Aristotelian philosophy, or shall we say more simply of philosophy. I also agree, of course, that it is the insights that are important rather than the names, the texts, the language, or the mode of presentation of Aristotle, St. Thomas, or whoever else may have first precisely stated them. Hence I have nothing but admiration for Mr. Adler's pungent use of the current vernacular, and the skilful and incisive way in which he carries on his dialectical debate with "the sceptical student" throughout seventy pages which never let the reader's interest down.

I was only disappointed that at page 69 he felt it necessary to drop "the sceptical student" (who, it seemed to me, was doing very well) and to carry on all by himself in a didactic disquisition full of learned references and voluminous foot-notes which struck me as a most unfortunate rhetorical anti-climax. In these learned passages Mr. Adler betrays an almost morbid fear of finding himself in complete agreement with some classic author and consequently reads into Aristotle and St. Thomas certain extraordinary views which are easy to reject, but which a careful reading of the texts in question, *with their contexts*, will hardly verify as having been intended by the author.

Thus in a note on page 104, Mr. Adler claims to "resolve" a conflict in Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* X), and something apparently even worse in St. Thomas (*S. Theol.* I-II 3-5). According to Mr. Adler both philosophers in these passages inconsistently define "imperfect or temporal happiness as consisting in contemplative activity." Neither text, as a matter of fact,

meets this description. Aristotle is not speaking materially of "imperfect or temporal happiness," but formally of essential happiness apart from the means by which it must be achieved in temporal life. Thus he says "it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in him."¹ St. Thomas makes it even more abundantly clear that he is speaking *not* of "beatitudo imperfecta," such as can be had in this life, but rather of "beatitudo perfecta."²

This, of course, is only a minor point, but it betrays a certain unwillingness on Mr. Adler's part to steep himself sufficiently in the subtle shades and nuances of classical thought, which I think, in certain more important matters, has deprived him not only of real agreement with classical thought, but of real agreement with the facts themselves. In short, if Mr. Adler had placed more texts before himself and fewer texts before the reader, I think his book would have been improved. So far as his own ethical doctrine is concerned, there are three major points on which, in my opinion, he is definitely mistaken.

2

THE FIRST IS THE unfortunate distinction made between "pleasure" so far as it names "an object of desire," and so far as it names "every satisfaction of desire."³ As a matter of fact, the first sense is altogether unjustifiable. The word "pleasure" can only be used legitimately in the latter sense. Mr. Adler complains⁴ that St. Thomas did not make this distinction. Indeed he did not, nor did Aristotle, nor any author deeply influenced by classical ethical theory, for very good reasons arising from the nature of pleasure itself which it will be impossible exhaustively to enumerate here. I can only refer Mr. Adler to Book II, Chapter 3, of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle points out that "pleasure accompanies all objects of choice," to Book X, where he shows that pleasure never exists alone but always completes an activity, and to the *Summa Theologica*, I-II, qu. 31-2, where the nature of pleasure (*delectatio*) is exhaustively considered.

To qualify as "an object of desire," pleasure, as such, would have to exist apart from some desire and some congruent object. But it cannot so exist. It is true that a man may say that he seeks only pleasure. What he really means, however, is that he seeks certain congruent objects, or certain desires for such objects, or for both objects and desires such that their congruence will be completed by pleasure. If we could separate off

¹ 1177 B 26.

² I-II, qu. IV, art. 7 *et passim*.

³ Adler, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 89.

the pleasure as an object all by itself, in which a man could be pleased, we could then separate off *this* pleasure as an object *in* which he could also be pleased by a pleasure of the third degree, and so on to the *n*th degree. Mr. Adler has sinned against the basic dictum that it is impossible to be pleased without being pleased *at* something. This error distorts much of his discussion, including his final classification of "goods,"⁵ where he is forced (erroneously) to regard "sensual pleasure" as an intrinsic good.

3

MY SECOND OBJECTION to Mr. Adler's doctrine concerns his definition of happiness as a "totality or sum of every kind of good."⁶ This is happiness *in the abstract*. But *in the concrete*, happiness, presumably, will be the largest possible sum of particular goods belonging to all the different *kinds*. On *this* view, everyone will accumulate some happiness, at least one or two virtuous acts, a large sum of pleasures, units of health, etc. At what quantitative point are we to say that the man is to be legitimately called happy? Furthermore, no matter how large a sum he accumulates, an indefinite *amount* of further possible happiness lies before him. Why indeed should we call anyone happy, or why should anyone strive for such a quantitatively indeterminate goal which can never be realized?

Mr. Adler asserts that happiness "is certainly not *used*, neither is it strictly speaking *enjoyed* or *possessed*" (his italics).⁷ It is a "becoming" which "can never be wholly present any more than a whole life can be."⁸ It is no wonder that Mr. Adler devotes considerable space to the discussion of "Solon's difficulty,"⁹ but he does not really escape from it. If happiness is like "the building of a house" which "gradually becomes,"¹⁰ we cannot say that a man *is* happy until he is dead, and certainly not *then*. But how could we even *then* say that he *was* happy, unless at some moment in the past it would have been true to say *now he is happy*? This is why neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas defined happiness as a quantitative sum of goods, transitively produced, but rather as an *energeia* or activation practised by immanent action. Mr. Adler is of course aware of this distinction between becoming (*kinesis*) and immanent action (*energeia*), but he has not actually assimilated it into his own ethical thought, and is apparently unaware of its importance in determining the metaphysical nature of happiness. If

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁶ *Ib.*, p. 55. Cf. p. 98 n. where he defines happiness formally as "all good things."

⁷ *Ib.*, p. 87.

⁸ Cf. pp. 61, 80, and 84.

⁹ Cf. *Nic. Eth.*, Book I.

¹⁰ Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

he had, he would never speak of "the means *productive* of it (happiness)"¹¹ or of "the cardinal virtues which *generate* happiness,"¹² etc.

The house does not build itself. It has to be transitively built by some external agency. If happiness were passively received or *produced* in this way from the outside, we could *make* animals and children happy by treating them well or giving them a *sum* of goods, and Mr. Adler would be correct in asserting that happiness is not strictly *enjoyed* or *possessed* by the person himself. But, while proper nurture and training may provide a child with the necessary *conditions* for happiness, they cannot *make* him happy. As Aristotle points out, this is the reason we cannot call animals or children happy, for they are too dependent upon external circumstances.¹³

Happiness is realized by *immanent* action, of which only properly trained rational beings are capable, and which does not pass over into any imperfect being to perfect it (*perfectio imperfecti*) but remains in the active agent as a further perfection of what is already perfect (*perfectio perfecti*).

4

MY THIRD DIFFICULTY CONCERNS Mr. Adler's view of the relation between ethics and politics.¹⁴ He attributes to both Aristotle and Aquinas ("in places too numerous to cite") "the error of neglecting the fact that the state is not a substance."¹⁵ Ethics I, 2, and Politics I, 2, are cited in connection with Aristotle, but after carefully reading these passages I am utterly unable to see how they support Mr. Adler's contention that Aristotle thought of the state as a substance. Since the individual by himself is not self-sufficient, he is *some kind* of part of *some kind* of whole, but the substantial whole is not the *only* kind of whole. The final cause is also capable of establishing a whole of substantially differing active parts which are unified as tending to one end. St. Thomas says that "in certain things, order itself acts as form, for instance in an army or a city."¹⁶ The human community is a whole of this sort, not a substantial whole. The end on which it is based is neither the happiness of the individual alone, as excluding the happiness of others (individualism), nor the happiness of some fictitious entity apart from the members (totalitarianism), but the common good, the happiness of each and every member, to which law, and

¹¹ *Ib.*, p. 98. My italics.

¹² *Ib.*, p. 104. My italics.

¹³ *Nic. Eth.*, p. 1099 b 34.

¹⁴ Adler, *op. cit.*, chapter VII.

¹⁵ *Ib.*, p. 115 n.

¹⁶ *In XII Libros Metaphysicorum*, Lib. V, Lectio V.

all the machinery of government are ordered. Thus the *common good* includes the individual good, and as Aristotle says, it is "more divine" to achieve the former than the latter. Politics, when rightly conceived, is inclusive, not exclusive of ethics.

I simply do not follow the line of argument by which Mr. Adler, apparently in agreement with a number of Roman Catholic theologians,¹⁷ attempts to derive totalitarianism as a necessary consequence of this Aristotelian and Thomistic position. This argument seems to be based on the assertion that "the state exists accidentally."¹⁸ This assertion is correct if taken predicamentally, but it is ambiguous. Does it mean that sociability, and the state which issues from this capacity, is a *proper accident* of man, or a merely *contingent accident*? If Mr. Adler means the former, then he is in agreement with St. Thomas, who uses sociability and risibility as standard examples of *proper accidents*. In this case, the natural development of social life cannot be opposed to human nature, for a *proper accident cannot conflict with its cause*. But Mr. Adler does not mean this. He means that sociability is only a *contingent*, extraneous accident of human nature, as his whole argument clearly shows. Thus he maintains that "the state has the same kind of accidental being that a work of art has," and that "not being natural in the order of efficient causality the state cannot exist in human powers as such."¹⁹

In other words, man is *not*, in Aristotle's sense, "a political animal," and sociability is only a *contingent accident*, which either may be totally neglected or developed as an end in itself, without being *necessarily* ordered to human nature. If sociability is a *contingent accident* of man, then the state can be dispensed with, and we are led into individualism. If, on the other hand, this *contingent accident* is developed as an end in itself, this end is opposed to the end of human nature and totalitarianism will follow. But sociability is a *proper accident* of man. Hence the natural development of this power in "social life," the state, etc., *must* be ordered to the end of man. There can be no ultimate *conflict* between the individual good and the common good when they are properly understood, though we may agree that this is very seldom the case.

For instance, Mr. Adler, in a fantastically exaggerated attempt to avoid "totalitarianism," goes to the extreme of asserting that "the goodness of this whole (i.e., the common good) is, along with other social goods, a constitutive part of happiness. . . ."²⁰ In other words, the good of a

¹⁷ Cf. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 115 n.

¹⁸ *Ib.*, p. 112.

¹⁹ *Ib.*, p. 112.

²⁰ *Ib.*, p. 114 n.

whole society is only a part of the good of one of its members. I hope Mr. Adler will excuse me in not agreeing with his assertion that "there is nothing paradoxical about this"²¹ and with his further assertion that "this truth is not inconsistent with that other truth, namely, that under certain circumstances and in certain respects, the individual's well-being must be sacrificed for the welfare of the community. . . ."²²

I cannot conceive of anyone seriously attempting to defend the first assertion except on the grounds of a rabid individualism or subjectivism which might maintain that the good of others is only a part of *my* good. Nor can I conceive of "certain circumstances" or "certain respects" which could legitimately lead from this first assertion to the second. I may be very stupid, but I cannot imagine *any* circumstances which would rationally convince me of the need of sacrificing a whole of any kind to one of its parts. At this point, I regret the absence of the "sceptical student" and his questions. Perhaps Mr. Adler will resume his dialectic again, and allow us to "listen in" on the ensuing dialogue, especially to that portion in which the "sceptical student," having been thoroughly convinced that "the common good" is only a "part" of his individual good, is *now* persuaded that it is nevertheless right for him to die *pro patria*. I hunger for this feast.

It is, of course, a notorious fact that the modern individualistic departure from classical moral theory has bred the opposite extreme of totalitarianism. I seem to discern something of the sort in Mr. Adler's own progress of thought. Having once defined the happiness of the individual as opposed to the common good (individualism), when he turns his attention to social and political matters he is forced to define the common good as opposed to the individual good (the root of totalitarianism). Thus, instead of identifying the end of social action with happiness, the end of man as such, he identifies it with one of the subordinate agencies by which, if utilized correctly, this end may be attained,—the goodness of the state, and even goes so far as to say that "the state is *identical* with the common good."²³ It does not seem to me that Herr Goebbels would have any very violent objection to this statement. I am quite aware that to find himself in real agreement with Herr Goebbels would be just as obnoxious to Mr. Adler as to find himself in real agreement with John Stuart Mill. But his plan of campaign seems to be a matter of using Mill to do down Goebbels and Goebbels to do down Mill,—which leads me to wonder if Mr. Adler is really in agreement with himself.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*

²² *Ib.*, p. 115 n.

²³ *Ib.*, p. 113, author's italics.

· C O M M E N T ·

Defining 'Planning' and 'Monopoly'

IN A RECENT BOOK REVIEW¹ Dr. Franz Oppenheimer, continuing our "amiable controversy," persists in calling me a "planner," despite the fact that in my first reference to Dr. Oppenheimer's views I wrote as follows:

But I hope never to see our economic system turned over to the collectivists 'planners' who, I fear, would operate it as a gigantic W.P.A. project.²

Subsequently I elaborated my objections to planning, in an article entitled "*Government Intervention in the Post-War Economy*."³ If there was anything in that article that gave aid and comfort to the planners they have, as yet, recorded no appreciation of it. So far as I know, of all my acquaintances, Dr. Oppenheimer is the only one who, despite the protests both of the planners and myself, would list me as one of them. There seems to be nothing I can do about this.

Dr. Oppenheimer also objects to my suggestion that applying the word "monopoly" to the private ownership of land makes only for confusion.⁴ He insists that confusion would result if the word "monopoly" is not so used, and states, with apparent seriousness, that economists reject this terminology because it would lead to radical conclusions from which they "shrink by inveterate instinct and tradition." Arguments about the meaning of words are particularly futile because if we do not use words in their accepted meanings, any human discourse becomes impossible. To determine what is the accepted usage we must appeal to authority, and as authority in the field of economic terminology I will rest my case with the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. From its article on "Monopoly," I quote the following:

The term is sometimes loosely used to cover any strict limitation of supply not resulting from concerted or unified discretionary action by persons or groups—for instance, the limitation of supply of particular grades of land or of labor—but this usage is probably inexpedient, as it leaves no point at which the principle of monopolistic control may be distinguished from the universal principle of scarcity.⁵

¹ AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO., Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1942), p. 131.

² *Ib.*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jan., 1942), p. 192.

³ *Ib.*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (July, 1942).

⁴ This suggestion was made in a review of Dr. Harry Gunnison Brown's recent book, "Basic Principles of Economics and Their Significance for Public Policy," *Ib.*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April, 1942), p. 329.

⁵ *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Macmillan, New York, 1930, Vol. 10, p. 624.

When Dr. Oppenheimer says that "large landed property is just as surely a monopoly as a poodle is a dog," he intimates that the fact of monopoly is dependent on the size of land holdings. Such a test of monopoly is so vague and so novel that I must respectfully continue to conform to the usage recommended by the encyclopedia cited above. There is indeed one form of radicalism from which I shrink "by inveterate instinct and tradition," and that is the radicalism which manifests itself by using words in a sense that differs from accepted usage.

GLENN E. HOOVER

On Union-Management and Co-operation

IN PROFESSOR G. E. HOOVER's interesting discussion of "Government Intervention in the Post-War Economy,"¹ reference is made to my discussion of similar matters in the April issue of *THE JOURNAL*.² Dr. Hoover's reference to the old and familiar phrase—"labor and capital"—needs revision as the result of the increasing prominence in the business world of corporations with large numbers of absentee owners. In large corporations a new analysis of the interests involved is necessary,—labor, *management*, and capital. Management is a new factor. It does not own the business; but through the proxy it is in a position of authority and power. The owners are absentee and practically functionless stockholders.³ In this complex economy of mass production, the long-run selfish interests of the three—labor, management, and capital—are aided in no small measure by maintaining industrial peace and by producing at capacity instead of resorting to strikes and restriction of output. There seems to be no good reason in experience or in logic to expect that the selfishness of workers, of managers, or of investors will be "washed, burned, or withered away." Selfishness in a primitive or pioneer environment expresses itself, is channeled, differently than in a complex technological civilization. The selfishness of the itinerant peddler is manifested quite differently from that of the management and ownership of a large city store which expects to remain in business in one place for a long term of years. But selfishness exists in both instances.

Union-management co-operation does not signify any change in the fundamentals of human nature. It has been proved on occasion, as in the case of the shops of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, or in certain war

¹ *AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO.*, Vol. I, No. 4 (July, 1942).

² Pp. 399-400.

³ See my article, "The Business Managers Take Over," in *Dynamic America*, January, 1942.

industries, that management and men may co-operate for the mutual advantages which may accrue to plants operated efficiently and with a small amount of friction in human relations within the plant. In short, there are certain common interests between men, management, and ownership. For efficiency in industry, that is, for capacity output at low-unit cost, these common interests should be stressed.

Moreover, advocates of union-management co-operation do not anticipate that this program will "by-pass the whole problem of governmental ineptitude." As followed by many business units, however, it may reduce the likelihood of governmental interference in industrial affairs. If labor and management work together in reasonable harmony, governmental interference may be by-passed. Americans who advocate planning in a complex, technological world, do not necessarily favor a program of increasing governmental intervention. They, as well as others, see the danger of surrounding business with governmental red-tape. But, when monopoly rears its ugly head, or whenever non-governmental groups cannot or do not work together in harmony or in efficiency, it may be essential in the interests of productive efficiency that the government, representing the consumers or the public, act as the umpire of the business or take over the operation of specific enterprises.

FRANK T. CARLTON

• N O T E S •

Cultural Dynamics in a Democratic Structure

By MAURICE H. KROUT

WE LIVE IN A WORLD of actual and potential unrest. In a world such as this the "nature of human nature" must be reconsidered. The motives of men must be reconsidered. Culture itself—the framework within which men move and have their being—must be reconsidered.

We live in a world vastly more complex than any we have ever known. The preliterate world which was the world of our ancestors concerned itself with food, shelter, sex, and the general security of life. In the present-day world these are still unavoidably real. But, added to them, are motives often just as compelling. The need for freedom, the need for education, the need for recreation, the need for creative expression, are today just as vital as those basic needs ever were.

The ways in which the motives of human beings can be satisfied, as well as the things that make these satisfactions possible, are derived from the cultural setting of man, from his group life. Outside of culture there is a void. Within culture there is life. Hence our problem is to consider more fully what it is that gives us the means and the ends of our existence, and makes possible the life men want to live. In other words, our problem is—What is an adequate culture?

When we think of an adequate culture, we think of civilization. Our first impulse is to point out to what extent we have succeeded, as a people, in replacing the physio-chemical pressures with cultural controls. Our ability to defy cold and rain and heat is shared by all cultures. But our defiance of space by skyscrapers, radios, and airplanes, our defiance of time by electric typography, and our conquest of pain and disease are impressive cultural achievements in a certain sense. Yet, in another sense, they are signs of but partial achievement so long as the cultures which have implemented the researches of science still have people tied to their dungeons: people unable to read or write, people at the mercy of the elements. Unless cultural progress in the realm of physical science is matched by equal progress in the field of social science, we cannot say that science gave us an adequate culture. By itself, science is not a sign of adequate culture.

One of the tests of cultural adequacy is the diminution of the formal control aspect of culture. No group life is possible without social control.

But, in an adequately organized society, control is automatic and informal, dependent on conscience and inner compulsion, not on force and brutality. An adequate culture is not based on fear but on utility. Where formal control predominates, witch-hunting is essential. In such a society, stability is impossible. From a utilitarian point of view, stringent formal control defeats its own purposes in the long run.

An adequate culture does not glorify its institutions, draw halos around its traditions, and order them kept sacred. An adequate culture considers its institutions habits of functioning people, not things to be admired at a distance. Institutions are not necessarily valuable because they exist, or because they come to us through cultural inheritance. An adequate culture can turn upon its institutions and study them objectively and calmly. It can reconsider their utility when necessary, and arrange for reconstruction. However, an adequate culture always retains one basic institution: the institution of change. An adequate culture does not merely institutionalize its important activities, but provides a technique by which these institutions can achieve "self-amendment." George Washington saw the constitution as a stabilizing factor in American life, because an instrument of change was made one of its elements. It is preposterous to think that what man has the power to create, he does not have the power to change.

An adequate culture does not merely accept change as natural and necessary, but provides opportunities for change. For one thing, it does not close its doors to other cultures. A narrow, biased culture, which emphasizes some goal like "national unity" at the expense of cultural minorities, is seeking oblivion through stagnation. Isolation of those who are different is a stoppage of progress. Only the freest kind of intercourse among people can lead to the reconstruction of obsolescent institutions, and the progress that assures the group of continued existence. Only a changing culture possesses the resiliency it needs to withstand external and internal strains.

Nevertheless, change itself is no guarantee of progress. A culture that provides for change in non-essentials, but neglects its major institutions, is not likely to achieve a successful social organization. Tastes and manners, styles of dress, and forms of address do give distinction to life, and add to the conveniences of social intercourse. Changes in these spheres, however, cannot be confused with the life and death interests of people. Any culture that insists on strict conformity in taste and manners, that enforces its salutes and heels but disallows such basic attitudes as sympathy, humility, and truthfulness, sanctions graft, trains children to obey without

asking why, and makes sex merely a means to government ends in especially improvised camps, is not building for posterity, and is not an adequate culture.

An adequate culture aims at the achievement of social security on the one hand, and individual happiness on the other. The first demands stability; the second, change. These are not irreconcilable. The second, however, is more basic than the first. Individuals may be very secure and very unhappy; whereas happiness must include a measure of security, or it is incomplete. From this point of view, we may define the normal personality as a capacity for an economically secure and socially successful adjustment. It is this capacity with which an adequate culture must endow its followers.

A perfect culture would provide satisfaction for all the wishes it creates. A perfect culture is one that makes it possible for every member to satisfy his wishes. If unable to satisfy a certain wish, an adequate culture would not create the wish. Such a culture perhaps is impossible. But it is fair to say that the ability of an adequate culture to create human wishes should not exceed its ability to satisfy these wishes.

Unsatisfied wishes bring tensions in their train. No culture is adequate, unless it provides (somewhere in its framework) an outlet for the tensions which group members develop in the course of their cultural life. Most cultures have some provisions of this kind. Primitives recommend an appeal to magic to relieve shame, embarrassment, and unconscious guilt. In our culture, the Catholic church has offered for ages the institution of the confessional, which not only helps remove the attitudes of shame and guilt, but also combats a tendency to ridicule on the part of those who are themselves maladjusted. The use of mental hygiene clinics in Europe and America is an attempt to meet the selfsame need with the aid of the science of psychology.

One of the most important tests of cultural adequacy in releasing psychic tensions is the degree to which esthetic culture has been liberated for the use of group members. The esthetic culture of the group—its art, play, music, drama, athletics—tests, as does no other aspect of culture, the satisfying nature of the social order of which it is a part. For such an order must provide maximum opportunities for the expressive, emotional self-realization of the individual. In the absence of these opportunities, a social order is social only in a perfunctory sense. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that it is an order, for it lacks the stability which an order presupposes.

No culture is adequate if it fails explicitly to recognize that the individual exists as an individual. Yet one school of theorists has argued that a group has an unqualified right to make the individual subordinate to anything else, be it a principle of order, a principle of utility, or a principle of survival. On the other hand, eighteenth century dualism, stressing the separateness of the individual and society, held the individual completely inviolate, and thus justified revolution as a normal reaction to tyranny. Somewhere between these two views lies the truth. It is futile to deny the existence of the group and its culture. It is true that those who sponsor the control culture of the group, and own its inductive culture, have a near-monopoly on thinking and planning. It is true that many members of the group, even in a democracy, remain docile, awkward instruments of execution. Yet, in an adequate culture, the individual is just as real as the group and its culture. In an adequate culture there is increasing opportunity for creative thought and decreasing emphasis on habit.

A culture that does not emphasize habit is largely secular. That is to say, it is not primarily controlled by emotionalized sacred patterns. Such a society is also primarily free. That is to say, it is not primarily dominated by leaders and their lieutenants in a hierarchy of ranks. In such a society the individual can direct his energies toward new objects and new ideals. In such a society the individual may even create a new office, or change the nature of an office assigned to him. That is because in a free, secular, stable society passage from one status to another is smooth and easy. The control of offices by generations of men is not typical of such a society.

In a society ruled by a culture that is standardized and iron-bound, individuals are puppets. Men of talent are treated condescendingly at least; while those in control of inherited offices rule without interference, regardless of ability or competence. One need have no better illustration than the case of Johann Sebastian Bach. A genius who had changed the basic patterns of music, Bach owed his existence to the bounty of a German princeling, one Christian Ludwig, margrave of Brandenburg. The princeling's claim to fame is based on the fact that he encouraged Bach. Aside from that, he not only died; he is dead. But Bach lives on, though he, too, died. He left a heritage in esthetic culture which converging cultural forces made possible through him. Yet Bach bowed before the princeling, and, in 1721, he wrote to him abjectly as follows:

Two years ago when I had the honor of playing before your royal highness I experienced your condescending interest in the insignificant talents with

which heaven has gifted me, and understood your royal highness' gracious willingness to accept some pieces of my composition. In accordance with that condescending command, I take the liberty to present my most humble duty to your royal highness in these concerti for various instruments, begging your highness not to judge them by the standards of your own refined and delicate taste, but to seek in them, rather, the expression of my profound respect and very humble obedience. In conclusion, I, Monseigneur, most respectfully beg your royal highness to continue your gracious favor toward me and to be assured that there is nothing I so much desire as to employ myself more worthily in your service.¹

As a result of the French and American revolutions, this type of subjugation ceased to be fashionable; but it is regaining its ancient form in fascist Europe today. The dukes and fuehrers of fascist lands are hardly as competent or as educated as was the princeling of Brandenburg to whom this letter was addressed; yet they have capable scientists and artists, the creative individuals of Europe, at their beck and call. They determine what shall pass as science and art. Themselves mentally limited, and mentally unwell, they do not choose art or science which spells social usefulness or social progress. Yet such is the culture of those countries that alternatives are out of the question at this time.

An adequate culture must prevent the development of abject attitudes in individuals, no matter what their ability. It must, and can, do so by building capacity for intelligent choice in individuals. It must do so by preventing frustration from taking heavy toll in human incapacity and over-compensated hostility. It must, and can, do so by re-directing the aggressions of individuals to physical objects and socially useful tasks, instead of making it possible for them to receive expression in riot and war and revolution.

To be able to meet the needs of its citizens, a democratic culture must not harden, must not keep its cultural lags. Unless removed, cultural lags—outworn beliefs, obsolete methods—spread like cancers to absorb more and more of the body politic. If permitted to accumulate and spread, they may cause its destruction. The framework of democracy remains a healthy framework so long as the tendency to harden is detected and checked. Verily, the price of democracy is eternal vigilance, but vigilance for the purpose of removing, not preserving or promoting, lags. A democratic culture must grow unceasingly in the direction of progressive goals. If it does not, it dies.

¹ Quoted from a program of the Chicago Symphony Society, series of 1940.

Dr. William Temple, New Archbishop of Canterbury

By PRESTON KING SHELDON

AMONG THE CHURCHMEN IN GREAT BRITAIN who would atone for the failure of business, industry and politics to solve social and economic problems in the past by building, in the interest of the common man, a new social order here and now, is Dr. William Temple, new Archbishop of Canterbury. He sees in the principle of private profit as the sole motive of industry a cause of war. Hence he suggests that the profit motive "be subordinated to the service-motive, so that the initiation or expansion of a business shall be governed more by public need than by private advantage when these two diverge."¹ He urges the construction of a domestic economic system that provides for greater equality of opportunity for all citizens, one that gives them a voice and a share in business and industry.

Born in 1881 while his father was Bishop of Exeter, he early acquired an interest in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. His father later became Archbishop of Canterbury. The son studied at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford, and became president of the Oxford Union, a famous debating society. He lectured on philosophy at Queens College from 1901 to 1904 and was ordained a clergyman in 1909. He served as headmaster of Repton School from 1910 to 1914 and as rector of St. James Church, Piccadilly, 1914-1918. From 1919 to 1921 he was canon of Westminster and from 1921 to 1929 Bishop of Manchester. He then became Archbishop of York, a post he held until this year, when he became Primate of all England as Archbishop of Canterbury.

His life has been filled with activities in behalf of workers. He was first president of the Worker's Educational Association, starting in 1908 and continuing in office for sixteen years. He is now chairman of a provisional committee to organize a world council of churches.

Dr. Temple urges upon the British the creation of a planning authority on behalf of industry generally, including labor, with one or two government representatives in the interest of consumers.² On problems of the latter he suggests the alternative of consumer co-operation. Such a planning authority corresponds in aims and set-up to the commission proposed in legislation jointly introduced in Washington by Senator Wagner and

¹ "Christianity and Social Order," New York, Penguin Books, 1942, p. 84. (This volume is identical with a similar one he published as Archbishop of York.)

² *Ib.*, p. 81.

Representative Voorhis, to begin now on post-war economic reconstruction, with the aid of representatives of farmers, trade unions, big business, the government, churches, peace groups and consumer co-operatives.

The archbishop envisions also a new world order. He writes:

It must be recognized that the economic problems of the nation are bound up with the problems of international trade. It is in this sphere that unregulated competition produces its worst effects. If we are to establish effectively minimum standards of life and work, we must be prepared for a bold policy of international action. . . . As a step towards an equalization of the treatment accorded by nations to their neighbors, and pending the submission of these questions to international control, it might be well for all nations to adopt, as an *interim* [italics his] measure, a tariff policy based on the principle that in the case of such goods as can be efficiently produced in any country, a tariff be imposed on imports calculated to raise the price of the imported article to that of fully efficient producers of the home product—but no further. It is hoped that this would prevent undercutting, and also tend to raise the standard of life in countries where labor is cheap by removing some of the advantage gained by the exploitation of that cheap labor. It would certainly involve a drastic lowering of existing tariffs in many countries.³

In no country where tariffs have been tried have such results been realized as a result of the effort. The aim of protective tariffs has been to lessen competition in commodities and not to increase wages. Under them entrepreneurs continue to hire labor as cheaply as possible, prices are raised to consumers and thus the value of wages is lowered. To take but a single step in tariff reduction would be to introduce an element of uncertainty, tend to inspire insecurity and produce business depression. Just as long as tariffs are continued there will be continuance of the waste and the injustice that goes with the system it is sought to correct. Therefore the remedy is complete abolition of tariffs, that we may increase production of wealth, raise real wages and destroy monopolies. This remedy is more drastic than any proposals of the archbishop or his colleagues.

Manifestly the archbishop and many other churchmen would allow monopolies a restricted existence, permitting them the protection of reduced tariffs and providing certain punitive measures. "Whenever limitation of liability is granted" to any entrepreneur, Dr. Temple would limit dividends, allocate surplus profits to wage and dividend equalization, and extend fixed capital rather than seek new capital. Yet he would have capital wither away so that it would not be inherited by a "shareholding" class, a privilege he would end.⁴ To do so, however, it would be necessary

³ *Ib.*, p. 87.

⁴ *Ib.*, pp. 84-5.

to get new capital, ultimately, from each new generation to take the place of that now passed on in bequests, if the latter practice is to be stopped by a withering process. Questions of commerce, he holds, should be treated with migration and means of communication as matters of general concern for international authority. Monopolies, he said in an address at Albert Hall in 1942, might be entrusted to the State. Lending by banks, he thinks, should be limited to amounts on deposit by the borrower. Additional credit should be left to public authority, he says, opposing industrial control by financial interests.

The archbishop's vision is that of a world understanding in which no nation may rise at the council table as judge in its own cause. He sees it as contrary to natural order to make political and economic frontiers equal. He stands for the extending of democracy from mere individualism to personalism and favors encouraging attitudes of responsibility toward weaker persons and weaker nations.

In his speeches and writings is found continued interest in the welfare of labor. Many social and economic problems now in the hands of politicians, reformers and selfish interests are in essence religious and theological, he holds. The archbishop includes among these the great political issues, as he told an American radio audience shortly after his new enthronement. These and the more intimate problems of industry, business and education, as well as of government, he would place in the hands of Christians. Social and economic expression of the Christian faith is what he expects, after the Christian Church publishes the principles of truth entrusted to its care and warns when the social order develops conditions in conflict with them.

The Church, however, "must never commit itself to an ephemeral program of detailed action."⁵ What the Church has in its keeping is not knowledge of the techniques of science and industry or of social and political action, but of the need of continued improvement, first of men and through them of society. The Church has in its charge the whole truth as to the original intent of the Creator. This, men seek, expecting to be made free. In so doing they have found it impossible to segregate spiritual from mental and social processes, because truth is the object of the search in religion and science. It has many divisions, each of which is as divine as theology. What theologians lost sight of is the economic and social expression necessary for religious faith to survive. It cannot live without works nor on works performed in its name with contrary motives. What

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 19.

prophets once preached, scientists have paved the way for theologians to understand.

Beginning with individuals, the problem has been to demonstrate the value of self-control following spiritual change. Evangelists of the so-called fundamentalist type have turned converts in upon themselves by appealing to the instinct for eternal self-preservation. But liberal evangelists and theologians have a more healthy view. They stress the need of collective, voluntary action and declare "it is not enough to say that if we change the individual we will of necessity change the social order. That is a half truth." This position was adopted by representatives of the major Protestant bodies in sixty-nine countries in a statement drawn up in Madras, India, in December, 1938.⁶ This was endorsed in January, 1941, by Anglicans under the leadership of the Archbishop assembled at his invitation at Malvern. Findings of their own were published. Certain of them were turned over to a committee of industrialists, economists and theologians for study. The Madras pronouncement, which arraigned financial exploitation and attendant corporate evils, continued:

The social order is not entirely made up of individuals now living. It is made up of inherited attitudes, which have come down from generation to generation through customs, laws, institutions, and these exist in large measure independently of individuals now living. Change those individuals and you do not necessarily change the social order unless you organize those changed individuals into collective action in a wide-scale frontal attack upon those corporate evils.

Many of the archbishop's proposals have been studied throughout the world with interest, along with those, with a wider following, put forward at Madras, such as the ones in the findings of the Malvern conference and in a statement of its special committee. Protestants in Great Britain, drawn together through common understanding of the need for social reform upon the outbreak of the war, have replaced at least three Protestant interdenominational organizations by a commission to promote social and economic action. A statement by this commission contains a "Charter for a World Economy" which reinforces the archbishop's suggestions with a similar appeal for action by Christians.⁷

In its statement the commission announced its intention of studying further the land question, which it barely reached except to say a fuller

⁶ "The World Mission of the Church," International Missionary Council, Madras, Dec. 1938, p. 107.

⁷ "Towards a Christian Britain," Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility, published by the Department of the Church and Social Service, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York, 1942.

statement would be issued. However, the commission and the archbishop have hailed one of the Malvern findings which called for a recovery of "reverence for the earth and its resources." The Malvern conference's special committee advocated "occupying serviceable ownership" and denounced absentee and non-serviceable ownership as "contrary to a morally sound system." It said that

in particular, the owner of the sites of cities has hardly any function that would not be as well or better performed by a public body, while he absorbs a great deal of wealth communally created; this is conspicuously true of those who own land on the outskirts of growing towns. . . .

At one point this statement followed almost verbatim Dr. Temple's comments in an appendix to "Christianity and Social Order," first published when he was Archbishop of York, as follows:

. . . Inversion of the natural order, which is characteristic of our whole modern life, is especially important. If house property is improved (a social service), the rates are raised and the improvement so far penalized; if it is allowed to deteriorate (an injury to society) the rateable value is reduced and the offending landlord is relieved. Taxation of the value of sites (as distinct from the buildings erected on them) would encourage the full utilization of the land.⁸

This is one of the few constructive notes in the welter of findings by social investigators that have appeared in the past decade.

Most recommendations from religious leaders here and abroad have been based on beneficent hopes without complete understanding of what should be done. Several hints, however, may be found in arguments for participation of workers and consumers in the control of business and industry, particularly where consumer co-operatives are advocated, as is often the case; in calls for land value taxation, tariff reform and in the denunciation of exploitation. But the most important step, these religious leaders have now recognized, is to change public opinion. They are preparing to do their part in that task.

⁸ "Malvern and After," p. 14. *Cp.* "Christianity and Social Order," p. 91.

William Byrd (1542-43—1623)

"Father of Musicke"

By FRANCIS NEILSON

IN ENGLAND THE MUSICIANS are making preparations for a celebration of the birth of William Byrd, the great English composer of the sixteenth century. The month and the day when he made his first appearance are not known, but it must have been in December, 1542, or January, 1543. Where he was born is a matter of conjecture; probably in Lincolnshire, where the name is found in the church registers of some of the parishes. He was organist of Lincoln Cathedral and remained there some six or seven years before being appointed co-organist with Tallis at the Chapel Royal.

Perhaps the reason why we know so little of his music in this country is that our choirmasters have preferred the well-known oratorios and requiems of the eighteenth and nineteenth century composers. In England the local choirs—not only those of the church, but also those secular organizations, which have held so nobly to the tradition of Tudor music—have been responsible for presenting to the people the works of the precursors of Bach and Handel. The English singers who came to this country some years ago introduced us anew to the works of William Byrd, and their success was so startling that many of our musicians took up the study of Byrd's madrigals and Masses. Almost any week before this war, one could hear Byrd's music sung at Westminster Abbey or at the Cathedrals of Southwark or St. Paul's.

The editors of "Tudor Church Music"¹ place the name of John Dunstable (c.1390—1453) as the first great English composer in the history of polyphonic music. After Dunstable came Robert Fairfax (c.1465—1521). Among other composers of that fruitful period were Hugh Aston (c.1480—1523) and John Redford (c.1486—1540). The first volume of "Tudor Church Music" is devoted to the work of John Taverner (c.1495—1545) "the greatest exponent of the style developed in the post-Fairfax period."

In the *Cheque Book* of the Chapel Royal it is set down that Byrd was accepted as the "father of musicke."² Wood, a contemporary, said he was "bred up to musick under Thomas Tallis."³ And in 1603, in a work entitled *Medulla Musicke*, Easte held that the pieces were

¹ 4 vols., published by the Oxford University Press, 1923.

² *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 13th edition, Vol. IV, pp. 896—97.

³ *Ib.*

sucked out of the sappe of two (of) the most famous Musitians that ever were in this land, namely Master Wylliam Byrd . . . and Master Alphonso Ferabosco⁴ . . . either of whom having made 40th severall waies (without contention), showing most rare and intricate skill in one upon the playne song Miserere.⁵

Byrd's contemporaries regarded him with the utmost veneration:

Thomas Morley, in his "Plaine and Easie Introduction to Practicall Musicke,"⁶ speaks of him as "never without reverence to be named of the musicians," and John Baldwin of Windsor closes his Manuscript collection⁷ with a poem in which he places Byrd above all the composers of his time, native and foreign alike.⁸

Today Byrd is accepted by many of the best English musicians as the most important of their composers.

His was a busy life and comparable in this respect with that of Bach. He lived for eighty years and worked until the end. His will, dated November 15, 1622, declares him to be "now in the eightieth year of mine age." There was no form of music in that day which Byrd did not attempt. He was considered, with Bull, as the head of the earliest school of keyboard composition in Europe. A recent writer in *The Times* (London), who seems to be familiar with his various works says:

He developed its technique particularly through the writing of fascinating variations on popular tunes of his day, tunes which we now call folksongs.⁹

This writer, in calling for the four hundredth celebration of his birth, reminds his readers that

musicians have been talking about William Byrd as "the greatest English composer of all time" for long enough. Now is their chance to prove it.

On the tercentenary of his death, many commemorative services were given in the English cathedrals and also by secular choral societies. That was a few years after the close of the first World War. What can be done now, in the midst of this strife, is something of a problem in organization and preparation, but I feel sure it will be met in an adequate manner.

Byrd made his entrance upon the world's stage in stormy days. He was born a few years after the suppression of the greater abbeys, and lived through the reigns of three monarchs—Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth.

⁴ Organist of Ely Cathedral, 1662-82.

⁵ Cf. "Tudor Church Music," Vol. II, p. xix.

⁶ Ed. 1597, p. 117.

⁷ In the Royal Music Library at the British Museum.

⁸ "Tudor Church Music," Vol. II, p. xi.

⁹ *The Times* (London), July 10, 1942, p. 6.

Had he survived but three years longer he would have reached the end of the reign of James I. Shakespeare came and went within Byrd's lifetime. His contemporaries were Bacon, Marlowe, and Ben Jonson; Hooker wrote "Ecclesiastical Polity," which inspired John Locke; and Edmund Spenser enriched the English tongue with the brilliant fancies of the "Faërie Queene"; while Sir Philip Sidney endowed the poets with the glowing imageries of his genius to be found in his "Arcadia." There was music in verse and melody in music in the days when Byrd sang to warring Catholics and Protestants. The marvel of it all was how, in years of sectarian and political stress, the creative joys of Byrd and the poets rose happily above the angry tumults of the time.

When I was a boy, William Bretton, once suborganist of Canterbury Cathedral, gave me lessons on the organ at the Presbyterian Church in Liverpool, at which my parents worshipped twice every Sunday. I little knew, when my teacher spoke to me of Byrd and Tallis, that in the years to come I would be associated with musicians who would bring these names back to my mind. Having a retentive memory, I discovered as I grew older that there was a world of music buried in an almost forgotten past. The first to awaken me to the fact that I had heard the names of Tudor composers and had sometimes practised their short pieces was Sidney Waddington, with whom I was associated at the Royal Opera, and later Sir Charles Villiers Stanford, when I produced his setting of "Much Ado About Nothing." Long afterwards when I knew Joseph Bonnet, the organist of St. Eustache, Paris, I rejoiced to find in him the man who had done so much to revive interest in the little known composers of the pre-Reformation schools. Both through his beautiful collections of the forerunners of Bach and in his work with the Benedictines, Bonnet restored to our choirs the wonderful compositions of the early masters.

Some years ago my friends, Dean Dwelly of Liverpool Cathedral and Sir Frederick Radcliffe, came to me with the story of how Edmund Fellowes had worked for many years, collecting the vocal works of Byrd, and told me the difficulties he had encountered in finding a publisher for them. Dr. Fellowes is the King's organist at St. George's Chapel, Windsor Castle. His tremendous industry in restoring to the English people the chief works of the musicians of long ago is known to all the best choirmasters in Europe. His work, "The English Madrigal School,"¹⁰ complete in thirty-six volumes, comprises the finest examples of the early English song writers. After I met Fellowes, I decided to sponsor the publication of his collection of the

¹⁰ London, 1924.

vocal works of William Byrd. Before this war began, eleven volumes of it had been published;¹¹ it is to be complete in seventeen. When the rest will be given to the public depends upon the state of the world when the war is brought to a close.

Those who are interested in fine music may find time, even in this turbulence of everyday life, to turn their minds back to the musicians who bequeathed to us so many of the beauties of sound, and spare, perhaps at Christmas time, a quiet hour in thinking of William Byrd and what he did for our music. Those who seem shy and would rather let their friends sing to them may take from Byrd a hint of what vocal music is worth. In dedicating the songs of sadness to Sir Christopher Hatton, he prefixed the following quaint reasons to persuade everyone to learn to sing:¹²

First, It is a knowledge easely, taught, and quickly learned, wher there is a good Master, and an apt Scoler.

2. The exercise of singing is delightfull to Nature, & good to preserue the health of Man.

3. It doth strengthen all parts of the brest, & doth open the pipes.

4. It is a singular good remedie for a stutting & stamaring in the speech.

5. It is the best meanes to procure a perfect pronounciation, & to make a good Orator.

6. It is the onely way to know where Nature hath bestowed the benefit of a good voyce: which giuft is so rare, as there is not one among a thousand, that hath it: and in many, that excellent giuft is lost, because they want Art to expresse Nature.

7. There is not any Musicke of Instruments whatsoever, comparable to that which is made of the voyces of Men, where the voyces are good, and the same well sorted and ordered.

8. The better the voyce is, the meeter it is to honour and serue God there-with: and the voyce of Man is chiefly to be employed to that end.

*Since singing is so good a thing,
I wish all men would learne to sing.*

During a great storm in the English Channel I was at Le Touquet, the French seaside resort. My daughter tuned in the radio and from London came the pathetic music of Byrd's motets sung by an English choir. It was a strange experience sitting there, listening to the beauty of the music and the voices, interrupted occasionally by the great clamor of the gale. It reminded me of the stormy days of the master's life.

¹¹ "The Collected Vocal Works of William Byrd," edited by Edmund H. Fellowes, London, 1938.

¹² "Psalms, Sonets, and Songs of Sadness and Pietie," 1588.

• R E V I E W S •

Man and His World

An Introduction to Sociology. By L. L. Bernard. New York: T.Y. Crowell & Co., 1,040 pp., \$3.75.

This book is so rewarding in its approach to social reality that rather than criticize it I prefer to proclaim and recommend. The author has had large experience as an investigator in social science, and as teacher in a dozen collegiate institutions during the last forty years. A great deal of the material in this volume comes out of sheer personal observation and exploration; although Dr. Bernard has, of course, examined original documents as well as read many books on many subjects.

Intended for college and university students, and also for readers interested in sociology, it is, first, a general description of social development from the early Stone Age to modern times. The treatment then goes on to consider the various "factors" in social evolution, such as the geographic, climatic, biological, psychological, and cultural; heading up finally into a study of social organization and social control.

The sub-title of the volume describes it as "A Naturalistic Account of Man's Adjustment to His World." In other words, without dogmatizing about the transcendent, metaphysical, or "noumenal," aspect of society as an item in the "cosmos," the author presents the subject in the same way that physicists, chemists, geologists, or astronomers handle the data of their sciences. A great deal is said about religion as a fact in society; but religious institutions and ideas are interpreted objectively, in the same way that political and economic facts are handled.

We are today in the midst of religious changes more drastic and far-reaching than the Protestant reformation; and it is necessary for exact scholarship to point out that the so-called opposition between science and religion, as conceived a few decades ago, is based upon a false antithesis: "The acceptance of the evolutionary hypothesis in the place of the doctrine of special creation," says Dr. Bernard, "does not in and of itself make untenable belief in the existence of Divinity. In the case of some persons it does have this effect. In the case of others it merely leads to a higher conception of Divinity and the ordering of the universe. There is nothing inherent in the theory of evolutionary development which precludes the participation of a Supreme Intelligence in the process. The theory does maintain that this intelligence, instead of creating one form of phenomena, after another, planned the whole process of evolutionary development beforehand, just as the Natural Law theologians—St. Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and the Deists, for example—maintained that Divinity had planned and executed the control of the universe, including man and human society, through a system of natural laws" (p. 362 f.).

Students who make use of this treatise will find not only instruction but entertainment.

LOUIS WALLIS

Personal and Social Disorganization

Social Pathology: Personal and Social Disorganization. By Lawrence Guy Brown, New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1942, xii + 595 pp., index, \$3.75.

The study of personal and social disorganization is now in its third transitional stage. In the first stage the student of society concerned himself nearly exclusively with social welfare, his motivation being one of reform rather than scientific understanding. The second approach to the study of social disorganization was the outgrowth of the introduction of the scientific spirit into the understanding of society. Social maladjustments and problems became conceived of by analogy with the pathologies of medicine in which the abnormal was but an exaggeration of the normal. The conversion of social problems into pathologies cleared the way for a fundamental understanding of social malfunctioning. But there was no corresponding clarification of theory which would have made it possible to do more than lip service to the conception of the abnormal as but an exaggeration of and variation upon the normal. The result was a congeries of pathologies collected together from a wide variety of fields without any integrating framework.

The third stage, well represented by Brown's work, tries to harmonize with what has been learned scientifically about human nature, its genesis and development, and of what culture and social organization consist. Its premise is the realization that social adjustments, whether normal or abnormal, are in general the same type of phenomena. This makes it possible to establish a frame of reference in which both organization and disorganization can be studied and explained, and makes possible the statement of unifying principles that apply to all social phenomena.

A plan of this type has been carried out in Brown's text. The frame of reference for personal disorganization is presented in chapter I and analyzed in five subsequent chapters (dealing with the organic heritage, the social heritage, human nature, the normal and the abnormal, and unique experiences). Part II deals with the periods of disorganization (childhood, adolescence, and adulthood and old age), while Part III covers twelve types of personal disorganization (ranging from speech disorders to delinquents and criminals); the frame of reference for social disorganization is discussed in chapter XXII, which is followed by analyses of the pathological aspects of ideologies, the family, education, religion, science, economic, political, and legal factors, the press, social-psychological epidemics, and war.

Brown's distinct contribution is his capable analysis of the various aspects of personal and social disorganization in terms of a consistent and inter-related framework which contributes to the understanding of personal and social disorganization as well as to personal and social organization as well. Since this is quite a novel approach, and since most of the courses given in the American educational institutions seem to prefer to give courses in "social problems" (and some such similar titles) without determining the unifying principles, a fact which enables the instructors to treat any topics under the sun which appear to them worthy of their consideration, Brown's

book will probably not be widely favored as a textbook. But its textbook value is by far surpassed by its contribution to the interactive point of view of the sociological theory which recognizes the dictum of Cooley that the individual and society are not antithetical but instead are distributive and collective aspects of the same thing.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

The Problem of Administrative Law

The Judicial Function in Federal Administrative Agencies. By Joseph P. Chamberlain, Noel T. Dowling and Paul R. Hays. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1942, xii + 258 pp., \$3.00.

This little book is a sort of intellectual Cook's Tour through the judicial function of administrative agencies, as covered by the report of the Attorney General's Committee and other current literature on the subject. Writing with scholarly restraint, the authors pass casually through the subjects of methods, policies, sanctions and judicial review of action of administrative agencies. In general the book is reminiscent of the usual type of descriptive techniques found in Political Science textbooks for college sophomores. It is neither a statistical study nor a critical analysis, but has a general descriptive quality, choosing its illustration at random from various Federal administrative bodies that come to mind to illustrate the particular principle which the authors are discussing at the moment. It is another of a long series of attempts to find generalities in the so-called field of administrative law. Had the authors heeded their own excellent conclusion—"no general rules can be laid down, but each situation must be studied and the advantages and disadvantages of different devices of administration carefully weighed . . . it is not a 'task for a summer's day'" (p. 229)—they undoubtedly would have written a totally different book.

The task of making such a study is one that immediately confronts any scientific endeavor to understand administrative law. The authors have very pertinently suggested that a permanent sub-committee to study administrative agencies be created in Congress. This suggestion might well be followed but such a committee, although reporting to Congress, ought to be independent. The result of political impact upon the otherwise excellent work of temporary committees, such as the Hoover Law Enforcement Committee and the Attorney General's Committee, would seem to indicate that independence, permanence and vast resources are necessary if we are to have any scientific study of administrative bodies and an evaluation of the efficiency and means which they use to accomplish the ends for which they are created.

FREDERICK K. BEUTEL

Mathematics in Scientific Discovery

What is Mathematics? By Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins. New York: Oxford University Press, xix + 521 pp., \$5.00.

Here at last is a survey of the basic elements of mathematics so trans-

parent that even those, like myself, who have difficulty comprehending the philosophy of mathematical reasoning may hope to understand it. Professor Courant, head of the department of mathematics at New York University, was formerly director of the Mathematical Institute of the University of Göttingen. There he distinguished himself by his researches in the calculus, function theory and mathematical physics. But he did not allow his interest in mathematical research to dull his sense of responsibility for the development of his discipline. Hence when he discovered that the teaching of mathematics, sometimes, had "degenerated into empty drill in problem-solving, which may develop formal ability but does not lead to real understanding or to greater intellectual independence" and when he noted that "mathematical research has shown a tendency toward overspecialization and overemphasis on abstraction" and that "applications and connections with other fields have been neglected," he was willing, busy as he was with more demanding interests, to do something about it. "Teachers, students, and the educated public demand constructive reform, not resignation along the line of least resistance," he declares. "The goal is genuine comprehension of mathematics as an organic whole and as a basis for scientific thinking and acting." He put many years into the preparation of a book that would open the way for such a genuine comprehension, one which now appears, with the collaboration of Dr. Robbins, an instructor at New York University who was trained at Harvard and Princeton, under the sub-title, "An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods."

The book is intended to be of interest to mathematicians as well as to mature thinkers who have no more preparation than "a good high school course." For the mathematicians I cannot speak, although I have heard the work praised highly in such circles. The specialist in the social sciences, however, even with the limited mathematical preparation that is the average today, will find the book invaluable in that it shows in clear, logical steps the derivation of a number of the formulae now in common use in these fields. In the social studies too much mathematical and statistical work, even on a rudimentary level, is imitative and time-wasting; and too often the results compound error. With more understanding the work might become more imaginative and thus, perhaps, more fruitful.

Professor Courant's and Dr. Robbins's work may be recommended as an introduction to the theory of mathematics. It is not easy reading, in the sense that Lancelot Hogben's "Mathematics for the Million," or E. T. Bell's "Men of Mathematics" and "The Development of Mathematics" were. That is, the human interest material in the lives of mathematicians and in the occurrence of mathematical discoveries has been sacrificed in favor of operational exposition. It requires in the reader the readiness to think as he reads that makes for slower page-turning, but, curiously, faster page-grasping. Almost everywhere the authors succeed in making even high order abstractions simple and clear by carefully-paced steps. Indeed, the simplicity and the clarity of the exposition achieves sheer brilliance at times, such as in the section on the theory of numbers and in the several discussions of the basic concepts of the calculus.

Of especial interest to workers in the social sciences are the all-too brief remarks, at the beginning and here and there in the pages, on the development of mathematics. The authors believe that "to establish once again an organic union between pure and applied science and a sound balance between abstract generality and colorful individuality may well be the paramount task of mathematics in the immediate future" (p. xvii). The task is one that many of the social studies share, and perhaps other disciplines come in for responsibility. It is odd to find the authors adhering to the over-simplified sociological notion that mathematical development is "started under the pressure of necessary applications" (p. xv), particularly in view of their discussion of the contributions of Newton and Leibniz toward the evolution of the calculus (p. 398 ff.), but since no evidence is presented in support of the thesis it cannot be discussed here. Incidentally, the careful reader would do well to transfer the corrections on the two pages of errata (a quite usual volume of typographical errors) to the pages involved or he may find himself perplexed at times. W. L.

Simon Bolivar: A Story of Courage. By Elizabeth Waugh. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941, x + 326 pp., \$2.50.

There are few more romantic figures in the world's history than Simon Bolivar, Liberator of South America from the Spanish yoke. An aristocrat of wealth, old lineage, blueblood, he gave most of his life to the fight for independence, for freedom as he understood it. Freedom for the country of his birth, Venezuela, freedom from the bonds in which Spain held all the new world colonies in that region. After the usual early life of a young man of wealth and position, years of travel, amusement, study of the arts, Simon Bolivar became an admirer of George Washington, and later, of that real lover of freedom, Thomas Jefferson.

He fought for freedom on the battlefield. Simon Bolivar (Simon José Antonia de la Santissima Trinidad Bolivar y Palacio) was a soldier first and foremost. A soldier and a horseman. The writer of this book sees him always as the soldier, the man who believed in fighting, fighting for freedom, but fighting on horseback, with deadly weapons. That was what he best understood, leading an army was the ideal that always floated in the minds of men of his ancestry. But Simon Bolivar understood that his country could be free, could work out its own salvation and need not always suffer under the yoke of Spain. What the States of North America had done, the States of South America could do. And to this ideal, Simon Bolivar devoted his life.

From his earliest boyhood he was independent by nature. His small stature and delicate health did not deter him from a life full of adventure, of danger, of terrific effort amid wild nature, great mountain peaks, appalling forests. The author must be an unusual woman. For what evidently attracts her most in Bolivar's life is the nature of the country he lived in, the struggle it gave him. To her, that appears stronger than the fact of what he had to overcome by reason of his birth, the surroundings of his earlier years as a young man of wealth and position. And it may

be just that spirit of adventure that made him the man he was. The thing that awoke in him when he first saw the great llanos, the Llaneros with their wild horses. (The pages that tell of his first rides on these horses cannot help but arouse the interest of any reader who loves adventure.)

The world knows what Simon Bolivar did, how he literally gave his life to unite the countries of northern South America and make them free. All this is history, even if it is half forgotten now, as so much of history is. But this book gives us a picture of the man himself. Freedom—what the name fully implies—means not so much to the writer. Simon Bolivar means a great deal. And she has given us an unforgettable portrait of a rare individual who freed himself from the clinging vines of a wealthy blue-blooded ancestry and became a fighter for liberty. He gave the South American States a Constitution, freed them, and was called a Dictator by his enemies. The Liberator, dying, still almost a young man, saw all the things he thought he had accomplished, fall to ruin. As the author says, "He lived to say with despair, 'We who have served the Revolution have plowed the sea!'"

GRACE ISABEL COLBRON

To Form a More Perfect Union: The Lives of Charles and Mary Clarke from Their Letters, 1847-71. By Herbert Oliver Brayer. Albuquerque, N. M.: The University of New Mexico Press, 1941, 233 pp., index, \$3.50.

There is no particular reason for the title given this book. In fact, it rather deters the reader who might think it something quite different from what it is: a collection of rather interesting letters written to his "home folks" by a young Englishman who left his comfortable home to start life in the western States. He tells a good deal that is most enlightening about pioneer days in that part of the country. He had a clear eye for land speculation, and, particularly in his letters to his father, he reveals a good deal that did not get into public print. When, after his marriage, he goes into the Army for the wars against the Indians, he is equally open and honest in his letters. He does his duty well, but he sees the poor generalship, the waste of public money and a great deal more about what went on in our "reclaiming a continent."

Charles Francis Clarke, the Englishman who became an American citizen and died in the service of his adopted country, looks, by his pictures, rather like General Grant, in his uniform and with his full beard. There is nothing English about him, though, and, in spite of what he saw, he realized what the "New Country" might mean to humanity in the end. After his death, his Irish wife, Mary, takes up the letter writing. For a number of years she writes faithfully to the mother-in-law in England whom she has never seen. She tells of her life; her struggle to bring up her five boys; her poverty and the way in which she is sometimes "done" by land speculators and other sharpers who take advantage of the widow. Her letters are a delightful, if sometimes sad, picture of what life in those years 1856 to

1871 meant to a struggling woman. She does not complain, she just tells of things as they happen in the Kansas town in which she has settled.

But we get an excellent picture of daily life in a growing community, of the honesty and the dishonesty by which it was built up. Also, it sounds very modern when Mary Clarke tells of her struggles to get the Army authorities to give her a small pension as the widow of a soldier who died in service. The way in which she is put off—"your petition has been passed on to the proper authorities." The death of Grandmother Clarke in England in 1873 put an end to the correspondence. The last words by the editor, of how these two simple people worked towards "a more perfect Union" seem irrelevant.

G.I.C.

Francis of Assisi, Apostle of Poverty. By Ray C. Petry. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1941, ix + 199 pp., \$3.00.

This excellent study of the activities and attitudes of Il Poverello in terms of his use of evangelical poverty as a device for influencing social institutions is by the assistant professor of church history in the Divinity School of Duke University. From primary and secondary sources Mr. Petry achieves a balanced view of the Umbrian Saint. As he remarks, "To see in Francis and his early followers social reformers of the modern stamp is to superimpose modern thought forms and techniques upon a time which knew them not" (p. 59). Yet in an age in which unearned wealth and uncontrolled power were threatening Christian culture, he was able to introduce a higher regard for human values. Perhaps he followed an earlier reformer when he rescued thousands of laymen from the military levies of the militarists of his time by clothing them with the immunities of the religious, as he did in admitting laymen to become members of his society although they remained laymen living in the world. But that is only a very partial explanation of the growth of fraternities of secular tertiaries; and its type a totally inadequate one of the spread of the Franciscan movement. "Perhaps the mastery of sciences and the multiplication of techniques do not spell true wisdom," Mr. Petry thinks. "What Francis discerned of life's ultimates—of God, His Son, His Bible, His Church and His World—may actually become instructive to peoples so sophisticated as we. It may be that we shall learn, after all, the secret of Francis' power" (p. 176). No secret so priceless can we learn, it is true; provided we remember, at the same time, the secret of Francis' weakness. "There was no conscious effort on the part of Francis and his brethren to evaluate scientifically the economic, political, and social ills of their day. . . . He had no well-balanced solution for the social difficulties of thirteenth-century life" (p. 60). Between intelligence, on the one hand, and love and humility, on the other, there is no natural opposition, and in the union of these attributes is the way of Christian perfection.

W. L.

Papers

Agrarian Conflicts in New York and the American Revolution. By Irving Mark. *Rural Sociology*, Raleigh, N. C., Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sept. 1942), pp. 275-93, 75¢.

"Abstract: What is the relation to the American Revolution of feudal or other oppres-

sive aspects of the New York land system? Feudal forms in colonial New York existed though they were neither extensive nor profound in influence; on the other hand, phases of the land system, not strictly feudal, were. Thus an oppressive economic dependence was reflected in small farmer obligations and insecure tenure. Furthermore, the concentration of land ownership nurtured a landed aristocracy who flourished in a legal and political milieu in which monopoly of land and office was securely maintained. Of these possible seeds of agrarian unrest, only the non-feudal ones sprouted into violence in colonial New York. Yet neither feudal nor other oppressive characteristics of the land system were conditioning factors producing the Revolution insofar as New York was concerned. Although otherwise caused, the Revolution had undeniable effects upon the land system, particularly in sweeping away lingering feudal forms, though not the continuing oppression of the small farmer" (p. 275). Dr. Mark, member of the history department of Brooklyn College, continues in this paper the studies of much originality which had previously yielded his monograph, "Agrarian Conflicts in Colonial New York, 1711-1775" (New York, Columbia University Press, 1940) and his essay, "Agrarian Revolt in Colonial New York, 1766" (AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO., Vol. 1, No. 2, Jan. 1942).

Heinrich Pesch and His Theory of Christian Solidarism. By Franz H. Mueller. *Aquin Papers*. No. 7. Saint Paul, Minn.: The College of St. Thomas, 1941, 50 pp., 25¢.

Pesch, whose theory is summarized succinctly here by a disciple, was one of the European intellectuals who, unwittingly, helped prepare the way for the fascism they loathed by their propaganda for a corporative social order. Doomed by a theological approach (Pesch failed to follow his own dictum, "Religion cannot produce grain"), their system was a failure, for one thing, because of its vagueness on the practical details of the economy. The fault enabled the fascists to take over their ideas for other uses. The result was typical of the age; business monopolists did the same to economic liberalism.

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